[J-49-2016] [MO: Dougherty, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 75 MAP 2015
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court at No. 906 MDA 2014 dated
: February 23, 2015 Affirming the Order
v. : of the Centre County Court of Common
: Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-14-
: MD-0000836-2013 dated April 30, 2014.
VICTORIA C. GIULIAN, :
: ARGUED: April 6, 2016
Appellant :
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: July 19, 2016
I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full. I agree that the operative language of
18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i) is ambiguous, and that Victoria Giulian presents the correct
interpretation of the statute. The Majority aptly depicts the absurd and unreasonable
results that a contrary construction would engender. I write separately to identify a
peculiar consequence that would follow from the Commonwealth’s suggested
interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i), which further illustrates the untenable nature
of the Commonwealth’s position.
In construing ambiguous statutory language, “we presume to be erroneous any
interpretation that leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.” Freedom Med. Supply,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 A.3d 977, 984 (Pa. 2016); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
I agree with the Majority’s assessment that the Commonwealth’s reading of the statute
yields an unreasonable result, in that the 1997 offenses never may be expunged, while,
oddly enough, expungement of the 1998 conviction is fully permissible. See Maj. Op. at
15.
I note, as well, that the Commonwealth’s suggested interpretation would
countenance an even more plainly unreasonable and absurd result, as follows. The
Commonwealth maintains that “a defendant with a subsequent arrest or prosecution
within the five years following the initial summary offense conviction may never have the
initial summary offense expunged,” but that a summary offense conviction may be
expunged if the defendant “can simply remain arrest-free for five years following that
conviction.” Brief for the Commonwealth at 10, 14. The Majority correctly notes that
this interpretation would preclude expungement of the 1997 offenses even if Giulian
remains arrest-free for another fifty years. However, over a similar fifty-year period, the
Commonwealth’s interpretation would allow for the expungement of up to ten offenses,
provided merely that five years elapsed between each conviction and subsequent
arrest. While an individual that was arrested within five years of a summary conviction
would have a criminal record forever, another individual would be free to recidivate in
perpetuity, reoffending every five years while never being precluded from expungement
as a matter of law. Although occurring over a period of time, this is precisely and
ironically the sort of “volume discounting” and “expungement windfall” that the
Commonwealth argues should be forbidden under the statute. See Id. at 17. These
volume discounts and expungement windfalls would accrue liberally for recidivist
offenders under the Commonwealth’s own interpretation.
The Majority’s analysis of the factors supporting Giulian’s construction of 18
Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i) is well-reasoned and compelling. Even if those factors were
absent, however, the absurdity of the results that flow from the Commonwealth’s
position renders its interpretation of the statute erroneous.
[J-49-2016] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 2