ALD-351 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-2106
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LARRY JONES,
Appellant
v.
SGT. YOLINSKY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00099)
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 21, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 27, 2016)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Larry Jones appeals from the Magistrate Judge’s order granting
Appellee Sergeant Yolinsky’s motion for summary judgment and denying Jones’s motion
for summary judgment. 1 Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the judgment below. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6.
I.
Jones, a prisoner at State Correctional Institution – Forest, acting pro se, filed this
civil rights action against Sergeant Yolinsky, an employee of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. Jones alleged that, after he transferred into SCI-Forest in
March of 2014, Yolinsky targeted him for retaliation for a lawsuit that he had filed
against Yolinsky in 2004. Jones further alleged that, as a result of Yolinsky’s actions, in
May of 2014, Jones was placed in administrative custody for 192 days. Jones’s
Complaint stated both due process and retaliation claims. Yolinsky, on the other hand,
maintained that he merely informed SCI-Forest of alleged threats that Jones had made
against him in the past and was not involved in decision-making regarding Jones’s
placement in administrative custody. The Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment
on all claims to Yolinsky, ruling that he had no personal involvement in Jones’s
placement in administrative custody and thus could not be held liable. Jones now
appeals.
1
The parties consented to disposition of this matter by the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
2
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary. See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). We will summarily affirm because Jones’s appeal presents
no substantial question. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Jones failed to produce
evidence suggesting that Sergeant Yolinsky was personally involved in or had actual
knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the commission of any alleged constitutional violation.
Here, Jones only broadly alleged that Yolinsky triggered the process by which he was
held in administrative custody by others. Jones has not alleged Yolinsky’s knowledge
and acquiescence with the required particularity, nor has Jones offered evidence tending
to show that Yolinsky had the necessary level of involvement in the underlying allegedly
unconstitutional retaliatory conduct for the claim against him to survive summary
judgment. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that a plaintiff must allege “with appropriate particularity” that the defendants “have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be shown through allegations
of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence”). To the contrary, the
record reflects that Yolinsky’s involvement is extremely limited – namely, to the sole act
of submitting the Incident Report informing SCI-Forest of his history with Jones and his
belief that a Separation Order was in place due to Jones’s prior threats against him.
Based on the undisputed record, Yolinsky did not participate in issuing the DC-141 Other
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Report that placed him in administrative custody pending a transfer and he did not
participate in any of the Program Review Committee reviews that extended that
segregation. Put more simply, even if one were to assume an incident of retaliation did
occur, there is no evidence that Yolinsky was personally involved in the violation of
Jones’s constitutional rights. 2
Even if Yolinsky had been personally involved, the District Court still properly
granted him summary judgment. A prisoner claiming that prison officials have retaliated
against him for exercising his rights under the First Amendment must prove that, inter
alia, he suffered an “adverse action” at their hands. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333
(3d Cir. 2001). However, defendants can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
they “would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 334. Here, the record
reveals a clear legitimate penological basis underlying the decision to house Jones, who
had made threats against a corrections officer, in administrative custody: prison security.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”).
2
Yolinsky introduced several affidavits of prisoners who swore to have overheard
Yolinsky make disparaging remarks about Jones. This cannot overcome Jones’s lack of
personal involvement in any specifically alleged constitutional violation.
4
Finally, Jones fares no better as to the claim that his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was placed in administrative custody
pending a transfer out of SCI-Forest. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not create an inherent liberty interest to remain free from administrative
custody unless it would create an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995). The summary judgment record is devoid of any facts suggesting that Jones’s
transfer to administrative custody for 192 days resulted in “atypical and significant
hardship.” See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (exposure to the
conditions of administrative custody for periods of as long as 15 months is not atypical
and does not deprive prisoners of a liberty interest). Because Jones’s claim does not
implicate a liberty interest, Yolinsky was entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.
III.
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order granting Yolinsky
summary judgment and denying Jones summary judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
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