United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 17, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-60476
GALA GOLDSMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. CV-02-178
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Gala Goldsmith brought a Title VII employment
discrimination case against her employer, the U.S.D.A. Forest
Services (the “Service”). Goldsmith claims that, in retaliation
for an EEOC race discrimination claim that Goldsmith filed against
the service in 1996, the Service did not promote her in 2001. The
jury found for the Service and Goldsmith now appeals. She raises
two issues on appeal: 1) that the district court erred in failing
to address adequately the issue of whether the Service’s exercise
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-60476
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of its peremptory challenges was pretextual and therefore a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucy2;
and 2) that the district court erred by excluding evidence that the
Service denied Goldsmith promotions and lateral transfers on nine
previous occasions. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the
district court’s rulings.
I.
As to the first issue, in United States v. Seals, this Court
set forth the three-step process for Batson challenges:
First, the defendant [or any litigant] must make a prima
facie showing that the prosecution [or other party]
exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of a juror’s
cognizable racial background. Second, the burden shifts
to the prosecution [or challenged party] to articulate a
race-neutral explanation for removing the juror in
question. Finally, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has met his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.3
During voir dire, both parties had three peremptory challenges.
Goldsmith first used two peremptory challenges to remove two white
jurors. The Service used its first peremptory challenge to remove
a white juror and its second to remove a black juror---juror #5.
Goldsmith objected and asked the district court to require the
2
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3
987 F.2d 1102, 1108 - 09 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Service to state a nondiscriminatory reason for challenging juror
#5. The court denied the request.
Goldsmith used her last challenge to remove another white
juror. The Service, without exhausting its single remaining
peremptory challenge, accepted the jury, which at that point was
all white. Goldsmith objected, arguing that the Service’s failure
to exercise its remaining peremptory challenge in combination with
its previous challenge of the only black juror seated constituted
a Batson violation. The district court ordered the Service, “to
make the record complete, provide a reason why you struck Juror
Number 5.” The Service’s counsel responded that juror #5 was
challenged because he was not paying attention to the questions and
because he was retired and had no management work experience.
Goldsmith’s attorney argued that the juror’s intelligent responses
showed that in fact he was paying careful attention and that the
Service’s acceptance of a retired white juror cast doubt on that as
the reason for its challenge of juror #5. Goldsmith contended that
both of the Service’s reasons were pretexts and that it had failed
to indicate a non-biased reason for the challenge. The district
court denied the Batson challenge, stating: “The court can’t find
that in this matter with only one black juror being challenged.
And further, the court is not in a position to really render a
quarrel with the defendant’s exercise in this instance.”
On appeal, Goldsmith argues that the Service’s peremptory
challenge was a pretext for its purposeful discrimination against
No. 04-60476
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black jurors on the basis of their race. We conclude, however,
that the district court did not err in finding that Goldsmith
failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination. We see no error in the district court’s finding
that Goldsmith failed to show that the Service’s exercise of a
single peremptory challenge against a black juror established a
prima facie case of a Batson violation. Consequently, we need not
reach the questions of whether the district court clearly erred in
determining that the Service carried its burden of articulating a
race-neutral explanation for removing juror #5 and whether
Goldsmith failed to meet her burden of proving purposeful
discrimination.
II.
It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to
exclude evidence of the nine previous occasions on which Goldsmith
was not promoted or laterally transferred.4 While the evidence may
have tended to make more probable the existence of the Service’s
personal animus toward Goldsmith, Goldsmith’s proffer revealed that
the evidence lacked the ability to show that those previous denials
were based upon racially discriminatory reasons. When the district
court asked Goldsmith’s counsel what evidence she had that she had
been unlawfully discriminated against when she was denied the
4
See Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. V. Freeport Chemical Co., 704
F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Absent proof of abuse an
appellate court will not disturb a district court’s evidentiary
rulings.”).
No. 04-60476
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promotions and transfers, counsel responded that she didn’t have
any such evidence other than the fact that she didn’t get the jobs
over a long period of time. This information elicited during
Goldsmith’s proffer showed little indication that the nine previous
job denials were based on race rather than other reasons.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding this evidence. “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”5 In Goldsmith’s case, the district court reasonably
could have determined that the slight probative value of the
previous denials of her advancement was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue
delay, and waste of time in the presentation of only marginally
relevant evidence.
For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court’s
rulings.
AFFIRMED.
5
FED. R. EVID. 403.