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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WARREN D. ANDERSON
Appellant No. 372 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 27, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003367-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 18, 2016
I join the majority decision in this matter but write separately to note
additional reasoning supporting the decision.
The Majority cites Commonwealth v. Romero, ___ A.3d. ___, 2016
PA Super 87 (Pa. Super. 2016) (filed 4/19/2016) for the proposition that
where the authorities1 have a reasonable belief that the subject of an arrest
warrant lives within a given premises, they can enter the home and arrest
the suspect without a search warrant. However, that statement does not
define “reasonable belief.” I believe we should clarify the rule and follow the
guidance of the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Vasquez-
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The authorities in Romero were probation officers.
J-S31015-16
Algarin, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1730540 (3 rd Cir.) (filed 5/2/2016) and
define reasonable belief as probable cause.2 In Vasquez-Algarin, Judge
Krause has provided a thorough history of the issue and the standard
applied as well as sound reasoning why “reasonable belief” should be
interpreted as probable cause. While I direct interested parties to the entire
decision, I quote two passages.
Although the language of Payton and the Supreme Court's other
Fourth Amendment decisions provides [sic] strong support for
interpreting reasonable belief as a probable cause standard, it is
the nature of the privacy interests at stake that solidifies our
conclusion. Without question, the home takes pride of place in
our constitutional jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has
reiterated on numerous occasions, “when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the
Amendment's ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679,
5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). Indeed, such intrusion is “the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585.
The vaunted place of the home in our constitutional privacy
jurisprudence was central to the Supreme Court's analysis in
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2
[I]t is well-settled that this Court is not bound by the decisions of federal
courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, or the decisions of
other states' courts. We recognize that we are not bound by these cases;
however, we may use them for guidance to the degree we find them useful
and not incompatible with Pennsylvania law.
Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted).
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Payton and Steagald. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-90;
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220, 222. These cases together provide
insight that neither case provides alone—insight that leads
inexorably to the conclusion that the Circuit-created two-prong
test is workable only if governed by a robust reasonableness
standard akin to probable cause, and that anything less would
defeat the “stringent ... protection” the home is due. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074,
49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (private homes are “ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection”).
U.S. v. Vasquez-Algarin, ___ F.3d ___, at *8 -*9.3
Additionally,
Given this precedent and the constitutional principles at stake,
law enforcement armed with only an arrest warrant may not
force entry into a home based on anything less than probable
cause to believe an arrestee resides at and is then present within
the residence. A laxer standard would effect an end-run around
the stringent baseline protection established in Steagald and
render all private homes—the most sacred of Fourth Amendment
spaces—susceptible to search by dint of mere suspicion or
uncorroborated information and without the benefit of any
judicial determination. Such intrusions are “the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585. We therefore join those Courts of
Appeals that have held that reasonable belief in the Payton
context “embodies the same standard of reasonableness
inherent in probable cause.” Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1111; accord
Barrera, 464 F.3d at 501.
Id. at 10.4
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3
Complete interior citations are: Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100
S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981).
4
Complete interior citations are: United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2006).
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In the instant matter, the record supports that the authorities, based
on information contained in the “warrant packet” and independently
developed at the scene, possessed probable cause to believe Ramos lived at
2308 Orange Street. Further, they possessed probable cause, based upon
the information that Ramos’s mode of transportation was a bicycle and a
bicycle was found at the rear of 2308 Orange Street, that he was present at
the time the authorities attempted to execute the arrest warrant.
Accordingly, I believe that facts presented in this case meet the standard as
set forth in United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, supra.
Judge Strassburger joins the concurring memorandum.
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Com. v. Anderson, W.
Combined Opinion