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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-14494
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cr-00308-PGB-GJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RADBOURNE MARK ANTHONY SALEEM,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(July 22, 2016)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Radbourne Saleem appeals his convictions and total 262-month sentence,
imposed after he pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of an unregistered
firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and one count of forcible assault of a
federal officer with use of a deadly weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)
and (b). Saleem argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in
failing to sua sponte reject his guilty plea as unknowing or involuntary. He argues
that he pleaded guilty only because his counsel told him that he would be
sentenced to less than 10-years imprisonment, and he did not know that his
maximum possible sentence was greater than ten years. Upon careful review of
the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
When a defendant does not object to the plea proceedings or move to
withdraw his plea before the district court, we review for plain error the district
court’s compliance with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11. United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2014).
“To establish plain error, a defendant must show there is (1) error, (2) that is plain,
and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. (quotation omitted). The defendant
must also show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the guilty
plea but for the district court’s error. Id. at 1252. “[W]here the explicit language
of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error
where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly
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resolving it.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam).
A guilty plea must “be made knowingly and voluntarily to satisfy the
requirements of due process.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). In accepting a guilty plea, the district court must
comply with three “core principles” of Rule 11 to “ensur[e] that a defendant (1)
enters his guilty plea free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges,
and (3) understands the consequences of his plea.” Id. (quotation omitted). To do
this, the district court “must inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands” a number of things, including “any maximum possible
penalty,” “any mandatory minimum penalty,” and “the [sentencing] court’s
obligation to calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider
that range, possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).
Under Rule 11, it is the district court’s “obligation and responsibility to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea.”
United States v. Siegel, 102 F.3d 477, 481 (11th Cir. 1996). In conducting this
inquiry, there is a strong presumption that sworn statements made to the district
court during a plea colloquy are true. United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187
(11th Cir. 1994).
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Saleem fails to show that the district court plainly erred in finding that his
guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. The express terms of the plea
agreement stated that the first two counts carried “a maximum sentence for each
count of not more than 10 years’ imprisonment,” and the final count contained “a
maximum sentence of not more than 20 years’ imprisonment.” The agreement
further stated that “[t]he Court may, although it is not required to, impose the
sentence for these charges consecutively.” Saleem initialed the page of the plea
agreement on which those maximum sentences appeared, and signed the final page
of the agreement in full.
Saleem also verified under oath at his plea hearing that he understood the
statutory maximums involved in his case and entered his plea knowingly and
voluntarily. The district court asked during the plea colloquy whether Saleem had
read the entire plea agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and felt “confident
and comfortable that [he was] familiar with all the terms and representations
contained in [it].” Saleem responded in the affirmative. Saleem also verified that
he had not been forced or coerced to plead guilty, and that he had entered into the
agreement voluntarily and freely.
Saleem further verified that he understood the maximum sentence for each
count of his plea after the district court had the government read those maximums
aloud during the proceedings. He also confirmed that he understood that the
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sentences for each could be imposed consecutively at the court’s discretion. The
district court told Saleem that he “could, in theory, be exposed to as much as 40
years imprisonment . . . . Do you understand that?” Saleem responded, “[y]es,
Your Honor.” The district court also confirmed with Saleem that if the ultimate
sentence based on the Sentencing Guidelines was higher than he anticipated, he
would not be able to withdraw his guilty plea.
The district court found that Saleem’s plea was knowing and voluntary
based on these statements at the plea hearing. There is a strong presumption that
Saleem made these statements truthfully. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. The
district court’s thorough inquiry, spanning more than twenty pages of hearing
transcript, is further evidence that its inquiry into the voluntariness of Saleem’s
guilty plea was sufficiently searching.
Saleem identifies nothing in the record suggesting that the district court was
aware of any conflicting representations made to him by his counsel as to his likely
sentence or statutory maximums. Saleem also has not pointed to any particular
rule, statute or case from the Supreme Court or this Court directly establishing that
the district court erred or that the plea must be set aside in the circumstances of his
case. See Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. The district court sufficiently complied
with its Rule 11 obligations and did not err, let alone plainly err, in determining
that Saleem’s guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.
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AFFIRMED.
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