Reverse; Render in part; and Remand and Opinion Filed July 6, 2016
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-15-01355-CV
DARRELL WATSON, Appellant
V.
MELODY HARDMAN AND DREW HARDMAN, Appellees
On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 1
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 93392-CC
OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Evans, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
Appellant Darrell Watson raises three issues in this interlocutory appeal from the denial
of his dismissal motion filed under the Texas anti-SLAPP statute, civil practice and remedies
code Chapter 27. We sustain his first two issues and reverse the order denying his motion. We
sustain his third issue in part, rendering judgment dismissing appellees’ defamation claims based
on Watson’s Rule 202 petition but otherwise remanding the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations.
Appellees’ live petition alleges the following facts:
In November 2014, a serious auto accident occurred in Louisiana. The accident killed
Michael and Trudi Hardman. Appellees Drew and Melody Hardman were Michael’s brother and
sister-in-law. Appellant Darrell Watson was Trudi’s ex-husband.
Michael had three children by a prior marriage. Trudi had two children by her prior
marriage with Watson. Michael and Trudi had one child together.
The auto accident also killed Michael and Trudi’s child, one of Michael’s children, and
one of Trudi and Watson’s children.
One of the Hardmans’ friends established a “Go Fund Me” account online to accept
donations for the Hardmans. Three days later, a statement was added to the Go Fund Me
webpage stating that donated funds would first be used to pay for the funerals of the accident
victims and then distributed to the three surviving children. Almost immediately, Watson began
to demand “his son’s share” of those funds.
Later, Trudi’s family created a second Go Fund Me account. The funds raised through
this account were directed to the Hardman family, who placed them in a benevolent bank
account. Additional donations received through other means were also placed in that account.
The donated funds received from all sources totaled about $60,000. This amount was
reduced to about $30,000 after the funeral and related expenses were paid. The Hardmans
eventually gave Watson three checks totaling slightly over one-third of the leftover funds for the
benefit of Trudi and Watson’s child.
Watson continued to seek more funds from the original Go Fund Me account, demanding
records and threatening to sue. The Hardmans supplied some information to him.
In June 2015, Watson filed a Rule 202 petition against the Hardmans in Rockwall
County. That petition alleged that the Hardmans had misappropriated funds for their own use.
–2–
B. Procedural History.
In July 2015, the Hardmans filed this separate lawsuit against Watson in Kaufman
County. The Hardmans asserted defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. They also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Watson answered, asserting a
general denial and affirmative defenses.
The Hardmans later filed the amended petition that is their live pleading in the case.
They continued to assert claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
declaratory and equitable relief. The most specific factual allegation supporting their claims is
this:
The Defendant’s 202 Petition filed in Rockwall County is, on information and
belief, but one example of the many communications, made by Defendant,
accusing Plaintiffs of malfeasance and theft.
(Emphasis in original.)
Watson then filed a Chapter 27 dismissal motion seeking dismissal of the Hardmans’
defamation claims, attorneys’ fees, and sanctions. He attached his lead counsel’s affidavit, his
Rule 202 petition, and the court’s order granting the Rule 202 petition.
The Hardmans filed a combined response and motion for leave to conduct discovery.
They attached exhibits, including Drew Hardman’s affidavit.
Watson filed a reply and a separate written objection to the Hardmans’ evidence.
Two days before the hearing on Watson’s motion, the Hardmans filed Melody
Hardman’s affidavit in support of their response. Watson filed an objection to the affidavit the
day before the hearing.
The trial judge held a hearing on Watson’s motion and denied it.
Watson timely perfected this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(12).
–3–
II. ISSUES
Watson asserts three issues:
1. Watson carried his § 27.005(b) burden by showing that the Hardmans’ suit
was in response to Watson’s exercise of his right of free speech and right
to petition.
2. The trial court abused its discretion by declining to rule on Watson’s
objections to the Hardmans’ evidence, and, regardless of whether it so
erred, the Hardmans failed to carry their § 27.005(c) burden.
3. The Hardmans’ defamation claims should be dismissed, and the case
should be remanded to consider Watson’s attorneys’ fees and sanctions.
For the reasons that follow, we resolve Watson’s issues as follows:
1. We sustain Watson’s first issue because (i) his Rule 202 petition was an
exercise of the right to petition and (ii) his other alleged defamatory
communications were exercises of the right of free speech.
2. We sustain Watson’s second issue because (i) his Rule 202 petition was
protected by absolute privilege and (ii) the Hardmans did not carry their
§ 27.005(c) burden as to Watson’s other communications.
3. We sustain Watson’s third issue to the extent that we render judgment
dismissing the Hardmans’ defamation claims based on Watson’s Rule 202
petition, but we remand the remainder of the case for consideration of the
Hardmans’ request for an opportunity to conduct discovery.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review.
The legislature enacted Chapter 27 “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights
of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to
the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file
meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002.
Chapter 27’s main feature is a motion procedure that enables a defendant to seek the
dismissal of frivolous claims and to recover attorneys’ fees and sanctions. Tatum v. Hersh, No.
05-14-01318-CV, 2015 WL 9583494, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2015, pet. filed); see
also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003. That statute provides for these procedures:
–4–
The movant has the initial burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legal action “is based on, relates to, or is in response to” the movant’s exercise of the right of free
speech, petition, or association. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b).
If the movant carries its initial burden, the nonmovant must then establish “by clear and
specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Id.
§ 27.005(c). If the nonmovant fails to carry this burden, the trial court shall dismiss the legal
action. Id. § 27.005(b)–(c).
Even if the nonmovant carries its § 27.005(c) burden, however, the trial court shall
dismiss the legal action if the movant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each
essential element of a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim. Id. § 27.005(d).
If the trial court dismisses a legal action, it shall award the movant court costs, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, other expenses, and sanctions. Id. § 27.009(a).
We review de novo the trial court’s determinations that the parties met or failed to meet
their § 27.005 burdens. Tervita, LLC v. Sutterfield, 482 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, pet. denied).
B. Issue One: Did Watson carry his initial burden under § 27.005(b)?
The threshold question is whether Watson showed by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Hardmans’ defamation claims are based on, relate to, or are in response to Watson’s
exercise of a protected right. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b). We conclude that Watson
carried his burden because (i) a Rule 202 petition initiates a judicial proceeding, (ii) that
proceeding need not itself address the government or a matter of public concern, and (iii)
possible misuse of publicly solicited benevolent funds involves a matter of community interest
and thus a public concern.
–5–
1. The Rule 202 Petition.
The Hardmans’ defamation claims are based in part on statements Watson made in his
Rule 202 petition seeking discovery about the Hardmans’ use of the donated funds. According
to the Hardmans’ live pleading, Watson’s Rule 202 petition alleged that they “misappropriated
. . . funds for their own use” and sought to investigate whether they had violated the Texas Theft
Liability Act. Watson’s evidence shows that he filed his petition in Rockwall County district
court and that he obtained some relief on that petition.
Watson argues that his Rule 202 petition was an exercise of his right to petition under
Chapter 27. For the following reasons, we agree.
Chapter 27 assigns numerous definitions to the phrase the “exercise of the right to
petition.” The first definition is “a communication in or pertaining to . . . a judicial proceeding.”
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(A)(1). A Rule 202 petition is a petition asking a court for an
order authorizing an oral deposition or a deposition on written questions either for use in an
anticipated suit or to investigate a potential claim or suit. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1. Rule 202
spells out the procedures to be used in adjudicating the petition. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.2–.4. A
Rule 202 hearing can be a contested matter. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4 (setting forth matters
petitioner must prove to obtain relief). We thus conclude that a Rule 202 proceeding is a
“judicial proceeding” for Chapter 27 purposes, and that Watson’s Rule 202 petition was
therefore a communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding. Watson’s Rule 202 petition
was therefore an exercise of the right to petition under Chapter 27. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.001(4)(A)(i).
The Hardmans, however, argue that a communication made in a judicial proceeding does
not qualify as an exercise of the right to petition unless the lawsuit’s subject itself concerns the
–6–
government or a public interest. They rely on Jardin v. Marklund, 431 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.), for support. We are not persuaded.
The statute provides that a communication is an exercise of the right to petition if it is
made in or pertains to “a judicial proceeding.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(A)(i). The
legislature could have qualified or limited the term “a judicial proceeding” as the Hardmans
propose, but it did not. Because the statute is unambiguous, we give it its plain meaning,
presuming that “words not included were purposefully omitted” by the legislature. Lippincott v.
Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
Nonetheless, the Hardmans argue that dicta in the Jardin opinion support the premise that
a communication does not qualify as an exercise of the right of petition unless the
communication is also somehow in the public interest. See Jardin, 431 S.W.3d at 772. But they
concede that Jardin was actually decided on other grounds—specifically, that the movant had
not actually made the communications that gave rise to the suit. Id. at 773–74. We also note that
the Jardin dicta rely heavily on a court of appeals opinion that the supreme court later reversed.
See id. at 771–72 (repeatedly citing Whisenhunt v. Lippincott, 416 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013), rev’d, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)). The supreme court held that
a Chapter 27 movant who relies on the “free speech” prong need not prove that his
communication was made in a public form because the statute does not contain such a
requirement. Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508. By the same token, the statutory definition of
“exercise of the right to petition” does not include a public interest requirement, and we will not
engraft one onto the statute.
To the extent the Hardmans’ defamation claims are based on Watson’s Rule 202 petition,
Watson carried his § 27.005(b) burden.
–7–
2. Other Accusations.
The Hardmans’ defamation claims are also predicated on other communications by
Watson accusing them of “malfeasance and theft” regarding the charitable funds. The
Hardmans’ live pleading supplies no other details about Watson’s alleged statements. The
Hardmans’ affidavits in opposition to Watson’s dismissal motion add few supporting details.
The affidavits state only that the Hardmans heard “in the community” that Watson was accusing
them of stealing from Watson and Trudi’s son.
Watson argues that any statements he may have made accusing the Hardmans of stealing
from the charitable funds and from his and Trudi’s son were exercises of the right of free speech
under Chapter 27. For the following reasons, we agree.
Under Chapter 27, “exercise of the right of free speech” means a communication made in
connection with a matter of public concern. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(3). The statute gives
the phrase “matter of public concern” several definitions, including the one Watson relies on: “an
issue related to . . . community well-being.” Id. § 27.001(7)(B). The statute does not define
“community well-being,” but courts have held statements to be related to community well-being
in a variety of contexts:
• Statements about a children’s baseball coach’s angry and aggressive
behavior during a game. Bilbrey v. Williams, No. 02-13-00332-CV, 2015
WL 1120921, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 12, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
• Statements by homeowners association members about possible
misconduct by the association’s property manager. Neyland v. Thompson,
No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 WL 1612155, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr.
7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
• Statements accusing someone of identity theft. Deaver v. Desai, 483
S.W.3d 668, 673 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
We have held that statements that a dentist had been charged with defrauding taxpayers
out of tens of millions of dollars in a Medicaid scam related to a matter of public concern under
–8–
the community well-being prong and other prongs of the statute. AOL, Inc. v. Malouf, No. 05-
13-01637-CV, 2015 WL 1535669, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 2, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, Watson allegedly accused the Hardmans of stealing publicly solicited charitable
funds earmarked for Michael’s and Trudi’s surviving children. We conclude that such
accusations relate to community well-being, specifically the well-being of those members of the
public who donated money to the funds and of the surviving children who were to receive the
charitable funds left after funeral expenses were paid.
The Hardmans, however, argue that Watson did not meet his burden to show that their
defamation claims related to his exercise of the right of free speech because he did not present
any evidence of the putative matter of public concern. But the statute provides that the court
shall consider not only affidavits but also the pleadings when determining whether an action
should be dismissed. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a). As discussed above, the Hardmans’ own
live pleading alleges facts demonstrating that Watson’s alleged accusations against them related
to a matter of public concern—specifically, community well-being.
We thus conclude that Watson was not required to adduce additional evidence beyond the
pleadings in order to carry his § 27.005(b) burden. See Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360
(Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (“The Act does not require [the movant] to present testimony
or other evidence to satisfy her evidentiary burden [under § 27.005(b)].”).
3. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we sustain Watson’s first issue.
C. Issue Two: Did the trial court err in its evidentiary rulings and in concluding that
the Hardmans met their burden under § 27.005(c)?
Watson’s second issue argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the
Hardmans’ defamation claims. He argues that the claims based on the Rule 202 petition are
–9–
barred by absolute privilege, and that the Hardmans failed to support their claims based on
Watson’s other alleged statements with clear and specific evidence of every element.
He also complains about the trial court’s failure to rule on his objections to the
Hardmans’ evidence. We need not consider Watson’s objections because, as shown below,
Watson prevails even if we consider all of the Hardmans’ evidence.
1. The Rule 202 Petition.
At the outset we note a slight mismatch between Watson’s argument and the statutory
framework. Watson’s argument regarding the Hardmans’ claims based on his Rule 202 petition
is that those claims are barred by absolute privilege, which is a defense. See Tervita, LLC, 482
S.W.3d at 284–85. This argument should be made under § 27.005(d), which provides that the
trial court shall dismiss a legal action covered by Chapter 27 if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence every element of a valid defense. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005(d); Tervita, LLC, 482 S.W.3d at 284–85. But instead, Watson argues that the absolute
privilege defeats the Hardmans’ attempt to establish by clear and specific evidence each essential
element of their defamation claims. Regardless, we construe Watson’s brief liberally and
analyze its merits under the applicable statute. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam) (appellate briefs must be construed “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right
to appellate review is not lost by waiver”); cf. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34
S.W.3d 887, 896–97 (Tex. 2000) (defendant could rely on punitive-damages cap even though it
cited wrong statute in its answer).
Here, the Hardmans argue that Watson failed to preserve his privilege argument in the
trial court. But Watson pled judicial privilege in his answer as an affirmative defense. And the
argument section of his dismissal motion contains this sentence: “Plaintiffs further cannot show
that how [sic] absolute privilege does not apply to Defendant’s Rockwall Rule 202 Petition.”
–10–
We conclude that Watson’s motion gave the Hardmans sufficient notice that he was relying on
the privilege defense as a basis for dismissal.
On the merits, we agree with Watson. “The general rule is that communications made in
the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are protected by an absolute privilege.”
Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 20 S.W.3d 880, 890 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.);
see also James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916–17 (Tex. 1982) (privilege attaches to pleadings
in a case). “‘Any communication, even perjured testimony, made in the course of a judicial
proceeding, cannot serve as the basis for a suit in tort.’” Tervita, LLC, 482 S.W.3d at 285
(citation omitted). The Hardmans respond that the privilege is conditional, but this contention is
incorrect, as the above authorities show.
Accordingly, we conclude that Watson established a valid defense to the Hardmans’
defamation claims based on the Rule 202 petition. The trial court erred by denying Watson’s
motion to dismiss those claims. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d).
2. Other Statements.
As to the Hardmans’ defamation claims based on Watson’s alleged extra-judicial
statements that the Hardmans were committing malfeasance and theft, we conclude that the
Hardmans did not carry their burdens under § 27.005(c).
Defamation’s elements are (i) the publication of a false statement of fact to a third party,
(ii) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (iii) with the requisite degree of fault
(negligence or actual malice, depending on the context), and (iv) damages (unless the defamatory
statements are defamatory per se). In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015) (orig.
proceeding).
Under § 27.005(c), the Hardmans had to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima
facie case for each such essential element. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c). The Lipksy court
–11–
explained that notice pleading merely reciting the elements of a cause of action will not satisfy
§ 27.005(c). 460 S.W.3d at 590–91. Instead, § 27.005(c) means a plaintiff must provide enough
detail to show the claim’s factual basis. Id. at 591. As an example, Lipsky holds that “pleadings
and evidence that establishes the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature
of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient” to defeat a Chapter
27 dismissal motion. Id.
Watson argues that the Hardmans did not produce clear and specific evidence of the
matters identified in Lipsky—the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature
of the statements, and how they damaged the Hardmans.
The Hardmans’ evidence consisted of the following: (i) an affidavit by each appellee, (ii)
something that appears to be a printout of electronic messages between someone named Ashlea
Bell Watson and someone named Chrissy Cummons Allmann, and (iii) copies of documents
related to one of Watson’s attorneys’ legal and ethical difficulties. Categories (ii) and (iii)
contain nothing that supports the Hardmans’ prima facie case against Watson. And the affidavits
are virtually identical. For convenience, we quote only Drew’s affidavit:
On information and belief, starting as early as December, 2014, within days of the
death of Mich[ae]l and Trudi and most of their blended family, I began to hear
accusations in the community directed and coming from Defendant, that I and or
my wife, were stealing or may steal from [Watson and Trudi’s surviving son]. I
have also heard the Defendant refers to the departed, Michael and Trudi, as the
“adulterers.” These accusations culminated in accusations that I had stolen
money from [Watson and Trudi’s surviving son]. These accusations are false and
were made by Defendant, without regard to the truth of the accusations.
We can also consider the Hardmans’ pleading, see CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a), but
their live pleading does not allege any details beyond those in their affidavits.
The Hardmans’ affidavits give more detail than mere notice pleading would, but they do
not supply all the details that Lipsky says “should be sufficient” to defeat a Chapter 27 dismissal
motion. The Hardmans’ affidavits, taken as true, support the premise that Watson said that the
–12–
Hardmans were stealing, may steal, and had stolen from Watson and Trudi’s surviving son. In
terms of the Lipsky example, see 460 S.W.3d at 591, the Hardmans’ evidence shows what
Watson said and shows the defamatory nature of Watson’s statements, but it does not show when
or where Watson made these statements. Nor does the Hardmans’ evidence show to whom
Watson made these statements. (The evidence also does not show how the statements damaged
the Hardmans, but Watson’s statements qualify as defamation per se, so the Hardmans did not
need to produce damages evidence. See id. at 595–96.)
According to Lipsky, the clear and specific evidence requirement ultimately means that
the “plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim.” Id. at 591. We
conclude that the Hardmans’ evidence did not satisfy this test. The Hardmans’ evidence showed
at most that Watson said—somewhere, on one or more unspecified occasions—that the
Hardmans were stealing or had stolen from Watson and Trudi’s son. The evidence did not
establish when Watson said these things, where he said them, or to whom he said them. Given
these gaps in the record, we conclude that the Hardmans’ evidence did not adequately show the
factual basis for their claims. Thus, the Hardmans did not carry their § 27.005(c) burden.
Accordingly, the trial court also erred by denying Watson’s motion to dismiss the
Hardmans’ defamation claims based on Watson’s alleged extra-judicial statements about the
Hardmans.
D. Issue Three: Is Watson entitled to dismissal of the Hardmans’ defamation claims
and remand for assessment of court costs, attorneys’ fees, other expenses, and
sanctions?
Watson’s third issue argues that if we sustain his first two issues, we should render
judgment dismissing the Hardmans’ defamation claims and remand the case for assessment of
costs, fees, expenses, and sanctions under § 27.009(a). He says that we have done this in other
Chapter 27 cases. See, e.g., Backes v. Misko, No. 05-14-00566-CV, 2015 WL 1138258, at *17
–13–
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 13, 2015, pet. denied); Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dallas, Inc. v.
Ward, 401 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied).
The Hardmans counter that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
Watson no attorneys’ fees because Watson’s fee evidence was impeached and did not meet the
standards usually applicable to interested witness testimony. But because the trial court denied
Watson’s dismissal motion, Watson was not entitled to an award of fees. Thus, the trial court
had no reason to consider Watson’s fee evidence, and the reporter’s record of the hearing of
Watson’s motion shows that the court did not do so.
Finally, the Hardmans argue that we should allow the trial court to consider their
alternative motion for leave to conduct discovery as permitted by § 27.006. Specifically, the
Hardmans’ response to Watson’s dismissal motion contained a cross-motion for permission to
conduct discovery about Watson’s alleged defamatory statements and his request for attorneys’
fees. The trial court did not reach this cross-motion since it denied Watson’s motion.
Our Chapter 27 opinions cited by Watson are distinguishable because they contain no
indication that the claimants requested an opportunity to conduct discovery either in the trial
court or on appeal. See Backes, 2015 WL 1138258, at *5; Better Bus. Bureau, 401 S.W.3d at
442–43 & n.1.
Because the Hardmans preserved a request to conduct discovery as permitted by
§ 27.006(b) and the trial court did not rule on that request, we conclude that the proper course is
to remand so that the trial court can consider that request.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Watson’s dismissal motion with respect to the
Hardmans’ defamation claims. We render judgment dismissing the Hardmans’ defamation
–14–
claims to the extent they are based on Watson’s Rule 202 petition. We remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
151355F.P05
–15–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
DARRELL WATSON, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court At Law
No. 1, Kaufman County, Texas
No. 05-15-01355-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 93392-CC.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill.
MELODY HARDMAN AND DREW Justices Lang and Evans participating.
HARDMAN, Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we REVERSE the trial court’s order
denying appellant Darrell Watson’s motion to dismiss. We RENDER judgment dismissing
appellees Melody Hardman’s and Drew Hardman’s defamation claims to the extent they are
based on appellant Darrell Watson’s Rule 202 petition. We REMAND this cause to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
It is ORDERED that appellant Darrell Watson recover his costs of this appeal from
appellees Melody Hardman and Drew Hardman.
Judgment entered July 6, 2016.
–16–