Leopold Munyakazi v. Loretta Lynch

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1735

LEOPOLD MUNYAKAZI,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Argued: March 24, 2016 Decided: July 11, 2016

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd concurred.

ARGUED: Ofelia Lee Calderon, CALDERON SEGUIN PLC, Fairfax,
Virginia, for Petitioner. Jeffrey Lawrence Menkin, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Mark C. Walters, Senior Counsel for
National Security, National Security Unit, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Leopold Munyakazi petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because substantial evidence

supports the agency’s rulings, we deny the petition.

I.

As a matter of background, we begin by quoting a United

States State Department summary of the 1994 Rwandan genocide:

Longstanding tensions in the country culminated in the
1994 state-orchestrated genocide, in which Rwandans
killed between 750,000 and one million of their fellow
citizens, including approximately three-quarters of
the Tutsi population. Following the killing of the
president in 1994, an extremist interim government
directed the Hutu-dominated national army, militia
groups, and ordinary citizens to kill resident Tutsis
and moderate Hutus. The genocide ended later the same
year when the predominantly Tutsi RPF . . . defeated
the national army and Hutu militias and established an
RPF-led government of national unity.

(J.A. 527).

Munyakazi, an ethnic Hutu, is a native and citizen of

Rwanda who came to the United States in 2004 on a business visa.

Prior to his visa’s expiration, Munyakazi filed an application

for asylum and withholding of removal. While in the United

States, Munyakazi, who worked as a college professor in Rwanda,

began teaching at Montclair State University in New Jersey. In

October 2006, he spoke at a faculty forum at the University of

2
Delaware. During this speech, Munyakazi expressed his opinion

that the 1994 massacre of ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda was

fratricide, not genocide. He would express similar views in

another speech later that year.

In November 2006, Rwanda issued an international arrest

warrant for Munyakazi, charging him with genocide and genocide

negation. Rwanda issued a second warrant for the same charges in

October 2008. In January 2009, almost five years after Munyakazi

filed his initial asylum application, the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) issued him a notice to appear, charging him with

removability. Munyakazi conceded removability but filed revised

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Munyakazi

also requested CAT protection. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a

multi-day hearing on Munyakazi’s removability.

Munyakazi testified at the hearing that at the time the

genocide began he and his family lived in the Rwandan capital,

Kigali. Although a travel ban was in place, Munyakazi and his

family joined a convoy 1 to his native village of Kirwa. On the

morning of April 19, 1994, Munyakazi briefly went to a local

government office in Kirwa to report an attempted break-in at

his home in Kirwa. He then returned to that home and did not

1
The convoy was headed by a high-ranking Hutu general who
has since been indicted for participation in the genocide.

3
leave until after April 22. Munyakazi testified that sometime

after April 22 he helped five Tutsi women obtain Hutu ID cards.

Munyakazi’s testimony that he remained indoors for several

days is important because following a rally at a soccer stadium

on April 19, ethnic Hutus killed virtually every Tutsi in Kirwa. 2

While acknowledging this fact, Munyakazi testified that he saw

little to no violence and did not know anyone responsible for

any of the violence. When pressed with accounts from

genocidaires—persons convicted of genocide in the Rwandan

courts—that he was involved in the violence in Kirwa, Munyakazi

testified that the Rwandan government was forcing them to speak

out against him.

Munyakazi further testified that he was arrested later in

1994 and held without charge until 1999. During his time in

captivity, he was subjected to beatings and psychological

stress.

Munyakazi’s wife, Catherine Mukantabana, also testified

before the IJ. Catherine, an ethnic Tutsi, generally agreed with

Munyakazi’s testimony regarding their exit from Kigali and

2The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent who
conducted an investigation into Rwanda’s allegations against
Munyakazi testified that investigators could find only one
unattached (i.e., not married to a Hutu) Tutsi in the entire
village—a man who was a child at the time of the genocide and
hid in the woods.

4
travel to Kirwa. Discussing their time in Kirwa, she testified

that she did not believe there was a meeting on April 19 but

conceded that her husband left the house that morning to go to

the government offices and to run some errands. She testified

that Munyakazi helped five Tutsis receive Hutu ID cards and that

he did not participate in the genocide. Importantly, she

testified that the five Tutsis arrived at their house prior to

April 19 and that Munyakazi took their names to Kirwa’s mayor on

April 19. She also testified that many members of her family

were killed during the genocide, and the IJ noted that she was

“tense and stressed” discussing the genocide and that “[h]er

hands were shaking.” (J.A. 896).

In addition to this testimony, Munyakazi also presented

several other witnesses, including former Attorney General

Ramsey Clark, who testified generally about the Rwandan justice

system and the genocide. None had first-hand knowledge of

Munyakazi’s actions during April 1994. Munyakazi also placed

into evidence five letters from the Tutsis he claimed to have

aided in obtaining Hutu ID cards. One letter writer stated that

Munyakazi assisted her in obtaining an ID card on April 19,

while another stated that Munyakazi aided her on April 20.

In response to Munyakazi’s evidence, the Government put

forth testimony and investigation reports from ICE Special Agent

Jason Hyman. Hyman, along with two DHS agents, traveled to

5
Rwanda in June 2009 to conduct an independent investigation into

the Rwandan government’s accusations against Munyakazi. The DHS

investigators created an interview list after reviewing Rwandan

government files. The Rwandan prosecutors gave DHS latitude in

conducting the investigation, and the Rwandans’ main role was

locating interpreters and procuring the witnesses. Hyman

testified that they tried to give the Rwandan government little

notice of the interviewees to minimize the chances that the

government would pressure them. The investigators would also ask

each witness if they had spoken to Rwandan authorities and

whether their statements were coerced. Importantly, the DHS

investigators uncovered several witnesses, including a

genocidaire, who had never spoken to Rwandan officials about

Munyakazi.

The DHS investigation confirmed the broad outline of

Munyakazi’s testimony—that he and his family fled Kigali in

April, traveled to Kirwa, and remained there during the

genocide. The investigation found that the genocide in Kirwa

began following a meeting at a soccer field on April 19. In

contrast to Munyakazi’s testimony, however, the investigation

revealed that Munyakazi, wearing banana leaves, 3 addressed the

3
The rally leaders told the attendees to wear banana leaves
in order to identify themselves as Hutu.

6
crowd at the soccer field on April 19 and helped to instigate

the genocide. After the meeting, Munyakazi led a group of Hutus

to find Felicien, an educated Tutsi who was eventually killed.

Munyakazi also had a role in orchestrating night raids against

Tutsi homes.

In total, the investigators interviewed 22 witnesses, six

of whom were convicted of genocide. Each interview was between

two-and-a-half and three hours in length. Generally, the

witnesses were afraid of Munyakazi and feared retribution from

him if he found out they cooperated with authorities. Several

witnesses testified that members of Munyakazi’s family contacted

them and offered them money if they refused to implicate

Munyakazi. 4 Importantly, “[t]he ICE investigation revealed no

individuals who attended the large meeting [at the soccer field]

and who did not see Dr. Munyakazi there.” (J.A. 911).

Hyman was recalled to the stand to address the interview

reports individually. Relevant here, Hyman discussed an

interview with TM, a convicted genocidaire. TM was not

identified by the Rwandans and had never been previously

interviewed by Rwandan authorities. The investigators uncovered

4
The investigators tracked down a nephew who was allegedly
responsible for the attempted bribes. The nephew denied offering
bribes to witnesses but did admit that Munyakazi participated in
the soccer field meeting wearing banana leaves. The nephew also
admitted to his own participation in the genocide.

7
his name during another interview and tracked him down the next

day. TM told the investigators that he was at the soccer meeting

and that Munyakazi was there wearing banana leaves. Munyakazi

told other Hutus to wear the leaves to avoid being mistaken as a

Tutsi. TM was able to draw a diagram of the soccer field and the

relative position of the leaders, including Munyakazi. TM told

the investigators that after the meeting Munyakazi led a group

to Felicien’s house. During this trip, Munyakazi met with a

smaller group of Hutus and urged them to kill Tutsis because

they were enemies of true Rwandans.

After the hearing, the IJ issued a 63-page opinion denying

Munyakazi’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under CAT. The IJ began by finding that Munyakazi was

not credible. The IJ noted that Munyakazi specifically testified

that he did not leave his house from April 19-22 but that

letters from two of the Tutsis he claimed to help, as well as

the testimony of his wife, suggested otherwise. “[T]hese

discrepancies,” the IJ found, “go to the heart of where the

Respondent was and what he was doing on and after April 19,

1994.” (J.A. 923). In addition, the IJ explained that

Munyakazi’s testimony about the genocide “is quite vague and

appears at odds with what would be expected given the size of

the village, given the significance of the events, and given his

wife’s recollections.” (J.A. 924). The IJ also discussed

8
Catherine’s testimony, concluding that she “has an interest” in

the outcome of the asylum petition, and, “[g]iven the extent of

the genocide in Kigali and Kirwa, [she] likely owes her life and

those of her children to her marriage to” Munyakazi. (J.A. 925).

Addressing the DHS investigation, the IJ found that, out of

an abundance of caution, she would not credit the testimony of

the convicted genocidaires. The IJ made an exception for TM, the

individual uncovered by the investigators. The IJ also found

that the testimony of the genocide survivors who identified

Munyakazi as a participant was credible. The IJ noted that in

contrast to genocidaires who have an incentive to point the

finger at others in exchange for leniency, genocide survivors

face violence and intimidation for testifying against genocide

participants. (J.A. 928). The IJ referred to several survivors

who placed Munyakazi at the soccer field or who heard that

Munyakazi was looking for them. The IJ summarized her views on

the investigation as follows:

There is certainly the possibility of the Rwandan
government attempting to pressure victims and other
witnesses. This does not explain the variations in
accounts from the witnesses or the fact that these
variations remain consistent with each other. It also
does not justify the risk being taken by victims and
other witnesses, since there is no indication that the
Rwandan Government can protect adequately those
individuals. In addition, the ICE special agents
sought to identify witnesses independently and to give
minimal notice to the Rwandan government when they
needed assistance in locating witnesses. This limited
the time available for Rwandan government officials to

9
 influence or coach witnesses. Finally, while record
evidence establishes that those accused of genocide
are pressured to implicate others in exchange for
leniency, evidence in the record regarding any
improper influence of other witnesses by the Rwandan
government is vague and far less specific.

(J.A. 929-30).

Given these factual findings, the IJ then addressed whether

Munyakazi was eligible for asylum. First, the IJ concluded that

Munyakazi, even with the adverse credibility finding, qualified

for asylum because he has a well-founded fear of future

persecution based on a protected ground—his political opinion.

Nonetheless, the IJ found Munyakazi was statutorily ineligible

for asylum under the persecutor bar because he “ordered,

incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution

of others on account of their Tutsi ethnicity.” (J.A. 932). The

IJ found that the DHS investigation supported a finding that

Munyakazi participated in the genocide and that Munyakazi failed

to prove otherwise by preponderance of the evidence. This

finding also rendered Munyakazi ineligible for withholding of

removal. Finally, the IJ found Munyakazi was not entitled to

relief under CAT.

Munyakazi appealed to the BIA. A three-member panel of the

BIA dismissed the asylum and withholding of removal appeals,

upholding the IJ’s credibility determinations and her conclusion

10
that the persecutor bar applied. 5 The BIA remanded the CAT claim

for further factual findings.

Thereafter, the IJ held another evidentiary hearing on

Munyakazi’s CAT claim. Following the hearing, the IJ issued a

written order denying relief. The IJ found that Munyakazi

claimed to be “mistreated” during his earlier detention but that

“significant developments” in Rwanda gave his allegations of

mistreatment “little relevance” to his current situation. (J.A.

101). The IJ did find that Munyakazi was likely to be arrested

and detained if he was returned to Rwanda and that, because he

was facing charges relating to genocide, he would be detained in

a civilian detention facility rather that a military facility.

This distinction was crucial to the IJ because, although the

civilian facilities have “poor conditions,” those conditions—

overcrowding, visit limitations, inconsistent food and medicine

and sporadic beatings—did not meet the legal definition of

torture. (J.A. 102). The IJ relied on a 2012 State Department

Report as well as reports from Amnesty International and

monitoring reports from the International Criminal Tribunal for

5The BIA did not address whether Munyakazi qualified for
asylum notwithstanding the persecutor bar.

11
Rwanda (ICTR), to support the finding that accused genocidaires

were held in civilian detention facilities. 6

In reaching the conclusion that Munyakazi more likely than

not would be detained in a civilian prison, the IJ noted that

his own witness, Simeon Babonampoze, testified that he did not

see any persons charged with genocide at the military facility

where he was detained. The IJ also explained that while

Munyakazi claimed that his arrest warrant was politically

motivated, there was no evidence that Rwanda was charging him

with terrorist or political offenses, and that Munyakazi was not

a member of the opposition party, the United Democratic Forces

(UDF).

Munyakazi again appealed to the BIA, and the BIA dismissed.

The BIA concluded that the IJ’s factual findings were not

clearly erroneous and that, with those factual findings—

including the finding that Munyakazi would be detained in a

civilian prison—he could not show it was more likely than not

that he would be tortured. The BIA agreed with the IJ that even

though conditions in civilian prisons were “far from ideal,”

Munyakazi “has not established that the conditions amount to

torture.” (J.A. 4).

6In contrast, the IJ determined that conditions in military
detention facilities were much more severe and might rise to the
level of torture in some cases.

12
 Munyakazi filed a timely petition for review of both of the

BIA’s orders. Munyakazi also filed a motion for stay of

deportation, which we denied.

II.

A.

Munyakazi first petitions for review of the denial of his

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Our standard

of review in this area is familiar. To begin, because the BIA

adopted the IJ’s decision and provided additional reasons, we

review both decisions. 7 Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944,

948 (4th Cir. 2015). We must uphold the decision to deny relief

unless it is “manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of

discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). We review the agency’s

findings of fact for substantial evidence, a “narrow and

deferential” review, Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 273 (4th

Cir. 2011), under which the agency’s factual findings “are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled

to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). See also

Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273 (“Substantial evidence exists to

support a finding unless the evidence . . . was such that any

reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to conclude to

7For ease of reference, we refer to the BIA and IJ
collectively as “the agency.”

13
the contrary”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review any

legal issues de novo. Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600

(4th Cir. 2010).

The agency’s adverse credibility finding is also subject to

the substantial evidence standard. We uphold an adverse

credibility determination if the agency provides specific,

cogent reasons that go to the heart of Munyakazi’s claim for

relief. 8 Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 274. “[O]missions, inconsistent

statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable

testimony are appropriate bases for making an adverse

credibility determination.” Id. at 273.

B.

The agency found that Munyakazi was statutorily barred from

receiving asylum or withholding of removal under what is

commonly called the “persecutor bar.” By statute, an asylum

applicant must prove that he is a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is defined, inter alia, to exclude

any person who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise

8This “heart of the claim” standard was modified by the
REAL ID Act of 2005, which permits an IJ to base a credibility
determination “without regard to whether [an inconsistency] goes
to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Because Munyakazi’s application for asylum
was filed prior to the REAL ID Act’s implementation, that
standard is inapplicable here. Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710,
716 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011)

14
participated in the persecution of any person on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A)

(asylum); 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (withholding of removal). If there is

evidence showing that Munyakazi participated in the persecution

of a particular social group (here, the Tutsis), then “he must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not barred

from relief on this ground.” Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417,

420 (4th Cir. 2006). The “evidence” necessary to trigger the bar

is not high—it must only “raise the inference” of participation

in persecution. Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 930 (9th

Cir. 2006). In addition, “while the commission of actual

physical harm may be sufficient to bring an alien within the

persecution exception, it is not necessary.” Higuit, 433 F.3d at

421. Accordingly, if there is evidence that Munyakazi was

present and participating during the April 19 meeting at the

soccer field in Kirwa, the persecutor bar would apply regardless

of whether he personally committed acts of violence against

Tutsis.

In his petition, Munyakazi argues there is no “evidence”

that he assisted or participated in the genocide and that he

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not barred

from relief. We address each argument in turn.

15
 C.

In finding that Munyakazi was a persecutor, the agency

relied on the DHS interviews with: (1) TM, the genocidaire that

DHS tracked down independently of the Rwandan government; (2)

two survivors who said they saw Munyakazi at the soccer field

meeting; (3) a survivor who was hiding in her house when

Munyakazi came and told the Hutus to spare her because she was

married to a Hutu; (4) a survivor who was hiding when men came

to her house and told her Munyakazi had ordered them to take her

children and grandchildren; and (5) a survivor who hid in the

woods during the genocide and was told that Munyakazi had been

searching for her father in order to kill him. These interviews

clearly constitute sufficient “evidence” that Munyakazi assisted

or participated in the genocide.

Munyakazi launches a broad assault against the DHS

investigation and Special Agent Hyman, asserting that the

interviews were flawed because the Rwandan government pressures

witnesses to implicate people in the genocide and the DHS

investigators relied on documents supplied by the Rwandan

government during the investigation. 9 But, the agency considered

9 Munyakazi also asserts that his release in 1999 proves he
was not implicated in the genocide. Special Agent Hyman
testified that a Rwandan official said that many people were
released because the newly formed government lacked the ability
to bring cases to trial. As we have seen in other contexts, it
(Continued)
16
this argument and decided not to consider most of the

genocidaires’ interviews on this basis. The agency was

nonetheless permitted to weigh the testimony of Special Agent

Hyman that the survivors were being truthful and were fearful of

Munyakazi because the “evidence in the record regarding . . .

improper influence” of the survivors was “vague and far less

specific.” (J.A. 930). The agency was likewise permitted to

credit the interview with TM because there was no evidence that

the government had the opportunity to influence his interview.

DHS sent three investigators to Rwanda for several weeks to

investigate the allegations against Munyakazi. While the DHS

investigators necessarily relied on Rwandan documents to start

their investigation, to the extent practicable they kept the

Rwandan prosecutors at arms-length and made interview requests

as late as possible to minimize the possibility of undue

coercion. It is unclear what Munyakazi believes the agents

should have done instead. DHS, instead of simply accepting

Rwanda’s allegations, performed its own investigation under

less-than-ideal circumstances, and nothing in the record compels

us to find that the agency should not have credited that

is hardly rare for governments to find perpetrators many years
later. See Szehinskyj v. Attorney General, 432 F.3d 253, 254 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting recent spate of denaturalization proceedings
against former Nazis based on new evidence).

17
investigation. Munyakazi’s attempt to second guess the DHS

investigation and survivor interviews is an effort to have us

reweigh the evidence in his favor, but our standard of review

“does not permit a re-weighing of the evidence.” Lin v. Holder,

736 F.3d 343, 351 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we hold that

substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that

Munyakazi assisted and participated in the genocide.

D.

Given this conclusion, the burden shifts to Munyakazi to

show that he is not subject to the persecutor bar. The agency

concluded that Munyakazi failed to satisfy his burden, primarily

because his testimony was not credible. In reaching that

finding, the agency pointed to the discrepancies regarding: (1)

what Munyakazi was doing between April 19 and April 22; and (2)

his vague testimony about the genocide in Kirwa.

Munyakazi contends that any confusion about dates in April

1994 did not go to the “heart” of his asylum claim. We disagree.

As the BIA cogently explained, these discrepancies were “central

to [his] claim because they address where he was and what he was

doing during the genocide.” (J.A. 770). Munyakazi testified

unequivocally that, other than a quick errand on the morning of

April 19, he did not leave his house between that day and April

22 and that he did not help obtain Hutu ID cards until after

that date. Two of the Tutsis submitted letters stating that he

18
aided them on April 19 and April 20, and his wife testified that

he went out for some time the morning of April 19. It is

possible that the letters refer to the dates Munyakazi helped

the women at his home, not at a government office, but if the

administrative “record plausibly could support two results: the

one the [agency] chose and the one [Munyakazi] advances,

reversal is only appropriate where the court finds that the

evidence not only supports [Munyakazi’s] conclusion, but compels

it.” Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The record

supports the agency’s conclusion that the letters conflict with

his testimony.

Thus, nothing compels the conclusion Munyakazi advances.

Munyakazi specifically testified he did not go to the government

offices with the Tutsis until after April 23, their letters said

otherwise, and his own wife testified that he took the list of

Tutsis he was obtaining ID cards for when he left the house on

April 19. These inconsistencies “were neither trivial nor

unconnected to the core” of Munyakazi’s claim. Dankam v.

Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007). Those dates in

April, and Munyakazi’s activities on those dates, are central to

whether Munyakazi assisted in the genocide.

We upheld an adverse credibility finding under similar

circumstances in Dankam. In Dankam, the IJ had focused on the

19
alien’s “internal inconsistencies” regarding three alleged

arrests and detentions. Id. We explained that, “[b]ecause the

arrests are the key events underlying Dankam’s claim for asylum,

it follows that the details surrounding these arrests and the

dates on which they occurred are more than minor or trivial

details.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, the entirety of

Munyakazi’s claim hinges on what he was doing on April 19 and

the days immediately following; discrepancies about his

activities on those days necessarily go to the heart of his

claim.

Munyakazi’s vague testimony about the genocide also

supports the adverse credibility determination. He testified

that he saw virtually no outward signs of violence toward Tutsis

in Kirwa—no bodies, no destruction, no idea who started the

alleged violence. Special Agent Hyman testified that Kirwa was a

small agrarian village where everyone “seemed to know each

other.” (J.A. 902). Hyman also testified that there were very

few Tutsis left in the village, and only one who was not married

to a Hutu. Munyakazi is a college professor, and it strains

credulity to believe that he was unaware that every Tutsi in his

small village was being butchered even as he sat at home.

Munyakazi points to language in the DHS investigation that the

genocide was not as severe in Kirwa’s province as elsewhere in

Rwanda, but that statement must be read against Special Agent

20
Hyman’s testimony that there were few Tutsis remaining in Kirwa.

We give the agency “ample room” to “exercise common sense” in

making a credibility determination “even if the IJ cannot point

to” specific record evidence. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533,

540 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Common

sense supports the agency’s finding that Munyakazi’s vague

testimony about widespread killings in a small village lacked

credibility.

In sum, the inconsistencies regarding Munyakazi’s

activities on April 19 and the following days, as well as

Munyakazi’s vague testimony about the genocide in Kirwa “add to

and create a cumulative effect that is sufficient to support” an

adverse credibility finding. Dankam, 495 F.3d at 123.

Substantial evidence thus supports the agency’s adverse

credibility finding.

Here, upholding the adverse credibility finding requires us

to deny the petition for review. With that finding intact,

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that

Munyakazi cannot meet his burden. Without his own testimony,

Munyakazi is left with the five similarly worded letters from

the Tutsis he purportedly assisted and the general testimony

from his witnesses regarding conditions in Rwanda and alleged

coercion on the part of the Rwandan government. None of this

testimony compels a conclusion that Munyakazi showed by a

21
preponderance of the evidence that he did not assist or

participate in the genocide.

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports

the agency’s ultimate conclusion that Munyakazi assisted or

participated in the Rwandan genocide. Given that conclusion, the

agency correctly determined that Munyakazi is barred from

receiving asylum or withholding of removal. 10

III.

Munyakazi also challenges the agency’s denial of his

request for protection under CAT. “[O]ur standard of review is

deferential to the BIA,” and we review the denial of Munyakazi’s

claim for substantial evidence. Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190,

200 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, the “administrative findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude” otherwise. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). To

establish relief under CAT, Munyakazi must show it is “more

likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to

the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

Torture is relevantly defined as “any act by which severe pain

or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally

10Munyakazi also raises a constitutional argument—that the
DHS investigation violated his due process rights because he
could not confront the witnesses. Munyakazi failed to raise this
claim to the BIA, and that failure deprives us of jurisdiction
to consider it. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

22
inflicted on a person.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Evidence of

past torture is relevant under CAT, but “it does not create a

presumption that an applicant will be tortured in the future.”

Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013).

Although Munyakazi is barred from receiving asylum or

withholding of removal, that bar does not preclude the deferral

of his removal under CAT. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(4), 1208.17(a).

In addition, the agency is required to review “all the evidence

relative” to a CAT claim and an adverse credibility finding

“cannot alone preclude protection under the CAT.” Camara v.

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 372 (4th Cir. 2004).

The agency found that Munyakazi suffered harsh treatment

during his previous incarceration, and that conditions in

Rwandan military facilities may rise to the level of torture.

However, the agency found that genocide perpetrators were held

in civilian, not military, detention facilities and that

conditions in those facilities, while harsh by American

standards, do not amount to torture. 11

11 The agency relied on In re J—E—, 23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA
2002), in concluding that Rwandan civilian prison authorities
lacked the specific intent to inflict severe physical mental
pain or suffering on civilian detainees. The BIA’s decision in
In re J—E— “requires a CAT claimant to demonstrate that the
state actor who mistreats him desires to cause his severe pain
and suffering, and is not merely negligent nor reckless as to
the risk.” Oxygene v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 541, 548 (4th Cir. 2016).
In Oxygene, we held that the BIA’s interpretation of CAT’s
(Continued)
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 Again, our standard of review mandates that we deny

Munyakazi’s petition for CAT relief because substantial evidence

supports the agency’s findings and nothing in the record compels

the opposite conclusion. The available documentary and

testimonial evidence—including testimony from Munyakazi’s own

witness, Babonampoze—tended to establish that persons held on

state security and terrorism charges were subjected to barbarous

treatment 12 in military facilities but that persons charged with

genocide crimes were held in civilian detention facilities.

Likewise, the available State Department and United Nations

documents indicated that conditions in civilian prisons do not

rise to the level of torture. Munyakazi asserts that his charges

are politically motivated and based on his status as a moderate,

opposition Hutu. Even assuming he is correct, that does not

change the fact that the actual charges pending against

Munyakazi are not political crimes, but genocide crimes, and

that genocide defendants are not held in military facilities. 13

intent requirement is entitled to deference, and we see no error
in its application here.
12For example, Babonampoze testified that he was beaten,
placed in a hole underground while smoke was blown into it, and
burned with fire. On another occasion he was tied to a pillar
outside overnight in the cold.
13Munyakazi also discusses the local Gacaca tribunals—
courts that were created specifically to deal with the multitude
(Continued)
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Munyakazi did not show that he is a member of the opposition UDF

or that Rwanda is investigating him for opposition or terrorism

activities. The record evidence does not compel the conclusion

that Munyakazi will be held in a military detention facility. To

the contrary, the record amply supports the agency’s finding

that Munyakazi is likely to be held in civilian prison and tried

in civilian courts.

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports

the denial of Munyakazi’s request for CAT protection.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, Munyakazi’s petition for review

is denied.

PETITION DENIED

of genocide cases. Those courts, however, were closed in 2012
and the record does not show that Munyakazi would be before any
Gacaca court.

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