This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1806
Baron Montero Jones, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed July 18, 2016
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge
Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-13-185
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Lee A. Bjorndal, Albert Lea City Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Because appellant Baron Montero Jones was not provided assistance of counsel on
his first postconviction petition, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing Jones’s
petition and remand for appointment of counsel.
FACTS
On June 13, 2013, with the assistance of counsel, Jones pleaded guilty to driving
under the influence (DWI) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20,
subdivision 1(1) (2012). That day the district court sentenced Jones to 60 days in the
county jail.
On June 24, 2015, Jones filed a pro se motion in district court to withdraw his plea
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05, and Minnesota Statutes
chapter 590 (2014), which provides for postconviction relief. The state filed a response on
June 30, 2015, opposing the motion, which it treated as a petition for postconviction relief.
On September 1, 2015, the district court denied Jones’s petition, ruling that it was time
barred under the postconviction statute because two years after the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence had elapsed.
The district court did not inform Jones of his right to counsel at the postconviction
stage, nor did district court administration forward Jones’s pro se petition to the Office of
the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender (State Public Defender’s Office). On
September 15, 2015, Jones filed a pro se notice of appeal. The court of appeals forwarded
a copy of the pro se filing to the State Public Defender’s Office, and a state public defender
was appointed to represent Jones.
Jones now appeals the district court’s order.
DECISION
Jones argues that his right to counsel was violated when the district court did not
inform him of his right to be represented by counsel on his first postconviction petition and
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when district court administration never forwarded his pro se petition to the State Public
Defender’s Office. We agree.
We review a postconviction court’s findings of fact for an abuse of discretion and
questions of law de novo. Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 2009). When the
facts are undisputed, as they are here, whether a person’s right to counsel has been violated
is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Gergen v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 548
N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996).
The Minnesota Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to assistance
of counsel in his or her defense. Minn. Const. art I, § 6. The Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that the right to assistance of counsel extends to one review of a criminal
conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding.
Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2006). The denial of the right to counsel “is a
structural error,” Bonga, 765 N.W.2d at 643, that “does not require a showing of prejudice
to obtain reversal.” State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Minn. 1997). Structural
errors are such where “[t]he entire conduct of the [proceeding] from beginning to end is
obviously affected, and without the basic protections guaranteed by the right being
violated, no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” State v.
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Minnesota law further protects the right to assistance of counsel by providing that
when a defendant files a petition for postconviction relief, and is without counsel, the
district court administrator must send a copy of the petition to the State Public Defender’s
Office. Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(4); Paone v. State, 658 N.W.2d 896, 899 (Minn. App.
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2003) (“Properly applying the [postconviction] statute, the court administrator should have
sent a copy of the appellant’s petition to the state public defender.”). The State Public
Defender’s Office must represent an indigent person unable to obtain counsel on the
person’s first appeal or postconviction petition. Minn. Stat. § 590.05. Finally, a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea made after sentencing must be raised in a petition for postconviction
relief. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 586 n.2 (Minn. 2012).
Because Jones filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a petition for
postconviction relief, the district court needed to follow the postconviction statute’s
procedural safeguards by recognizing Jones’s right to counsel and forwarding Jones’s
petition to the State Public Defender’s Office. Jones was previously appointed a trial level
public defender, and there is no evidence in the record that Jones waived his right to
counsel. Because Jones’s right to counsel on his first postconviction petition was violated,
there was structural error.
The state argues that this court should affirm the district court because it found
Jones’s initial petition untimely and frivolous. However, as Jones points out, the
untimeliness of his petition is a claim by the state that is subject to several exceptions. See
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (providing several exceptions to the two-year time bar).
Thus, the timeliness of a petition is an issue subject to litigation and Jones did not have the
assistance of counsel to litigate the issue. Finally, reaching the merits of the timeliness
issue is not warranted because structural error does not require a showing of prejudice to
obtain reversal. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171.
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Jones’s right to counsel on his first postconviction petition was violated because he
was not informed of his right to counsel and his petition was not forwarded to the State
Public Defender’s Office. On remand, Jones should be allowed to petition the district court
for postconviction relief with the assistance of counsel.
Reversed and remanded.
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