FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 12 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30205
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:14-cr-00082-BMM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BASIL DONEY, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: EBEL,*** PAEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Basil Doney, Jr., appeals his conviction for two counts of aggravated sexual
abuse, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2241(a), as well as the trial court’s denial of his
motion for a bill of particulars. We affirm.
1. We are obligated to affirm Doney’s conviction if “any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The only element Doney
challenges is whether he “knowingly cause[d] another person to engage in a sexual
act . . . by using force against that other person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1); see also
id. § 2246(2)(A) (defining “sexual act”). L.G.B. testified that during the middle of
the night Doney came into the room in which she was sleeping, woke her, and
forcibly “put his penis inside of [her] vagina.” O.G. testified to the same conduct.
Doney denied it ever happened. The trial judge found both victims credible.
We recognize that neither victim could state with precision the date of the
separate attacks, as they occurred years earlier when the victims were just twelve
or thirteen years old. But the trial court gave adequate explanations for the minor
inconsistencies in the victims’ testimony. See United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d
1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The trier of fact has a wide latitude in which to decide
which witnesses to believe or disbelieve. The [trier of fact] [is] free to accept or
reject [a witness’s] testimony in whole or in part.” (citation omitted)). Moreover,
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other testimony showed that Doney had been at the trailer at the same time as
L.B.G. and O.G. on occasions during which the rapes could have occurred,
consistent with L.B.G.’s and O.G.’s testimony. The evidence was sufficient to
convict. United States v. Katakis, 800 F.3d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 2015) (“It is well
established that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may be sufficient
to sustain a conviction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Doney’s motion
for a bill of particulars. There is no dispute that “discovery [was already]
completed” when Doney filed his motion, and that the government had “disclosed
[its] entire [case] file[,] including witness statements” to Doney at that point. “Full
discovery . . . obviates the need for a bill of particulars.” United States v. Giese,
597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
AFFIRMED.
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