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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARK QUINTIN GALLOWAY
Appellant No. 1350 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0003033-2007
BEFORE: STABILE, PLATT *, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 25, 2016
Mark Quinn Galloway (“Appellant”) pro se appeals from the June 24,
2015 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (“PCRA
court”), which denied his request for collateral relief under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9451-46. We affirm.
While the present appeal does not require an exhaustive review of the
facts, some context is necessary. On September 8, 2008, Appellant pled
guilty to four counts of criminal attempt homicide, five counts of aggravated
assault, and two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. 1 The trial court
sentenced Appellant on December 22, 2008 to an aggregate term of forty-
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2702(a)(1),(4), and 6101-27, respectively.
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one and one-half years to one hundred years’ imprisonment. We affirmed
the judgment of sentence on January 6, 2010. See Commonwealth v.
Galloway, 991 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum).
Because Appellant did not seek an appeal to our Supreme Court, his
sentence became final on February 5, 2010.
On June 15, 2010, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, which the
PCRA court denied on August 29, 2011. This Court affirmed the PCRA
court’s decision on July 19, 2012. See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 55
A.3d 141 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum).
On April 20, 2015, Appellant filed what purported to be a Petition for
Modification of Order. Treating the filing as a second PCRA petition, the
PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Appellant then
appealed to this Court.
Preliminarily, we note that the PCRA court properly reclassified
Appellant’s April 2015 filing as a PCRA petition. The plain language of the
statute provides that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Cognizant of the
stated purpose of the PCRA, we have held that “any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011); see
also Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 842 (Pa. 2002) (noting that if
relief is available under the PCRA, the PCRA is the exclusive means of
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obtaining the relief sought). Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in
treating Appellant’s April 20, 2015 Petition for Modification as a PCRA
petition.
We must now determine whether the PCRA court properly dismissed
Appellant’s petition as untimely. For such an inquiry, our standard of review
is whether the PCRA court’s findings are free of legal error and supported by
the record. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 182 (Pa. 2010)
(citation omitted).
A court cannot entertain a PCRA petition unless the petitioner has first
satisfied the applicable filing deadline. Section 9545(b) of the PCRA specifies
the following requirements for a PCRA petition to be considered timely:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
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(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). The limitation established by Section 9545 is
jurisdictional in nature and “implicat[es] a court’s very power to adjudicate a
controversy.” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (citing
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999)). The time for filing can
be extended only by a petitioner satisfying one of the exceptions listed in
Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Id. Accordingly, courts are without power to
“fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted).
As stated above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on
February 5, 2010. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
Appellant therefore had until February 5, 2011 to file for collateral relief.
Because Appellant’s instant PCRA petition was not filed until April 20, 2015,
it is facially untimely.
The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner
alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. Here, Appellant has failed to allege, let
alone prove, any exceptions to the one-year time bar. Accordingly, the
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PCRA court did not err in dismissing as untimely Appellant’s instant, his
second, PCRA petition for want of jurisdiction.
Order affirmed.
Judge Strassburger joins this memorandum.
Judge Platt concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/25/2016
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