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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JUAN ANDLNO, :
:
Appellee :
: No. 31 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order December 3, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0010882-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s December 3, 2014
Order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas quashing
all charges against Appellee, Juan Andlno. After careful review, we reverse
the trial court’s December 3, 2014 Order and remand for further
proceedings.
On August 22, 2013, Detective Dennis Demas responded to Appellee’s
home at 517 Morse Street in Philadelphia for a reported stabbing. N.T.
Preliminary Hearing, 9/25/14, at 5. Detective Demas found a large amount
of blood trailed throughout the house, as well as through the neighboring
house at 519 Morse Street, which was connected through a second-floor
opening cut in the wall between the two front bedrooms. Id. at 5-6. After
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conducting further investigation, Detective Demas interviewed Appellee at
the hospital. Id. at 6-7.
Detective Demas executed a search warrant at 517 Morse Street and
recovered 1,065 grams of marijuana divided into multiple sandwich-size
bags all tied in a knot, additional baggies, a digital scale, and proof of
Appellee’s residency at 517 Morse Street. Id. at 6. Appellee admitted to
Detective Demas that he was the victim of the stabbing, that he lived alone
at 517 Morse Street, and that his child’s mother and his child lived in the
connected house at 519 Morse Street. Id. at 6.
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with Possession of a Controlled
Substance With Intent to Deliver (“PWID”) and Possession of a Controlled
Substance.1 On September 25, 2014, at Appellee’s preliminary hearing, the
Commonwealth called Detective Dennis Demas who testified regarding the
events leading up to and including the search of Appellee’s abode and
Appellee’s statements. Appellee proffered the property receipts for the
items removed from the premises. The property receipts state that the
items had been recovered from 519 Morse Street. Appellee moved for
quashal, arguing that because he lived in the conjoined building located at
517 Morse Street, and not at the address listed on the property receipts, the
Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case against him. Id. at 10-
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), respectively.
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13. The Honorable T. Francis Shields held the case for trial, concluding that
the Commonwealth had met its burden and had established the prima facie
case. Id. at 14.
On November 13, 2014, Appellee filed a written Motion to Quash
based on the issue of the address on the property receipts.2 On December
3, 2014, at the conclusion of a hearing on Appellee’s Motion to Quash, the
Honorable Harold M. Kane denied the Commonwealth’s request to present
clarifying testimony, and granted the Motion without explanation.3 N.T.
Motion, 12/3/14, at 4-7.
2
This Court has observed that
a petition labeled a ‘Motion to Quash’ [is] in fact a writ of habeas
corpus attacking the magistrate’s finding that the
Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing had established a
prima facie case. When the substance of the ‘Motion to Quash’
is identical to that of a writ of habeas corpus, the reviewing court
undertakes an identical inquiry in disposing of the issue asserted
and the relief sought is the same, there is no reason why an
error in label should prevent a court from seeing that justice is
done.
Commonwealth v. Orman, 408 A.2d 518, 520 (Pa. Super. 1979) (internal
citation omitted).
3
Judge Kane summarily resolved Appellee’s Motion to Quash in the following
exchange:
Commonwealth: I have case law that supports the
Commonwealth’s position.
The Court: Well [inaudible] the Superior Court because I’m
ruling against it.
Commonwealth: May I supplement the record, Your Honor?
The Court: No.
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On December 23, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal
and a voluntary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. Judge Kane did not file a
Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
The Commonwealth presents one issue for our review:
Did the lower court err in quashing all charges against
[Appellee], where the evidence was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
“In reviewing a trial court’s order granting a defendant’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus, we must generally consider whether the record
supports the trial court’s findings, and whether the inferences and legal
conclusions drawn from those findings are free from error.”
Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 2005) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). “A trial court may grant a defendant’s
petition for writ habeas corpus where the Commonwealth has failed to
present a prima facie case against the defendant.” Id.
It is well-settled that “the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of
the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of
law as to which an appellate court’s review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005). Our scope of review is limited to
determining whether the Commonwealth established a prima facie case.
N.T. Motion, 12/3/14, at 5-6.
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Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citation omitted).
The basic principles of law regarding the establishment of a prima facie
case at a preliminary hearing are well settled.
The preliminary hearing is not a trial. The principal function of a
preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right against an
unlawful arrest and detention. At this hearing the
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least a prima
facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably the one who committed it. It is not necessary for the
Commonwealth to establish at this stage the accused’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to meet its burden at the
preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth is required to present
evidence with regard to each of the material elements of the
charge and to establish sufficient probable cause to warrant the
belief that the accused committed the offense.
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (internal
citations omitted). In addition, “the evidence should be such that if
presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in
allowing the case to go to the jury.” Commonwealth v. Landis, 48 A.3d
432, 444 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotation, citation, and boldface omitted).
“The standard clearly does not require that the Commonwealth prove
the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage.” Id. (citation
and quotation omitted). Most significant in this appeal, “[t]he weight and
credibility of the evidence is not a factor at this stage.” Id.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with
possession of a controlled substance and PWID. With respect to the charge
of possession of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth was required to
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present evidence to show that Appellee probably impermissibly “[k]nowingly
or intentionally possess[ed] a controlled or counterfeit substance[.]” 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(16). Because the police officers did not recover the marijuana
from Appellee’s person, the Commonwealth was required to prove that
Appellee had constructive possession of the marijuana. Commonwealth v.
Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. 1983).
To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth must show that
the accused “exercise[d] a conscious dominion over the illegal
[contraband.]” Commonwealth v. Valette, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992).
Conscious dominion is the “power to control the contraband and the intent to
exercise that control.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d
132, 134 (Pa. 1983)).
In the instant case, Detective Demas testified at the preliminary
hearing that he recovered, inter alia, 1,065 grams of marijuana from 517
Morse Street pursuant to the search warrant. N.T. Hearing, 9/25/14, at 6.
Detective Demas also testified that Appellee had told him that he resided at
517 Morse Street alone, and that he had been stabbed at that location. Id.
Detective Demas corroborated these admissions by recovering additional
proof of Appellee’s residency at 517 Morse Street. Id. The totality of the
evidence supported the reasonable inference that Appellee constructively
possessed the marijuana found in his house. See Commonwealth v.
Parsons, 570 A.2d 1328, 1334-35 (Pa. Super. 1990) (concluding that the
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defendant constructively possessed drugs and paraphernalia located in every
room of the house he shared with his girlfriend). The Commonwealth, thus,
presented a prima facie case that Appellee possessed a controlled substance.
With respect to the PWID charge, the Commonwealth needed to
present sufficient evidence to show that Appellee probably “possess[ed] with
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance[.]” 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(30). The Commonwealth here presented such evidence, which
included the large quantity of the drugs, the manner of packaging, the
additional baggies, the scale, and the absence of paraphernalia for drug use.
See Commonwealth v. Heater, 899 A.2d 1126, 1131 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(concluding that “[r]elevant factors in establishing intent [to deliver] include
the quantity of drugs possessed, the manner of packaging, the absence of
paraphernalia for drug use, [and] the behavior of the defendant[.]”
(citations omitted)).
In his brief, Appellee argues that the trial court properly quashed the
charges because of the conflict between Detective Demas’ testimony
regarding the address from which officers recovered the drugs (517 Morse
Street) and the address listed on the property receipts (519 Morse Street).
This argument fundamentally implicates the weight and credibility to be
given to the evidence.
Any conflicts or discrepancies in the evidence, which are questions
regarding the weight and credibility of evidence, must be resolved by the
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fact-finder at trial, not at the preliminary hearing. See Landis, supra at
448. In Landis, this Court concluded that the trial court had committed
reversible error where it improperly weighed the police officer’s credibility in
evaluating the prima facie case by evaluating “the weight to be given to the
location of the bullet and the reasons Appellee did not succeed in actually
shooting a police officer.” Id. We explained that the trial court had
“improperly weighed the evidence and failed to properly view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as is required under the
appropriate standard of review.” Id. We emphasized in Landis that “it is
inappropriate for the trial court to make credibility determinations in
deciding whether the Commonwealth established a prima facie case.” Id.
Rather, “the charge must be bound over for trial if evidence of the existence
of each element of the offense is presented.” Id. (citations omitted).
In granting the Motion to Quash, which was based only on the
discrepancy between the officer’s testimony and the address on the property
receipts, Judge Kane evaluated the weight and credibility of the evidence in
contravention of the standard of review applicable to prima facie
determinations. In doing so, he assumed the responsibilities of a fact-finder.
This was improper. See McBride, supra at 591; see also
Commonwealth v. Maute, 485 A.2d 1138, 1144-45 (Pa. 1984) (stating
that “[m]ere evidence of a conflict in the prosecution’s evidence is not fatal
to its case” (citation omitted)). The Commonwealth was not obligated to
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present additional evidence, to develop its case with any more certainty or
clarity, or to explain the existence of disputed or contradictory evidence,
such as the address on the property receipt. See generally
Commonwealth v. Rashed, 436 A.2d 134, 137 (Pa. 1981) (stating, “there
is no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, on the Commonwealth to
produce all of its potential witnesses at a preliminary hearing.”).
Thus, in the instant case, the trial court needed to view Detective
Demas’ testimony in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
required by the appropriate standard of review. Landis, supra at 444. This
is exactly what Judge Shields did before concluding that the Commonwealth
had established a prima facie case.
After reviewing the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, we conclude
that the Commonwealth met “its burden of establishing at least a prima facie
case that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the
one who committed it.” McBride, supra at 591. To view the evidence
otherwise would be to view it in the light most favorable to Appellee.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s December 3, 2014 Order,
direct the court to reinstate the charges, and remand for further
proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/29/2016
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