UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4650
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THEODORE WILLIAM WELLS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00249-CMH-1)
Submitted: June 16, 2016 Decided: July 14, 2016
Before KING, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew M. Stewart, DENNIS, STEWART, KRISCHER & TERPAK, PLLC,
Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Joseph V. Longobardo, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Theodore William Wells appeals the 18-month sentence
imposed by the district court at resentencing following a remand
from this court. Wells argues that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his renewed motion for new counsel
and that the court failed to adequately explain its reasons for
imposing its sentence. We affirm.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to
substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion, United States v.
Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 2012), “consider[ing] three
factors . . . : (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the
adequacy of the court’s subsequent inquiry [into defendant’s
complaint]; and (3) whether the attorney/client conflict was so
great that it had resulted in total lack of communication
preventing an adequate defense,” id. at 467 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We discern no abuse of discretion here. It is
clear that Wells and his counsel were able to communicate with
each other, as Wells’ statements to the district court at both
sentencing hearings indicated that he disagreed with counsel’s
presentation of arguments in the original sentencing position
paper. While Wells was dissatisfied with counsel’s advice,
their disagreement was not sufficient to demonstrate that Wells
was not provided an adequate defense.
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Wells next contends that the district court did not
adequately explain its sentence. The Government responds that
any error is harmless. In explaining a sentence, the district
court is not required to “robotically tick through the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553 factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148,
153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the court “must make an individualized assessment based
on the facts presented when imposing a sentence, applying the
relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances of the
case and the defendant, and must state in open court the
particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence.” United
States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 113 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis,
alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Procedural sentencing error, including the failure to
adequately explain the chosen sentence, is subject to review for
harmless error. United States v. Martinovich, 810 F.3d 232,
242-43 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under that standard, the government
may avoid reversal only if it demonstrates that the error did
not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
result,” such that we “can say with fair assurance that the
district court’s explicit consideration of the defendant’s
arguments would not have affected the sentence imposed.” United
States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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We conclude that any error is harmless, given that nothing
in the record suggests that a more extensive discussion of
Wells’ arguments would result in a lower sentence. Wells’
requests for a variance sentence were the only sentencing issues
argued at both hearings. The district court twice heard Wells’
arguments for a sentence of time served and each time concluded
that a sentence at the low end of the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range was appropriate. While the court did not
extensively discuss its reasons, it noted that it had considered
the nature of the offense and Wells’ age in arriving at its
chosen sentence, indicating it considered Wells’ argument that
the offense was nonviolent.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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