United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1864
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
APOLINAR ORTIZ-ISLAS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Barron, Circuit Judge.
Benjamin L. Falkner, with whom Krasnoo, Klehm & Falkner LLP
was on brief, for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Thomas E.
Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
July 11, 2016
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
SOUTER, Associate Justice. Apolinar Ortiz-Islas appeals
his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess cocaine for
distribution and to distribute it. We affirm.
I
Mathieu LeBlanc orchestrated a cocaine distribution
conspiracy that completed a number of transactions beginning in
2010. He would typically arrange for Robert Rossignol to receive
money in Canada and smuggle it across the border into Maine.
LeBlanc then would drive the money to Texas or have others,
including Chad Hallett, transport it for him. Ahead of his and
the money's arrival in Texas, LeBlanc would notify Victor Charles
and Kyle MacDonnell that he was coming so that they could arrange
a meeting between LeBlanc and a cocaine supplier, most frequently
Ortiz-Islas. Charles and MacDonnell would provide protection and
logistical support during the transaction. After the exchange,
Hallett or Charles would drive the cocaine from Texas to Maine,
where it would be handed off to Rossignol.
In May 2012, Charles was incarcerated for a parole
violation, but he sought to preserve his place in the conspiracy
even while in custody, by receiving payment on future deals between
LeBlanc and Ortiz-Islas in recognition of the logistical
groundwork he had helped to lay in the past. Both LeBlanc and
Ortiz-Islas agreed to pay Charles for deals completed while he was
locked up. At one point, Ortiz-Islas contacted Charles's wife to
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obtain LeBlanc's phone number, and Charles ensured that LeBlanc
and Ortiz-Islas knew how to make contact with each other.
LeBlanc planned to complete a deal in June 2012 and spoke
ahead of time directly to Ortiz-Islas, since Charles was in
custody. LeBlanc made the plans known to Charles, who requested
that his share be paid to his mother. Hallett received the money
for the June deal from Rossignol in Maine, and, for this particular
trip, was supposed to meet LeBlanc in New Jersey, where they would
exchange Canadian currency for American dollars. Hallett then
would drive the converted cash to Texas, where he would connect
with LeBlanc again. As part of the June deal, Ortiz-Islas agreed
to "front" cocaine to LeBlanc: Ortiz-Islas would give LeBlanc more
drugs than he paid for on the understanding that LeBlanc would
make up the difference in a subsequent transaction.
But the June arrangements went awry. Hallett was
arrested driving the cash from Maine and agreed to participate in
a controlled delivery of the money to LeBlanc in New Jersey, as
planned. LeBlanc was then arrested in New Jersey on June 28 and,
like Hallett, agreed to cooperate. He placed recorded phone calls
to Ortiz-Islas, fabricating a reason to stall and work out new
logistics for what would be a controlled transaction.
While LeBlanc and Ortiz-Islas were still hashing out the
details of the delayed deal, on August 16 a grand jury in Maine
indicted Rossignol, Charles, and Ortiz-Islas for conspiring "with
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persons known and unknown" to distribute and to possess with intent
to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine in "Maine and
elsewhere" over a period beginning "no later than January 1, 2011,"
and continuing until "no earlier than June 28, 2012" (the date of
LeBlanc's arrest).
What was supposed to be the June deal ended as a sting
operation on September 18. Ortiz-Islas met with a federal agent
posing as LeBlanc's courier and was arrested as they approached
the location of the planned swap, where cocaine was seized.
Rossignol and Charles, who were included in the
indictment alongside Ortiz-Islas, pleaded guilty, as did LeBlanc
and Hallett, who were charged separately. MacDonnell received
immunity. At Ortiz-Islas's trial, Charles, LeBlanc, Hallett, and
MacDonnell testified against him, Charles attesting that on behalf
of LeBlanc he made about six trips to Maine transporting cocaine
purchased from Ortiz-Islas. The first was said to involve three
kilograms, and the quantity on each subsequent trip was at least
five. The jury convicted Ortiz-Islas of conspiring to distribute
and to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms
of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.
At sentencing, the district court found Ortiz-Islas
accountable for almost 34 kilograms of cocaine, which (at the time)
gave him a base offense level of 34 under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(3) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2013).
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The court applied a two-level increase in light of evidence that
Ortiz-Islas possessed a gun at some of the drug deals, id.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), but varied back downward by two levels at the
parties' urging in recognition of impending Guidelines amendments
providing two-level reductions in drug-quantity offense levels.
An offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I yielded
a Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. Id.
(sentencing table). The Government recommended a sentence at the
top of this range. But taking account of the other conspirators'
sentences (Hallett received 48 months, LeBlanc got 104, and Charles
and Rossignol 120 each), the court sentenced Ortiz-Islas within
the Guidelines range to 170 months' imprisonment. He appealed.
II
Ortiz-Islas raises four issues, none of them
meritorious.
A
According to him, there was an impermissible variance
between the indictment's charge and the Government's proof. While
the evidence may have shown that he conspired to sell cocaine to
LeBlanc in Texas, he says, it failed to place him in a conspiracy
with LeBlanc to distribute the drugs in Maine or elsewhere.
"When a defendant asserts a claim of variance premised
on the notion that multiple conspiracies existed and that his
activities were not part of the charged conspiracy, the initial
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question is one of evidentiary sufficiency." United States v.
Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 46 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d
109, 116 (1st Cir. 2011)). "We review sufficiency challenges de
novo. We consider all the direct and circumstantial evidence in
the light most flattering to the [G]overnment, 'drawing all
reasonable inferences consistent with the verdict . . . to
determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant[]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 16 (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Négron-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 307 (1st
Cir. 2015)).
"Three factors guide our assessment of whether the
evidence was sufficient to prove that a set of criminal activities
[constituted] a single conspiracy: '(1) the existence of a common
goal, (2) overlap among the activities' participants, and (3)
interdependence among the participants.'" United States v. Paz-
Alvarez, 799 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2012)). "In considering these
three factors, we must remember that the existence of a single
conspiracy does not require the participants to know of all the
other participants, understand all the details of the conspiracy,
or participate in each aspect of the conspiracy." Dellosantos,
649 F.3d at 118.
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Here, all three considerations point to a single
conspiracy. The first, existence of a common goal, "is broadly
drawn" and in a case like this is satisfied by evidence of a shared
"interest in furthering the distribution of drugs." Négron-
Sostre, 790 F.3d at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1999)).
That was the common goal here: "namely, to sell drugs for profit."
Paz-Alvarez, 799 F.3d at 30. Contrary to Ortiz-Islas's
characterization, he had more than a mere buyer-seller
relationship with LeBlanc: he was engaging in selling wholesale
quantities obviously purchased for further sale, and he was even
willing to front cocaine to LeBlanc, an act of trust that assumed
an ongoing enterprise with a standing objective.
The second, overlap among the activities' participants,
"is satisfied by the pervasive involvement of a single core
conspirator." Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 118 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562
F.3d 411, 422 (1st Cir. 2009)). Here, LeBlanc fills that bill.
He would (i) arrange for Rossignol to smuggle currency from Canada
into Maine, (ii) pay Hallett and others to drive the cash to Texas,
(iii) inform Charles and MacDonnell of his upcoming arrival in
Texas, (iv) meet with Oritz-Islas among others to swap the money
for cocaine, and (v) direct Hallett, Charles, and others to
transport the drugs back to Maine.
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Remarkably, Ortiz-Islas denies that the required overlap
occurred, relying on United States v. Monserrate-Valentín:
[T]he mere fact that a central person (the
"hub" of a wheel) is involved in multiple
conspiracies (the wheel's "spokes") does not
mean that a defendant . . . who participated
in a spoke conspiracy . . . may be convicted
of participating in an overarching conspiracy
encompassing the entire wheel. The
[G]overnment must also produce evidence from
which a jury could reasonably infer that the
spoke defendant knew about and agreed to join
any larger overarching conspiracy.
729 F.3d 31, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation and some internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Franco-
Santiago, 681 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016)).
But this was not a "hub-and-spoke conspiracy," where "one core
figure supplies drugs to multiple participants." United States v.
Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009). This, rather, was a
chain conspiracy:
Conspiracies to distribute narcotics, which
normally involve numerous sales and resales of
drugs until they reach the ultimate consumers,
are often "chain" conspiracies. Because the
success of participants on each level of
distribution is dependent upon the existence
of other levels of distribution, each member
of the conspiracy must realize that he is
participating in a joint enterprise, even if
he does not know the identities of many of the
participants. Accordingly, a single
conspiracy does not become multiple
conspiracies simply because each member of the
conspiracy did not know every other member, or
because each member did not know of or become
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involved in all of the activities in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 127-28 (1st Cir. 1987)
(quoting United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 549 (6th Cir.
1982)).
The third consideration, interdependence among the
participants, "exists where the activities of one aspect of the
scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another
aspect of the scheme." Négron-Sostre, 790 F.3d at 309 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Rivera
Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2009)). Among other evidence
of interdependence here, Ortiz-Islas contacted Charles's wife
while he was incarcerated to get LeBlanc's phone number, thus
indicating that LeBlanc's trafficking of cocaine from Texas to
Maine was advantageous to Ortiz-Islas's distribution of the
product. To the same effect, the conspirators put their unified
and continuing enterprise before immediate profit: Ortiz-Islas and
LeBlanc each agreed to pay Charles even when his incarceration
prevented his customary contribution to the conspiratorial
project.
Ortiz-Islas argues contrariwise by pointing to
Dellosantos. There, an indictment charged numerous individuals,
including the two appellants, with conspiring to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. 649 F.3d
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at 110-11. But as we saw it, rather than the single conspiracy
charged in the indictment, the evidence demonstrated at least two:
one based in Massachusetts to distribute only cocaine (revolving
around three individuals, including the appellants), and another
based in Maine to distribute both cocaine and marijuana (centered
around three different individuals). Id. at 119. Both
conspiracies sought to sell cocaine that traveled the same supply
chain, but we had no trouble distinguishing the two. Id. With
respect to interdependence, although the evidence showed that the
appellants participated in supplying cocaine to the Maine-based
conspiracy, we noted that "nothing was presented to the jury to
suggest that either of them believed that the success of their
cocaine distribution operation likely depended on [the Maine-based
conspiracy's] marijuana distribution venture." Id.
Here, by contrast, there was no second, Maine-based
conspiracy distinct from Ortiz-Islas's activity supplying cocaine
to LeBlanc in Texas. It is true that at one time LeBlanc and
Rossignol had conspired to sell Canadian marijuana in the United
States, but there is no claim that any marijuana conspiracy even
endured into the period covered by the Maine-Texas cocaine
conspiracy charged here. Ortiz-Islas simply says that he was
indifferent to the success of a LeBlanc-centered conspiracy to
distribute cocaine in Maine or elsewhere. But his actions belie
his words. As noted, for example, the importance of sustaining a
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regular course of business was in evidence when Ortiz-Islas showed
his willingness to front drugs to LeBlanc on the understanding
that LeBlanc would pay in the course of a subsequent transaction.
The jury could reasonably have inferred that the continuing
vitality of LeBlanc's distribution business was of some importance
to Ortiz-Islas. And sufficient evidence supported an inference
that Ortiz-Islas knew this distribution business extended to Maine
and elsewhere: LeBlanc and Charles both testified that they told
Ortiz-Islas that LeBlanc was from Canada, and Ortiz-Islas sought,
obtained, and used LeBlanc's phone number, which began with its
Maine area code.
In sum, there was no variance. The indictment charged,
and the Government proved, a single conspiracy to distribute and
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in Maine and
elsewhere.
B
The next claim on appeal is that, because the September
2012 sting "transaction" occurred after the indictment issued in
August, the district court erroneously admitted evidence of it.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Georgiadis, 819 F.3d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 2016).
This point is most easily resolved by recognizing that
even if the disputed evidence was not what our case law calls
"intrinsic" to the charged conspiracy, it was admissible under
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. Mare, 668
F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining supplementary character of
that Rule to the intrinsic-evidence rule; where challenged
evidence is intrinsic to crime charged in indictment, Rule 404(b)
is "not implicated at all" (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Villarman–Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2003))). Rule 404(b) distinguishes admission of "[e]vidence
of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person's character
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character," which it prohibits, from admission
of such evidence "for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident," which it permits. Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b).
In this case, as in others like it, "[t]he evidence in
question 'was not just [about] some random drug crime by the
defendant from which could be inferred a propensity on his part to
commit drug crimes.' It was closely linked in time to the alleged
conspiracy and proved the identities and relationships of the
conspirators." Niemi, 579 F.3d at 128 (citation and alterations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Fanfan, 468 F.3d 7, 12 (1st
Cir. 2006)). Here, evidence of the final, faux deal merely
illuminated what had been going on among the relevant parties for
over a year, a course of conduct that was firmly shown through
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overwhelming evidence including co-conspirators' testimony. The
district court accordingly acted within its discretion in
admitting the contested evidence.
C
Ortiz-Islas's final two claims of error relate to his
sentence. In assessing sentencing decisions, we review matters of
law de novo, findings of fact for clear error, and the
reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Guzman-Montanez, 808 F.3d 552, 554-55 (1st Cir. 2015).
1
The first of these objections goes to the district
court's application of the relevant sentencing statute: 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1). Subparagraph (C) establishes a default range of
imprisonment for the criminal objects of the conspiracy charged in
this case (irrespective of drug quantity), with a maximum of twenty
years and, through silence, a minimum of zero. As relevant here,
subparagraph (A) sets a higher range, a minimum of ten years and
a maximum of life, if the offense involved at least five kilograms
of cocaine.
The statutory maximum may be based on the quantity of
drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole, as found by the
jury. See United States v. Razo, 782 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 2015).
And because this jury found that the conspiracy involved at least
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5 kilograms of cocaine, the district court declared that
subparagraph (A)'s maximum of life was applicable.
A statutory minimum must rest on a jury finding as well,
see id. at 40, and we have previously held that it must be based
on the drug quantity attributable to the defendant individually,
rather than to the conspiracy collectively, see id. at 39. Here,
the jury made no finding on the amount of cocaine for which Ortiz-
Islas was personally responsible, and thus the Government did not
seek, and the district court did not apply, a statutory minimum.
Declining to apply a statutory minimum was functionally equivalent
to applying the implicit zero-year minimum under subparagraph (C).
Ortiz-Islas takes these circumstances as an opportunity
to contend that the district court used the maximum from
subparagraph (A) and the minimum from subparagraph (C). We have
to say that we find the claim improbable, given the 170-month
sentence actually imposed, which is far from life imprisonment;
the court's reference to the life maximum strikes us as more like
a stray remark than a ruling that it would apply subparagraph (A).
But even assuming both that Ortiz-Islas's characterization of the
district court's actions is accurate and that such "mixing and
matching" is impermissible, Ortiz-Islas obviously suffered no
harm. See id. at 40-41 (noting that we have previously reserved
judgment on this question and reviewed for harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt). Application of subparagraph (A)'s lifetime
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maximum did no harm because the district court did not apply the
cognate statutory minimum, and the sentence it did impose was well
below even the twenty-year maximum prescribed by subparagraph (C).
"[N]othing," moreover, "indicates that the 'theoretical' maximum
informed the sentencing determination." Id. at 40. Rather, the
district court's sentence appears to have been driven "purely [by]
[G]uidelines considerations" and "the factors referenced in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v. Rose, 802 F.3d 114, 127 (1st
Cir. 2015).1 The district court's application of the sentencing
statute does not require reversal.
2
Finally, Ortiz-Islas alleges an unreasonable disparity
between his sentence and that of each of his co-conspirators. As
against his within-Guidelines sentence of 170 months, Hallett,
LeBlanc, Charles, and Rossignol received below-Guidelines
sentences of 48, 104, 120, and 120 months, respectively.2
1 For what it may be worth, there was overwhelming
uncontradicted evidence that Ortiz-Islas was individually
responsible for at least five kilograms of cocaine, the finding,
if made by the jury, that would have sufficed to trigger the ten-
year minimum under subparagraph (A). Charles testified that he
transported cocaine purchased from Ortiz-Islas six times and that
the first trip involved three kilograms while each of the
subsequent trips involved no less than five.
2 Some of these sentences were subsequently reduced, but not
until after Ortiz-Islas was sentenced, so, in analyzing disparity,
the district court considered the sentences as set out above.
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) directs courts to consider
"the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct." "This provision is aimed, generally, at the
minimization of sentencing disparities among defendants
nationwide." United States v. Perez, 819 F.3d 541, 547 (1st Cir.
2016). "Unless two identically situated defendants receive
different sentences from the same judge, which may be a reason for
concern, our general rule of thumb is that a defendant is not
entitled to a lighter sentence merely because his co-defendants
received lighter sentences." United States v. Reyes-Rivera, 812
F.3d 79, 90 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 626 F.3d 639, 648 (1st
Cir. 2010)). "We have noted . . . the permissible distinction
between co-defendants who go to trial and those who plead guilty,
between those who cooperate and those who do not, and between those
whose cooperation is 'prompt and full' and those whose cooperation
is 'belated and grudging.'" United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804
F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514 (1st Cir. 2005)).
Varying criminal histories, roles in the crime, and offense conduct
also can undermine a claim of unjustified disparity between co-
defendants' sentences. Id.
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Ortiz-Islas says that his sentence is unreasonable, both
procedurally because of the district court's failure to explain
the disparities adequately, and substantively because of the
disparities themselves. As for procedure, the district court
supplied sufficient reasons. In sentencing each conspirator,
including Ortiz-Islas, the court expressly considered the need to
avoid unwarranted disparity and discussed the conspirators'
differing roles, actions, and histories, as well as the facts that
some of them pleaded, cooperated, and testified. With respect to
roles in the conspiracy, for example, the court explained that
Ortiz-Islas was perhaps most similarly situated to LeBlanc. The
court accordingly thought it "a little harsh" when the Government
sought a sentence for Ortiz-Islas that was over six years longer
than the one received by LeBlanc, and the judge accordingly imposed
a shorter one.
Nor has Ortiz-Islas carried his "heavy burden" to show
that his within-range sentence was substantively unreasonable.
See United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 622 (1st Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011)). The most obvious
explanation for the fact that Ortiz-Islas was sentenced within the
Guidelines range while Hallett, LeBlanc, Charles, and Rossignol
were sentenced below is that the latter individuals all pleaded
guilty and three of them testified against Ortiz-Islas. Ortiz-
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Islas, a principal cocaine supplier for the conspiracy, by
contrast, neither pleaded, cooperated, nor admitted
responsibility. It was no abuse of discretion to reject his
sentencing-disparity claim.
III
We have considered Ortiz-Islas's remaining subsidiary
arguments and find no merit in them. The district court's judgment
is AFFIRMED.
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