NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 22, 2016*
Decided July 22, 2016
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3573
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Fort Wayne Division.
v.
No. 1:06‐CR‐23‐001
MARLYN JERMAINE BARNES,
Defendant‐Appellant. Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
Marlyn Barnes was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment for conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a). See United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming Barnes’s
sentence). In September 2015, he asked the district court for a lawyer’s help with filing a
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction based on the retroactive
application of Amendment 782 to the federal sentencing guidelines. A federal public
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 15‐3573 Page 2
defender entered an appearance on Barnes’s behalf and filed an unopposed motion
requesting a 58‐month reduction in his sentence. The district court granted the motion
and entered an order lowering Barnes’s sentence to 234 months.
Not satisfied with the new sentence, Barnes a week later asked the court for an
extension of time to file a pro se motion “raising specific mitigating factors” not
presented by his lawyer. (He did not specify what those factors were.) The court denied
the extension. Barnes disregarded the court’s ruling and, a month after the district court
had entered the order lowering his sentence, filed a motion seeking a further reduction
under Amendment 782. The court denied that motion as well, and Barnes filed a notice
of appeal nine days later.
Barnes advances several arguments as to why the district court should have
granted him a greater reduction in sentence, but none of them warrants discussion. We
may not review the district court’s order reducing the sentence because Barnes filed his
notice of appeal more than a month after that order was entered—too late to serve as the
basis of an appeal from the order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (providing that notice of
appeal must be filed within 14 days of the order being appealed). No exception to the
14‐day limit applies here: Barnes did not seek an extension of time to file an appeal,
FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4), nor did he file a motion within the 14‐day window that would
have suspended the time for taking an appeal, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(3); United States v.
Beard, 745 F.3d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 2014). And although the 14‐day limit for filing a notice of
appeal under Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional, we must adhere to the time limit where, as
here, the appellee asks us to do so. United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2010).
Barnes’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his pro se motion seeking a
reduction based on Amendment 782 likewise fails. His filing was a successive motion
under § 3582(c)(2) and was therefore properly denied because § 3582(c)(2) allows only
one sentence‐reduction motion per retroactive change to the guidelines. See United States
v. Redd, 630 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.