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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
PHILLIPS PITTS,
Appellee No. 2360 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005714-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY AND PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals from the July 15, 2015 order finding that
a search warrant utilized to search the residence of Appellee, Phillips Pitts,
was not supported by probable cause and suppressing the fruits of that
search. We reverse.
We first set forth the principles that inform our review. When the
Commonwealth appeals from an order granting suppression, we consider the
defense evidence and the evidence from the prosecution that, in the context
of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Carter,
105 A.3d 765 (Pa.Super. 2014). If supported by the record, the suppression
court's factual findings bind us, but this Court is not obliged to accept the
suppression court’s conclusions of law.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In this case, we are examining a suppression court's holding that the
facts contained in a search warrant's affidavit did not justify its issuance. A
search warrant is valid when the facts in the affidavit establish the existence
of probable cause. Commonwealth v. Leed, 2016 WL 3135662 (Pa.Super.
2016). "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution" to
believe that a search should be conducted. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
Probable cause is determined by the magisterial district judge who issued
the warrant, and must be ascertained based upon a practical approach and
pursuant to a common sense, non-technical analysis. Id. at *7. The
magisterial body decides, based upon the facts in the affidavit itself, if "there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular case." Id. (citation omitted). Probable cause must be
established based solely upon "the information within the four corners of the
affidavit submitted in support" of issuance of the warrant. Commonwealth
v. Burgos, 64 A.3d 641, 656 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Once
that determination is rendered by the magisterial district judge, the warrant
may be issued.
The suppression court, as a reviewing court of the magisterial decision,
"is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed." Leed, supra at *7 (citation
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omitted). Thus, the court of common pleas does not engage in de novo
review and must grant great deference to the magisterial district judge's
finding that an affidavit sets forth facts establishing probable cause. Id. The
suppression court cannot invalidate a warrant through a hyper-technical
interpretation of the facts. Id. When this Court examines the contents of
the affidavit supporting the warrant, we utilize the same standard of review
as the court of common pleas and accord great deference to the magisterial
body that issued the warrant. It is a question of law as to whether an
affidavit supports the magisterial determination that there is probable cause,
i.e., a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found
at the described location. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 830 A.2d 554 (Pa.
2003). Thus, in this case, we owe no deference to the suppression court's
legal determination that the affidavit herein was insufficient to establish
probable cause to search Appellee’s residence.
In accordance with the foregoing precepts, we now review the facts
contained in the four corners of the affidavit utilized to obtain the search
warrant herein. On January 25, 2011, two Philadelphia Police Officers
received information that drugs were being sold in the vicinity of Ella and
Mayfield Streets, Philadelphia, and conducted surveillance there. They
observed the following. An unidentified male ("unidentified male")
continually entered and exited 243 East Mayfield Street, and handed small
items from a black plastic bag in exchange for cash to numerous people who
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approached him briefly. Police then utilized a confidential informant ("CI")
and observed the CI purchase PCP from the unidentified male on Mayfield
Street.
Officers continued their surveillance. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on
February 1, 2011, a tan Suburban parked on Ella Street near Mayfield
Street. The unidentified male approached that vehicle, received a black bag
from the driver, Curtis Coates, and placed the bag on the steps of 243 East
Mayfield Street. From 6:45 to 7:15 a.m., the unidentified male engaged in
numerous hand-to-hand transactions of small items for cash with various
people. Then, the unidentified male returned to the Suburban, took a small
item from Coates, went to 243 East Mayfield Street, and placed that item in
the black bag. He then sold something to another pedestrian.
On February 2, 2011, police began surveillance of the Suburban, which
was located in the rear alley of property at 345 Roosevelt Boulevard. At
7:00 a.m., police followed that vehicle to the area of Ella and Mayfield
Streets. The unidentified male again received a back bag from the
Suburban's driver, and resumed making what police concluded were
narcotics sales with numerous pedestrians on Mayfield Street. At 7:30 a.m.,
the Suburban returned to the alley behind 345 East Roosevelt Boulevard.
Later in the afternoon of February 2, 2011, the CI purchased heroin from the
unidentified male on East Mayfield Street.
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Police remained in their lookout positions on East Mayfield Street. At
about 3:30 p.m. on February 2, 2011, Appellee, who is referred to as
unidentified male number two in the affidavit, arrived at 243 East Mayfield
Street in a black Ford F-150 pickup truck, met with the unidentified male,
handed him a large black bag, and then re-entered his pickup truck. The
unidentified male took the bag into 243 East Mayfield Street.
At around 7:00 a.m. on the following day, February 3, 2011, Coates
again traveled to 243 East Mayfield Street. The unidentified male entered
Coates' Suburban, and, after a few minutes, the unidentified male returned
to 243 East Mayfield Street and began to sell small items for cash on the
street to various pedestrians.
In the meantime, police began surveillance of Appellee. At around
11:30 a.m., on February 3, 2011, Appellee exited 4166 Paul Street, drove to
the 200 block of East Mayfield Street, and handed a large black bag to the
unidentified male, who took it inside 243 East Mayfield Street. Appellee then
returned to 4166 Paul Street and entered that location. Later that day,
Appellee went back to 243 East Mayfield Street, and entered it. The
unidentified male was on the porch when Appellee arrived. The CI
approached and spoke with him. The unidentified male went inside 243 East
Mayfield Street, and Appellee then exited 243 East Mayfield Street. Appellee
sold PCP, which he retrieved from a black bag, to the CI. Appellee then
returned to 4166 Paul Street, where police observed a white garage that
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appeared to be storage container attached to that house. Since PCP is
caustic, police suspected that it was being mixed and stored in the garage.
Based on this information, the magisterial district judge issued a search
warrant for 4166 Paul Street, and, during its execution, police discovered
seventy grams of PCP and drug packaging material.
In concluding that the warrant failed to set forth probable cause to
search 4166 Paul Street, the suppression court opined that there was no
nexus between 4166 Paul Street and the drugs being sold by the
unidentified male and Appellee on East Mayfield Street. The suppression
court ruled that police had no reason to conclude that drugs would be found
in 4166 Paul Street. This appeal followed the court’s suppression of the PCP
and packaging material found at that location.
The Commonwealth assails the suppression court’s conclusion that the
affidavit failed to set forth facts supporting the police’s belief that there was
a fair probability that drugs would be located at 4166 Paul Street. As noted,
we accord no deference to the suppression court's legal determination that
the affidavit did not support the existence of probable cause to search 4166
Paul Street. Instead, we, as the suppression court should have, accord
great deference to the magisterial determination that the affidavit did, in
fact, establish that there was a fair probability that drugs would be found at
4166 Paul Street. We also view the facts set forth in the affidavit in a
common sense and practical fashion.
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We first note the following. On three separate days, police observed
the unidentified male engage in numerous drug transactions on East
Mayfield Street. The behavior of Appellee and Coates, viewed in a logical
manner, establishes that they were supplying the unidentified man with
those drugs. While the fact that Appellee was a drug supplier does not
necessarily mean that he was storing those drugs at 4166 Paul Street, we
conclude that the following event is critical in the probable cause equation.
On February 3, 2011, Appellee left 4166 Paul Street, traveled to 243 East
Mayfield Street, and handed a black bag to the unidentified male. The
unidentified man, as established through sales to the CI, was selling PCP and
heroin from black bags. That same day, Appellee sold PCP to the CI and
took it from a black bag. The previous day, Appellee also delivered a black
bag to the unidentified man. While there was no indication where Appellee
stored his drugs based upon what police saw on February 2, 2011, this
missing information was supplied by police surveillance conducted on
February 3, 2011. On that day, Appellee left 4166 Paul Street to make his
conveyance of the contraband to the unidentified man. Additionally, 4166
Paul Street had a structure suitable for mixing and storing PCP.
In Commonwealth v. Clark, 28 A.3d 1282 (Pa. 2011), the defendant
left his residence, traveled to another location, made a drug sale, and then
returned to his residence. Our Supreme Court held that this sequence of
events "connected the illegal transaction to [the defendant's] residence,"
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supporting the magisterial determination "that drugs would likely be found in
the residence." Id. at 1291. Appellee performed precisely these same
actions on February 3, 2011. He left 4166 Paul Street, gave a black bag to
the unidentified man, and that man took it inside 243 East Mayfield Street.
The affidavit established that the unidentified man was a street-level drug
dealer, that he procured and sold those drugs from black bags delivered by
his suppliers, and that he stored his drugs at 243 East Mayfield Street.
Thus, when all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are viewed in their
totality and with common sense, it is evident that Appellee delivered drugs
on February 3, 2011, and that he traveled from 4166 Paul Street to perform
that action. Under Clark’s rationale, there was a sufficient nexus between
Appellee's drug activity and 4166 Paul Street. The magisterial district judge
properly found that there was a fair probability drugs would be therein.
We conclude that the suppression court erred in applying
Commonwealth v. Davis, 310 A.2d 334 (Pa.Super. 1973). Therein, a
warrant was issued based solely upon the fact that the defendant was a
reputed drug dealer who was visited by other supposed drug dealers, and
police never even saw any drug sales. There were no events supporting a
belief that any drugs would be at Davis’ residence. In this case, police
observed, on three different days, the unidentified male make a plethora of
street sales of drugs, and the CI purchased narcotics from both Appellee and
that unidentified male. Additionally, police observed Appellee leave 4166
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Paul Street and deliver PCP to the street dealer. The Davis decision is
inapposite herein.
We also conclude that the suppression court’s application of
Commonwealth v. Kline, 335 A.2d 361 (Pa.Super. 1975) and
Commonwealth v. Way, 492 A.2d 1151 (Pa.Super. 1985), was misguided.
In those two cases, we held that there was not a sufficient basis to search
each defendant's home in that police did not view the defendant travel from
his residence to the location of the drug sales that the defendants
conducted. We noted in those cases that the fact that a defendant is a
criminal does not mean that contraband will be found in his residence.
Herein, the totality of the circumstances, and, most crucially, the police's
observation of Appellee leaving 4166 Paul Street immediately before he
proceeded to deliver narcotics, compels affirmance of the magisterial
determination that there was a fair probability that drugs would be located
in 4166 Paul Street.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/22/2016
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