CLD-356 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 16-1888
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BARON KAILEE ADAMS,
Appellant
v.
US STATES TREASURY SECRETARY;
EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES;
VICE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES;
TREASURY STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA;
BOARD OF GOVERNORS - WORLD BANK;
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD GOVERNORS;
TREASURY DEPARTMENT - IRS;
UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE;
MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
ATF/FBI DIVISION DEPARTMENT
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-01085)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 21, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Baron Kailee Adams, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order dismissing his action sua sponte for not meeting the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(ii). Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s
sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). When dismissing complaints for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard of review is the same as under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Where a complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for
relief that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is appropriate. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
We agree that Adams did not allege sufficient facts in his Complaint to state a
plausible claim for relief. The District Court properly concluded that Adams’s Complaint
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible” that it does not meet the
standard of providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief” required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Rather, the
Complaint is a jumbled amalgam of statements regarding various governmental
authorities, stock schemes, mining ventures, gun patent plans, presidential orders, and
bank guarantees that bear little or no resemblance to a claim demonstrating that Adams is
entitled to relief of any kind.
Moreover, when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the District Court must
dismiss his complaint if it is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Under that
provision, a complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, Adams’s Complaint was legally
baseless because it was “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,” Deutsch v.
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995), and factually baseless because “the
facts alleged r[o]se to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).1
In addition, the District Court did not err in concluding that, while it is standard
practice to allow a pro se plaintiff to amend his or he complaint unless it is clear that
granting any such amendment would be futile, see Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235
1
Adams’s filings on appeal are equally incomprehensible. Adams’s two lengthy Motion
filings are nothing more than expanded restatements of the frivolous Complaint. They do
not clarify any viable claim. These pending Motions are denied.
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(3d Cir. 2004), in this situation Adams’s muddled and frivolous allegations underscored
that it would be pointless to allow him to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002).
II.
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Adams’s
Complaint. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Due to our disposition of this appeal,
Adams’s Motion and Supplemental Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be denied
under Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
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