MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 28 2016, 8:26 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elgin Fidell, July 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1511-CR-2002
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1508-CM-28361
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1511-CR-2002 | July 28, 2016 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] Elgin Fidell appeals his conviction for battery of his former roommate, arguing
that the State at most proved that the two engaged in “mutual combat.”
Finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The State charged Fidell with battery resulting in bodily injury, see Ind. Code §
35-42-2-1, based on an August 2015 incident involving Fidell’s former
roommate, Shyanne Tingle. At a bench trial, Tingle testified that she was
walking down a street in Indianapolis when Fidell approached her and attacked
her. She testified that Fidell grabbed her by the hair, choked her, and hit her in
the face, causing pain and bruising to her eye. Two eyewitnesses (a husband
and wife who were on their porch nearby) testified consistently with Tingle’s
account of the attack, and the police officer who had responded to the scene
confirmed that Tingle’s eye was red and swollen. The trial court found Fidell
guilty and sentenced him accordingly.
[3] Fidell now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Fidell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. In
considering such a claim, we consider only the probative evidence and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1511-CR-2002 | July 28, 2016 Page 2 of 4
reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705,
716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence or
assess witness credibility. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably
to the conviction. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the judgment. Id.
[5] In order to convict Fidell of battery resulting in bodily injury, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fidell knowingly or
intentionally touched Tingle in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and that
Tingle was injured as a result. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1. Fidell does not challenge
the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on any particular element or elements.
Rather, he argues generally that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt “what occurred during the encounter between Mr.
Fidell and Ms. Tingle.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. We disagree.
[6] Tingle testified that Fidell approached her, grabbed her by the hair, choked her,
and hit her in the face. She also testified that the hitting caused pain and
bruising to her eye. Two people who were nearby and who witnessed the
encounter testified consistently with Tingle’s account. Finally, the police officer
who responded to the scene bolstered the bodily-injury evidence when he
confirmed that Tingle’s eye was red and swollen. This testimony was more
than sufficient to support the trial court’s guilty finding.
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[7] Fidell asserts that, “at most, tempers flared and a mutual combat took place.”
Id. at 11. However, he does not direct us to any evidence whatsoever that
would suggest that Tingle initiated the confrontation, willingly engaged in the
scuffle, or at any point fought back against Fidell, nor does he suggest that he
was acting in self-defense. Moreover, even if there had been such testimony,
Fidell’s argument would be a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. See Wilson, 39 N.E.3d at 716.
[8] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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