PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, and Kelsey, JJ., and Lacy,
S.J.
LEONTE D. EDMONDS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 151100 JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL
July 14, 2016
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Leonte Delmario Edmonds (“Edmonds”) was charged with possession of a firearm after
conviction of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. He entered a guilty plea on March 12,
2014. Edmonds moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. The trial court denied
the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. On appeal,
Edmonds argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the motion “was made in
good faith and premised upon a reasonable basis for the substantive defense of duress.”
I. BACKGROUND
At Edmonds’ guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth offered the following stipulated
facts leading to his charge of possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony:
[O]n September 30, 2013, officers responded to 104 North
Thomas Street in Arlington County for a disturbance of a man
threatening a woman and saying that he had a gun. When police
arrived, they learned that the threats involved an individual by the
name of Brandon Bumpy Miller, who had previously threatened
[Edmonds’] girlfriend with a gun.
While on the scene, Officer Martin heard shouting from an
apartment from that location and saw [Edmonds] coming out of an
apartment that was in the same direction as the shouting.
[Edmonds] had clothing that was similar to the clothing described
in the 911 call and he was detained. He initially did not comply
with keeping both of his hands on the wall as directed by Officer
Martin, keeping his right hand down by his waist. He then
complied and told Officer Martin that he had a gun in his pants
pocket. Martin recovered the handgun from the pocket without
incident. The chamber was empty, but there were seven rounds in
the magazine. [Edmonds] said he was not involved in the
disturbance and that he was trying to do the right thing by getting
the gun out of the apartment, so that Bumpy Miller couldn’t access
it while he was drunk and angry.
While in front of the magistrate, [Edmonds] stated, “Even
though I was wrong, I know I was wrong. I was doing the right
thing.” [Edmonds] had a blood alcohol content of .18 while he
was in booking. [Edmonds] was convicted of armed robbery in
South Carolina in 1998.
Represented by new counsel, Edmonds filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in
September 2014 prior to sentencing. Edmonds argued that he took the gun under duress because
of the threat of imminent harm to his uncle and girlfriend.
Denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court held that
It’s clear that the defense of duress could be available, and the
requirement is imminent harm. The facts here [are] that they
assume a threat was made, the individual – Mr. Miller – who
allegedly had the gun would have to exit the apartment building,
go across a courtyard, and go into another building. The Court
simply doesn’t find that can be imminent. This method of self help
is . . . not supported by the facts. A call to the police could have
been made, and a call to – we don’t even know if those individuals
were in the apartment at that point in time. So there is simply no
evidence of any imminent harm.
The trial court sentenced Edmonds to the statutorily mandated 5 year sentence.
Adopting the rationale of and affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held, in
relevant part:
[T]here was no indication that Miller’s threat of harm was
imminent. . . . In addition, taking possession of the firearm and
leaving the apartment was not the only way for appellant to avoid
the threatened harm. . . .
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1958-14-4, slip op. at 4 (June 19, 2015) (unpublished).
2
II. ANALYSIS
Edmonds argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because he had a reasonable basis for arguing he possessed the firearm under duress. 1 We
disagree that his defense of duress was reasonable.
Code § 19.2-296 provides,
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of a sentence
is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice, the court within
twenty-one days after entry of a final order may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea.
This Court previously addressed the applicable standard for reviewing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea in Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
[W]hether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a plea
of guilty for the purpose of submitting one of not guilty is a matter
that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is to be
determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. No fixed
or definite rule applicable to and determinative of all cases can be
laid down. However, the motion should not be denied, if timely
made, and if it appears from the surrounding circumstances that the
plea of guilty was submitted in good faith under an honest mistake
of material fact or facts, or if it was induced by fraud, coercion or
undue influence and would not otherwise have been made.
Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873.
[T]he statute does not expressly provide the standard by which a
trial court is to determine whether to grant a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea when, as in this case, the motion is made before
sentence has been imposed. However, logic dictates that the
standard must be more liberal than the requirement of showing a
manifest injustice. Cf. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 965,
243 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1978) (quoting Paradiso v. United States,
482 F.2d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 1973)) (holding that where the
defendant “waited until after sentence had been imposed to move
1
While Edmonds’ assignment of error raises the issue of good faith, he presents no
argument to support this basis. Therefore, we need not address it. Rule 5:27(d).
3
to withdraw his guilty plea,” it was appropriate to apply the “‘more
severe standard’” of requiring a finding of a manifest injustice).
Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 153, 645 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2007).
The Court of Appeals has held that in order to use the defense of duress or necessity, the
offender must show
“(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to
avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other
adequate means to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a
direct causal relationship that may be reasonably
anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of
the harm.”
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45, 553 S.E.2d 546, 550 (2001) (quoting Buckley
v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 33, 371 S.E.2d 827, 827-28 (1988)). See also McGhee v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978) (“The law of self-defense is the
law of necessity, and the necessity relied upon must not arise out of defendant's own misconduct.
Accordingly, a defendant must reasonably fear death or serious bodily harm to himself at the
hands of his victim.”).
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ articulation of the duress standard as announced in
Buckley and reiterated in Humphrey. Accordingly, we adopt the standard and apply it to the
facts of this case and to the facts in Small v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. __, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2016)
(this day decided). The only factor argued by Edmonds in support of his defense of duress was a
threat of “imminent harm.” In order to show that a threat of harm is imminent, Edmonds must
demonstrate “‘an immediate, real threat to one’s safety . . . .’” 2 Commonwealth v. Sands, 262
Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 399 (7th ed. 1999)).
2
Edmonds’ defense was based on a perceived threat to his uncle and his girlfriend.
Because we find that there was no “imminent threat,” we need not address the issue of whether
his argument based on the defense of a girlfriend is valid.
4
See United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding no evidence to
show present or imminent threat of death or injury despite a generalized fear of danger); Byrd v.
Commonwealth, 89 Va. 536, 539, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (1893) (“There must be . . . some act
menacing present peril . . . [and] the act . . . must be of such a character as to afford a reasonable
ground for believing there is a design . . . to do some serious bodily harm, and imminent danger
of carrying such design into immediate execution.”); Byers v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 174,
185, 554 S.E.2d 714, 719 (2001) (finding no imminent danger requiring possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon where Byers only had a “generalized fear” of bodily harm after alleged
threats to “finish the job” of killing Byers had been made); Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37
Va. App. 36, 553 S.E.2d 546 (2001) (allowing defense of necessity to charge of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon where defendant was under direct attack by gunfire at the time of
possession).
Here, Edmonds has not shown that there was “imminent threatened harm” which led to
him possessing a firearm. Humphrey, 37 Va. App. at 45, 553 S.E.2d at 550 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The record is devoid of a sufficient proffer of evidence that there was
the threat of imminent danger. Numerous questions are left unanswered by the record, including
the location of the apartment, where the firearm was actually located, whether Bumpy Miller
even possessed the firearm, or even knew of the firearm’s location. As the trial court held,
Edmonds’ actions in possessing the firearm were a “method of self help . . . not supported by the
facts.” In addition, as the trial court explained, “[a] call to the police could have been made, and
a call to – we don’t even know if those individuals were in the apartment at that point in time.
So there is simply no evidence of any imminent harm.” The Court of Appeals agreed with these
observations, concluding that “there was no indication that [the] threat of harm was imminent”
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and that “taking possession of the firearm and leaving the apartment was not the only way for
[Edmonds] to avoid the threatened harm; he could have called the police.” Edmonds, Record
No. 1958-14-1, slip op. at 4. Based on the facts of this case, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding no indication that any harm was imminent and, concomitantly, in
denying Edmonds’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 3 Nor do we conclude that the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding, for those same reasons, that “the trial court did not err in denying
[Edmonds’] motion to withdraw [his] plea.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Edmonds’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
Affirmed.
3
The Commonwealth argued on brief and at oral argument that the Court should apply
the stricter manifest injustice standard rather than the more liberal standard applied when a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed prior to entry of the sentencing order. Because we hold
Edmonds cannot meet the more liberal standard, applying the stricter manifest injustice standard
would be unnecessary.
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