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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL D. STOKES,
Appellant No. 610 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1126922-1991
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 19, 2016
This is an appeal from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County dismissing Appellant’s second petition under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. as untimely. We
affirm.
On April 20, 1994, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment after
a jury convicted him of, inter alia, first-degree murder. This Court affirmed
judgment of sentence on May 30, 1995, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied allocatur on December 18, 1995.
On September 6, 1996, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. The
PCRA court entered an order dismissing the petition and this Court affirmed
the order on August 6, 1999.
Nearly seventeen years after Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final, he filed his second PCRA petition on August 20, 2012, challenging the
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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constitutionality of his life imprisonment sentence under Miller v. Alabama,
132 S.Ct. 2455 (2010) (prohibiting mechanical mandatory sentences of life
without opportunity for parole for juvenile offenders).1 While disposition on
that petition was pending, Appellant filed a self-styled “Supplemental
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” on October 26, 2015, challenging 18
Pa.C.S. § 1102 (a), under which he was sentenced, as constitutionally void
for vagueness. On January 28, 2016, the PCRA court determined that Miller
afforded Appellant no relief since it was undisputed that Appellant was
twenty years and two months old at the time he committed the crime of
murder for which he received his life sentence. Accordingly, it dismissed
both the initial filing and the petition for habeas relief, which it treated as an
amendment to the initial filing, as time-barred under the PCRA. This timely
appeal followed.
This Court's standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth
v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA court's findings will
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1
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the United States
Supreme Court held that its decision in Miller applies retroactively in cases
on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 77 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (interpreting Montgomery to make retroactivity under Miller
effective as of the date of the Miller decision).
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not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified
record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2001).
We apply a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of review to
challenges involving questions of law. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d
1177, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2012).
The PCRA's time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be
altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.3d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or
subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of
sentence becomes final, unless one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies.2
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2
Specifically, the exceptions to the PCRA's timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(i)-(iii).
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Appellant contends it was error to dismiss his petition for habeas relief
under the rubric of the PCRA when the PCRA does not provide a remedy for
the claim he raises therein. We disagree. It is well-settled that “[t]he PCRA
at Section 9542 subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.”
Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013). Indeed, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9542 provides “[t]he action established in this subchapter shall be
the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when
this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. ”
See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 2016 WL 1249964 (Pa. 2016) (holding
if a defendant's claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the sole
method of obtaining collateral review and a PCRA petition is subject to its
restrictions).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a claim that a
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated is cognizable under the PCRA
and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailable to advance such an
averment. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640-41 (Pa.
1998). Appellant’s claim challenging the constitutionality of the statute
under which he was sentenced is, therefore, cognizable under the PCRA, and
it follows that the PCRA stands as the sole means by which Appellant may
seek relief for his claim. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly ruled that
Appellant could not seek habeas corpus relief and dismissed his habeas
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petition as an amendment to the untimely second PCRA petition he initially
filed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/2016
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