United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT December 8, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10210
Summary Calendar
JAIME CHAVEZ; MAYRA GUADALUPE
CHAVEZ-HERNANDEZ; JAIME DE JESUS
CHAVEZ-HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
MARK DE LA PAZ; ET AL.,
Defendants,
MARK DE LA PAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:04-CV-510-K)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
At issue is the denial of City of Dallas Police Officer Mark
De La Paz’s: motion to dismiss, both for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and based on
qualified immunity; motion for a Rule 7(a) reply; and motion for a
protective order to stay discovery.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Jaime Chavez, individually and on behalf of his minor
children, sued Dallas and several members of its police department,
including Officer De La Paz. Among the claims was a constitutional
claim for false arrest against Officer De La Paz under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and also under state law.
Chavez’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Officer
pressured an informant to implicate Chavez in a drug sale because
he had no other reliable evidence against Chavez. In his answer,
Officer De La Paz raised the defense of qualified immunity to all
claims, and subsequently filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; a
motion for Rule 7(a) reply; an alternative Rule 12(e) motion for
more definite statement; and motion for a protective order to stay
discovery. The district court granted the 12(b)(6) motion on all
claims except for false arrest, ruling the complaint stated a claim
on that basis and the Officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. For the same reasons that it held the complaint was
sufficient to preclude qualified immunity at the complaint stage,
the district court denied the motion for a Rule 7(a) reply.
We lack jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal contesting
a ruling that a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Chrissy F. v. Miss. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d
844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991). On the other hand, we do have
jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from that part of the
denial of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion “assert[ing] a qualified
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immunity defense to ... constitutional claims”. Morin v. Caire, 77
F.3d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1996). In deciding whether qualified
immunity should be granted, we determine, inter alia, whether a
claim has been stated. The qualified-immunity ruling is reviewed
de novo. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss fails unless “it appears ...
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations” in the complaint. Morin,
77 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added). Restated, we consider only the well-pleaded
facts in Chavez’s complaint.
To prevail against a qualified-immunity claim, Chavez must
show: (1) his allegations state a violation of current law; and (2)
the Officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of
the clearly-established law at the time of such conduct. E.g.,
Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.
1999).
The first prong concerns whether the well-pleaded facts state
a claim for false arrest. They do. Chavez’s complaint alleges
that, after he was arrested without a warrant, the Officer
pressured an informant to implicate Chavez in a 15 February 2000
drug transaction because Officer De La Paz knew he had no other
evidence against him.
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For the second prong, the Officer’s alleged conduct was
objectively unreasonable in the light of the then clearly-
established law, because the complaint alleges that he arrested
Chavez without probable cause. Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369
(5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that persons enjoy the constitutional
right to be free from false arrest without probable cause).
In sum, we must view Chavez’s complaint in the light most
favorable to him. Based solely on the well-pleaded facts in that
complaint, the district court correctly denied qualified immunity.
The Officer also contests the denial of his motion for a Rule
7(a) reply to his qualified immunity defense. We have jurisdiction
over this contention because it is a question of law regarding the
denial of qualified immunity. Because Chavez’s complaint states a
sufficient claim against Officer De La Paz to withstand qualified
immunity at this stage, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to order a Rule 7(a) reply.
Similarly, because we affirm the denial of qualified immunity
defense at this stage, the district court’s ruling on the Officer’s
motion for a protective order to stay discovery is moot.
AFFIRMED
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