FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 14, 2016
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BRUCE MINGO,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-1115
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-03282-RBJ)
RICK RAEMISCH; CYNTHIA (D. Colo.)
COFFMAN,
Respondents - Appellees.
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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
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Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
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Bruce Mingo, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 application for habeas relief. We deny his request for a COA and dismiss this
matter.
A jury convicted Mingo of first-degree murder, and the state trial court
imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed Mingo’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Mingo appears pro se, we liberally construe his combined opening
brief and COA application. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir.
2009). But we don’t assume the role of his advocate. Id.
Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. The state district court denied Mingo’s
motion for postconviction relief under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c), the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Mingo then
applied for § 2254 habeas relief. The district court denied Mingo’s habeas application
and also denied Mingo’s requests for a COA.
Mingo now asks us to issue a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). But we can do
so only if Mingo makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). This means Mingo must “show[] that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Mingo asserts three claims: (1) his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in several
respects violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
(2) the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process
when the trial judge offered inducements to the chief prosecution witness, and (3) the
trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when
the trial judge failed to ensure that Mingo knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to testify.2
2
Mingo asserted a fourth claim in his habeas petition—that the State violated
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights when it failed to consider
certain evidence in postconviction proceedings. The district court determined that
claim wasn’t cognizable in a federal habeas action. Mingo doesn’t challenge that
2
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected each of these claims on the merits
when it affirmed the state district court’s denial of Mingo’s motion for postconviction
relief. Thus, Mingo had to demonstrate to the district court that the Court of Appeals’
rejection of these claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). In its 74-page order denying Mingo’s habeas application, the
district court thoroughly considered the Court of Appeals’ treatment of each of
Mingo’s claims and determined Mingo wasn’t entitled to habeas relief.
We have reviewed Mingo’s combined opening brief and COA application, the
appellate record, the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision, the district court’s order
denying habeas relief, and the applicable law. Based on this review, we conclude
Mingo hasn’t demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the
district court’s resolution of his habeas application. Thus, we deny Mingo’s request
for a COA and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
determination or reassert the fourth claim in his combined opening brief and COA
application.
3