United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-1100
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* District of Nebraska.
Calvin Williams, *
* [PUBLISHED]
Appellant. *
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Submitted: October 23, 2009
Filed: March 19, 2010
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Before RILEY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Calvin Williams pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, pursuant to a plea
agreement. After granting Williams's motion for a downward departure, the district
court1 sentenced Williams to 235 months' imprisonment based upon his status as a
career offender. Williams appealed, and we remanded for resentencing in light of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On remand, the district court sentenced
Williams to 144 months' imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. Subsequently,
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The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
Nebraska.
Williams sought a further reduction in sentence based upon amendments to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. The district court denied the
reduction based upon his career offender status. Williams now appeals arguing that
he was not actually sentenced as a career offender. We affirm.
I. Background
In his original sentencing, Williams contested his classification as a career
offender. At the resentencing hearing, the district court found that Williams's base
offense level was 37 based on his status as a career offender. The district court did,
however, find that Williams's criminal history was overstated and reduced his criminal
history classification to category V. This placed Williams's sentencing range at 235
to 293 months' imprisonment. Absent the career offender enhancement, Williams's
sentencing range after the criminal history reduction would have been 210 to 262
months' imprisonment. The district court also overruled Williams's objection that the
Guidelines were unconstitutional. The court then sentenced Williams to 235 months'
imprisonment.
Following imposition of his initial sentence, we filed an opinion in United
States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004 WL 1636960 (8th Cir. July 23, 2004), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted. Based on Mooney, Williams filed a motion to stay the
entry of his judgment. The district court granted the motion and set the case for further
sentencing on September 3, 2004. Prior to the new sentencing hearing date, this court
vacated the decision in Mooney. On September 3, 2004, the district court lifted the
stay previously imposed and pronounced its previous sentence of 235 month's
imprisonment.
Williams appealed the constitutionality of his sentence, and in light of the
decision in Booker, we remanded his case for resentencing. Prior to Williams's
resentencing, the parties entered into a new written plea agreement. This plea
agreement provided that Williams would be sentenced to 144 months' imprisonment
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and that he would waive any right to appeal his conviction and sentence in any
post-conviction proceedings. The district court accepted the plea agreement and
sentenced Williams to 144 months' imprisonment.
On November 1, 2007, new amendments to the Guidelines went into effect
which lowered the sentencing ranges for crack offenses by two levels. On December
11, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to make the two-level
reduction retroactive. On September 9, 2008, Williams filed a motion seeking a
modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and requesting an
evidentiary hearing. The district court denied Williams's request for an evidentiary
hearing on his motion to reduce his sentence and ruled that the modifications to the
Guidelines did not apply to his case because he was sentenced as a career offender.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Williams maintains that the district court erred in concluding that
he was sentenced as a career offender and thus ineligible for a sentence reduction
pursuant to the modifications to the Guidelines. Williams argues that the new
amendments to the sentencing Guidelines apply to him because his sentence was
based on U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and not on the career offender statute.
A district court's legal conclusion regarding its authority to reduce a sentence
is reviewed de novo. United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 1992).
"[T]he extent of a downward departure in the defendant's favor lies within the district
court's discretion and is virtually unreviewable on a defendant's appeal, absent an
unconstitutional motive animating the district court." United States v. Dalton, 478
F.3d 879, 881 (8th Cir. 2007).
We hold that Williams is not entitled to a further sentence reduction under the
modified crack cocaine Guidelines. Although it is not entirely clear whether the
district court sentenced Williams as a career offender or simply found that he fit that
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status, that issue is not dispositive because we find that Williams's sentence was based
on a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.
Williams does not contend that his plea agreement was not under Rule
11(c)(1)(C) or dispute its binding nature. Consequently, our recent decision in United
States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009) controls. In Scurlark we stated:
[Once the court accepted the agreement] [u]nder Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the
court therefore was bound to sentence Scurlark pursuant to the terms of
the parties' agreement, and § 3582(c)(2) became inapplicable because
Scurlark's sentence was based on the agreement and not a sentencing
range that had subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.
Id. at 842. (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). We further found
that "a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), like all plea agreements, is binding on
both the government and the defendant, but Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements are
unique in that they are also binding on the court after the court accepts the agreement."
Id. (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). Williams's plea agreement
is similarly binding and is not subject to § 3582(c)(2).
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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