15‐3909‐cv
Spring v. Allegany‐Limestone Central Sch. Dist.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of July, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
______________________
KERI SPRING, EUGENE SPRING,
JULIANNE SPRING, EUGENE SPRING
AND KERI SPRING, on behalf of Gregory
Spring, KERI SPRING, as the duly
appointed administrator of the estate of
Gregory Spring,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
‐v.‐ No. 15‐3909
ALLEGANY‐LIMESTONE CENTRAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE ALLEGANY‐
1
LIMESTONE CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT, KAREN GEELAN,
Superintendent, JOE ZIMMER, President,
PHIL QUINLIN, Vice President,
MATTHEW KAHM, Member, JEFF
BLACK, Member, DAVID FARRELL,
Member, JAY KING, Member, KIM
PALMER, Member, SUE SCHIFLEY,
Member, MAGGIE NUSS, Member, KEVIN
STRAUB, Principal, DIANE LOWRY,
Teacher Assistant, ERIC HEMPHILL,
Teacher/Coach, CHRISTOPHER KENYON,
Teacher/Coach, JOHN WOLFGANG,
Psychologist, ROBERT DECKER,
Psychologist, all in their individual and
official capacity, MICHAEL EASTON, and
JACOB ROWE,
Defendants‐Appellees,
JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE, administrators,
representatives, agents, employees, and
servants of the Allegany‐Limestone Central
School District, JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE,
students of the Allegany‐Limestone High
School,
Defendants.
______________________
2
FOR APPELLANTS: DANIEL FLYNN (A.J. Bosman, on the brief),
Bosman Law Firm, L.L.C., Canastota, NY.
FOR APPELLEES JENNA W. KLUCSIK, Sugarman Law Firm,
ALLEGANY‐LIMESTONE LLP, Syracuse, NY.
CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT, THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE
ALLEGANY‐LIMESTONE
CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT, KAREN GEELAN,
JOE ZIMMER, PHIL
QUINLAN, MATTHEW
KAHM, JEFF BLACK, DAVID
FARRELL, JAY KING, KIM
PALMER, SUE SCHIFLEY,
MAGGIE NUSS, KEVIN
STRAUB, ERIC HEMPHILL,
CHRISTOPHER KENYON,
JOHN WOLFGANG AND
ROBERT DECKER:
FOR APPELLEE DIANE AIMÉE LAFEVER KOCH, Osborn, Reed &
LOWRY: Burke, LLP, Rochester, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York (Skretny, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the orders and judgment of the District
Court are AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings.
3
Plaintiffs‐Appellants Keri, Eugene, and Julianne Spring appeal from
several orders and a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (Skretny, J.), which together granted a motion to dismiss
their claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on
alleged violations of the First Amendment, as well as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; the New York Constitution,
the New York Civil Rights Law; and New York common law; and further denied
leave to amend with respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Plaintiffs
filed their lawsuit against the defendants in this case after the tragic suicide of
their son and brother, Gregory Spring, a seventeen‐year‐old boy with disabilities.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural
history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our conclusions.
First, with respect to the District Court’s denial of leave to amend the
pleadings, we review such denials for abuse of discretion, while keeping in mind
the balance between the federal rules’ liberal policy towards amendment and a
court’s interest in finality. See Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212–13 (2d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)). A district
4
court necessarily abuses its discretion “if it based its ruling on an erroneous view
of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 n.2 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claims on the ground that the complaint failed to allege adequately that
Gregory’s named conditions susbtantially limited him in a major life activity and
further determined that the proposed amendments to the complaint failed to
cure this defect. We conclude that in holding that the proposed amendments did
not allege a qualifying disability through specific facts about Gregory, App. 208–
09, the District Court clearly misconstrued the amended pleadings and
misapplied the law. The proposed second amended complaint explicitly
identified the effects of Gregory’s conditions on his major life activities of, inter
alia, “speaking,” “learning,” “concentrating,” and “communicating,” identifying
“a long‐standing record of suffering with a variety of motor and vocal tics” with
a specific list of examples including “outbursts,” “involuntary knee slapping and
eye blinking tics,” “repetitive utterance of foul language,” and “repetitive
questioning.” App. 186. It further alleged that the effects intensified “during
periods of stress or unfamiliar settings or situations” and that his disabilities
5
“substantially limited his ability to communicate” because “he was unable to
recognize emotions communicated by tone of voice and misunderstanding of
social cues.” App. 185–86. Taken together, the proposed amendments alleged
sufficient facts to make plausible that the impact on Gregory’s learning ability,
which also prompted a need for special education services, constituted a
substantial limitation. On the facts alleged, therefore, we conclude that these
proposed amendments would have sufficed to meet the requirements of a
qualifying disability, particularly given the ADA Amendments Act of 2008’s
significant relaxation of the standard for substantial limits on major life activities.
See, e.g., Parada v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 68 & n.3 (2d Cir.
2014). Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s denial of leave to amend and
so much of the judgment as dismissed Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims.
We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ substantive due
process claims but for different reasons than those articulated below. See
Blackman v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 491 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We may, of
course, affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground appearing in the
record, even if the ground is different from the one relied on by the district
6
court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A violation of substantive due
process rights requires that the official conduct in question be “‘so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”
Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall‐on‐Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 431 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). In situations
in which time for deliberation is available to the official, we apply a “deliberate
indifference” standard, which requires demonstration of a “willful disregard” of
the “obvious risks,” “serious implications,” and “likelihood” of harm. Id. at 432.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice to show that individual
defendants’ conduct amounted to a state‐created danger, see id. at 428–29, there
are no facts alleged from which we can plausibly infer that any individual
defendant had actual knowledge of yet disregarded an obvious or excessive risk
of Gregory’s suicide, see id. at 432 (applying the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference requirement that the official both “‘know[] of and disregard[] an
excessive risk’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). In order to
state a claim, factual allegations must be more than “‘merely consistent with’”
the defendant’s liability and instead make it “more than a sheer possibility.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
7
U.S. 544, 554 (2007)). We are unable to conclude that the Plaintiffs’ allegations
meet that requirement with respect to any defendant’s deliberate indifference
and must therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the substantive due
process claims.
We also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equal protection
claims. Plaintiffs first allege that Defendants subjected Gregory to disparate
treatment. Such claims require plaintiffs to show that the person “was treated
differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2009). The first
amended complaint contains no allegations regarding disparate treatment
between Gregory and similarly situated students; for example, although it refers
to Gregory’s suspension, it contains no factual allegations that non‐disabled
students who also physically responded to bullying were not punished nor that
Gregory’s bullies committed similar physical acts but were left unpunished. The
absence of such allegations render us unable to make a plausible inference that
Gregory was selectively treated on the basis of his disability or, as is also
required, that such treatment was irrational. See id. (noting that disparate
treatment must fail “the appropriate level of scrutiny” applicable to the equal
8
protection claim); Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate, 101 F.3d 818,
824 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that disparate treatment based on disability is
subject to rational basis review).
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Gregory’s harassment. The factual allegations are insufficient to establish
deliberate indifference of the kind we have required in the context of racial or
sexual harassment in schools. See, e.g., Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ.,
195 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring “defendant’s response to known
discrimination ‘[to be] clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances’”
(quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)).
With respect to the retaliation claims, Monell liability claims, and state
constitutional claims, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the
District Court. With respect to the state statutory and common‐law claims, we
vacate the order and judgment of the District Court for consideration of whether
supplemental jurisdiction over them should be exercised in light of our remand
of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. We have considered all of Plaintiffs’
remaining arguments and conclude that none warrant further vacatur.
Accordingly, the District Court’s order denying leave to amend the complaint
9
with respect to Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, its order declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state statutory and common‐law
claims, and the corresponding portions of the judgment are VACATED, while
the remainder of the orders and judgment is AFFIRMED. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
10