In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐2172
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
GEORGE E. ROBEY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 12 CR 00027‐001 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 7, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 3, 2016
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Defendant George Robey operated a
modern‐day “chop shop”—he and his associates stole cars, al‐
tered their identities using office and computer equipment,
and then sold them. He was convicted by a jury, and the dis‐
trict court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and
three years of supervised release.
2 No. 15‐2172
Robey appeals his conviction and sentence on three
grounds. First, he argues that he did not receive a speedy trial,
in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment.
Second, Robey contends that the district court erred in allow‐
ing the government to amend the indictment by dropping
nineteen of the twenty‐five charges. Third, he argues that the
district court erred at sentencing by finding that Robey’s theft
of ten vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles forming the
basis of his conviction, constituted relevant conduct. We af‐
firm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
From 2009 until 2011, Robey and his associates stole cars
from lots around Indianapolis, altered the cars’ identities, and
then sold them. As part of this operation, Robey would
change a stolen car’s identity by giving it a new Vehicle Iden‐
tification Number (“VIN”), a unique 17‐digit identification
code. Robey would also create counterfeit documents to sup‐
port a stolen car’s new identity, which included generating a
title, insurance card, sales contract, and temporary license
plate. Robey created these counterfeit VINs and documents
using a computer, scanner, printer, and digital image editing
software.
B. Procedural History
Robey was arrested on a criminal complaint on December
6, 2011. Between Robey’s arrest and indictment, Robey and
the government jointly requested and were granted two ends‐
of‐justice continuances to extend the pre‐indictment period.
No. 15‐2172 3
On February 23, 2012, a grand jury returned a 25‐count in‐
dictment against Robey, alleging conspiracy to identify, steal,
and sell stolen vehicles for profit; trafficking in vehicles with
altered VINs; making, uttering, and possessing counterfeit
state securities; and identification document fraud.
Robey made an initial appearance on the indictment on
March 1, 2012. Between Robey’s initial appearance and trial
start date of February 10, 2015, Robey requested and was
granted ten ends‐of‐justice continuances. Additionally, he
filed several pre‐trial motions, requested and received new
counsel twice, underwent a psychological examination, and
entered and withdrew from a plea agreement. During this pe‐
riod, the government also was granted one ends‐of‐justice
continuance.
On December 29, 2014, the government moved to dismiss
nineteen of the twenty‐five counts in the indictment, reducing
the charges against Robey to six remaining counts—four
counts of trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, in viola‐
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2321; and two counts of making, uttering,
and possessing counterfeit state securities, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 513(a). The district court granted this motion.
Robey also filed two motions to dismiss. On December 31,
2014, Robey filed his first motion to dismiss, arguing that his
speedy trial right had been violated, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161(c)(1), 3162, because his case had not been tried within
70 days of his initial appearance. The district court denied
Robey’s motion on January 5, 2015, finding that only 28 days
had elapsed on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial clock. On Janu‐
ary 28, 2015, Robey filed his second motion to dismiss, again
alleging violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district
court denied this motion on February 6, 2015.
4 No. 15‐2172
Robey’s three‐day trial began on February 10, 2015. The
jury saw and heard evidence that Robey had, for four stolen
vehicles, altered the VINs, created counterfeit vehicle docu‐
ments, and sold the vehicles, including one sale to an under‐
cover agent. The jury convicted Robey of all six counts on Feb‐
ruary 12, 2015.
On May 20, 2015, the district court held Robey’s sentenc‐
ing hearing. The revised presentence investigation report
(“PSR”) concluded that, in addition to the four vehicles that
were the focus of the trial, another ten stolen vehicles consti‐
tuted “relevant conduct.” The evidence found in Robey’s
home showed that, as with the four cars that made up his con‐
viction, he had altered the VINs and created counterfeit doc‐
uments for these other ten cars. The total value of the fourteen
cars—four that constituted Robey’s conviction and ten
deemed relevant conduct—exceeded $400,000. This loss
amount increased Robey’s offense level by 14, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1), (H) (2014).
At sentencing, Robey contested the total value of the cars,
arguing that the ten uncharged cars should not be considered
relevant conduct. The district court ruled that the evidence
found during the search of Robey’s home confirmed a pattern
of common conduct sufficient to establish the ten additional
vehicles as relevant conduct. Adopting the PSR, the district
court determined Robey’s guidelines range was 110 to 137
months’ imprisonment, based on an adjusted offense level of
26 and criminal history category of V. After taking into ac‐
count Robey’s age and infirmity, the court imposed a within‐
guidelines sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment and three
years of supervised release, with the standard conditions and
No. 15‐2172 5
some discretionary conditions. Judgment was entered against
Robey on May 27, 2015. Robey appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
Robey appeals his conviction and sentence on three main
grounds. First, he claims that he did not receive a speedy trial,
in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment.
Second, Robey contends that the district erred in allowing the
government to amend the indictment by dropping nineteen
of the twenty‐five charges. Third, he argues that the district
court erred at sentencing by ruling that Robey’s theft of ten
vehicles, in addition to the four vehicles that form the basis of
his conviction, constituted relevant conduct.
A. Speedy Trial Violations
Robey claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated
under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. Robey
first argues that his speedy trial right under the Speedy Trial
Act was violated by: (1) the 79 days that elapsed between his
arrest and indictment and (2) the 1076 days that elapsed be‐
tween his initial appearance and trial commencement. Robey
then contends his speedy trial right under the Sixth Amend‐
ment was violated by the 1076 days that elapsed between his
initial appearance and trial commencement.
1. Speedy Trial Act
This court reviews “the district court’s legal interpretation
of the [Speedy Trial Act] de novo, and its decisions to exclude
time for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ramirez, 788
F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2015).
The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that a criminal in‐
dictment be filed within 30 days of a defendant’s arrest. 18
6 No. 15‐2172
U.S.C. § 3161(b). Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act generally
requires that a criminal trial begin within 70 days of an indict‐
ment or a defendant’s initial appearance, whichever is later.
Id. § 3161(c)(1). The Speedy Trial Act provides exceptions,
however, which allow certain periods of delay to be “ex‐
cluded” from the relevant speedy trial clock. Id. § 3161(h).
Some of these exceptions, such as consideration of plea agree‐
ments, are automatically excludable. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(G); see
United States v. O’Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 642 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that “periods of delay excludable under
§ 3161(h)(1)–(6) may be automatically excluded if the specified
conditions are present”). In addition to the enumerated auto‐
matic exclusions, a judge may exclude any period of delay re‐
sulting from a continuance if the judge finds “the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added).
In granting an ends‐of‐justice continuance, the judge shall
consider the factors listed in § 3161(h)(7)(B) and must “set[]
forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its
reasons for finding that the ends of justice would be served.”
Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The district court’s decision “need not be
lengthy and need not track the statutory language,” but it
should provide this court with an adequate record to review
the district court’s consideration of the relevant factors.
O’Connor, 656 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing an ends‐of‐justice decision, this court examines
not only the district court’s order on a particular motion but
also “the sequence of events leading up to the continuance
followed by the courtʹs later explanation.” United States v.
Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 946 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
No. 15‐2172 7
In the present case, we begin by addressing Robey’s pre‐
indictment period of delay and then turn to his pre‐trial pe‐
riod of delay.
Robey first argues that the 79 days that elapsed between
his arrest on December 6, 2011, and his indictment on Febru‐
ary 23, 2012, violated the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‐day pre‐indict‐
ment requirement. However, during this period, Robey and
the government jointly requested and were granted two ends‐
of‐justice continuances. Excluding these periods of times
leaves only 13 days on Robey’s pre‐indictment speedy trial
clock.
In this case, Robey’s pre‐indictment delay argument fails
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in grant‐
ing the two ends‐of‐justice continuances. Both of the district
court’s decisions were supported by an order articulating ad‐
equate justification, as well as by the relevant sequence of
events. The court granted the two ends‐of‐justice continu‐
ances because both Robey and the government needed addi‐
tional time to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the matter
without a trial. These were reasonable decisions because they
allowed both parties, at an early stage in the case, to pursue
the option of resolving the case without a trial.
Robey next argues that the 1076 days that elapsed between
his initial appearance on March 1, 2012, and his trial com‐
mencement on February 10, 2015, violated the Speedy Trial
Act’s 70‐day pre‐trial requirement.
Again, most of this time is excludable. First, the period of
time in which Robey was negotiating his withdrawn plea
agreement is automatically excluded. § 3161(h)(1)(G); O’Con‐
nor, 656 F.3d at 642. Second, the district court granted ten
8 No. 15‐2172
ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey.1 Excluding these time
periods leaves only 60 days on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial
clock. Third, the district court granted one ends‐of‐justice con‐
tinuance for the government. Further excluding this time pe‐
riod leaves only 50 days on Robey’s pre‐trial speedy trial
clock. Therefore, if the district court did not abuse its discre‐
tion in granting Robey’s ten ends‐of‐justice continuances, his
argument fails.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting ten ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey. Each of
the district court’s decisions was supported by an order artic‐
ulating adequate justification, as well as by the relevant se‐
quence of events. We discuss each briefly.
The court granted Robey’s first, second, and third ends‐of‐
justice continuances because Robey required additional time
to evaluate discovery, explore the possibility of a plea agree‐
ment, and effectively prepare for trial if the plea negotiations
proved unsuccessful. These were reasonable decisions be‐
cause they allowed Robey, at an early stage in the case, to pur‐
sue the option of a plea agreement and still prepare for trial.
The court granted Robey’s fourth ends‐of‐justice continu‐
ance because Robey required additional time to undergo a
psychological evaluation, evaluate discovery, explore the
possibility of a plea agreement, and effectively prepare for
trial if the plea negotiations proved unsuccessful. This was a
reasonable decision because Robey did eventually undergo a
1 The district court granted ten ends‐of‐justice continuances for Robey on
the following dates: (1) April 12, 2012, (2) June 12, 2012, (3) August 7, 2012,
(4) November 28, 2012, (5) March 1, 2013, (6) May 1, 2013, (7) September 9,
2013, (8) November 21, 2013, (9) July 3, 2014, and (10) August 20, 2014.
No. 15‐2172 9
psychological evaluation. This reasonable decision also al‐
lowed Robey to pursue the option of a plea agreement and
still prepare for trial.
The court granted Robey’s fifth ends‐of‐justice continu‐
ance to allow his new counsel to prepare for trial. This was a
reasonable decision given that Robey had been appointed a
new lawyer, at Robey’s request, two weeks earlier.
The court granted Robey’s sixth, seventh, and eighth ends‐
of‐justice continuances because of delays in trial preparation
arising from Robey’s psychological evaluation. These were
reasonable decisions in light of Robey’s psychological evalu‐
ation.
The court granted Robey’s ninth ends‐of‐justice continu‐
ance in order to prepare for trial. This was reasonable decision
given that he had recently withdrawn from a plea agreement.
The court granted Robey’s tenth ends‐of‐justice continu‐
ance to evaluate discovery, explore a plea agreement, and pre‐
pare for trial. This was a reasonable decision because Robey
had been appointed new counsel again, at Robey’s request,
two weeks earlier.
For the sake of completeness, we also review the govern‐
ment’s one ends‐of‐justice continuance, which the court
granted because the government had recently changed coun‐
sel and the leading case agent was unavailable for the trial
due to the expected birth of his child. This was a reasonable
decision because, in fact, the government’s new counsel was
heavily involved in pending litigation and the leading case
agent was unavailable for the trial because of paternity leave.
Accordingly, Robey did not suffer violation of his speedy
trial right under the Speedy Trial Act.
10 No. 15‐2172
2. Sixth Amendment
Robey also argues that the 1076 days that elapsed between
his initial appearance and his trial violated his right to a
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, which is related to
but independent of his Speedy Trial Act claim. OʹConnor, 656
F.3d at 643. Because Robey did not raise this argument below,
we review for plain error. Id.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused “the right to
a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This court
examines the following factors in assessing a speedy‐trial
claim under the Sixth Amendment: “‘[W]hether [the] delay
before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government
or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,
whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s
result.’” OʹConnor, 656 F.3d at 643 (alteration in original)
(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992)).
In the case at hand, the pretrial period did not violate the
Sixth Amendment. On one hand, Robey did timely assert his
right, and he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. See id.
(“Delays of more than one year are considered presumptively
prejudicial.”). On the other hand, Robey bears “primary re‐
sponsibility” for the years of pretrial delay, and he was not
actually prejudiced. Id. He filed a motion to suppress, sought
ten ends‐of‐justice continuances, and entered and withdrew
from a plea agreement. He underwent a psychological exam‐
ination. He also changed lawyers twice. Furthermore, it ap‐
pears that Robey was uncooperative with his appointed coun‐
sel, as indicated by his pro se letters to the court and change‐
of‐counsel hearings. As a result, while the pretrial delay in
No. 15‐2172 11
Robey’s case was lengthy, there was no Sixth Amendment vi‐
olation. See id. (holding no constitutional violation because
defendant “bears primary responsibility for many of the pre‐
trial delays and did not suffer actual prejudice”).
B. Amending the Indictment
Robey next claims that the district erred in allowing the
government to amend the indictment by dismissing nineteen
of the twenty‐five counts prior to trial. Specifically, Robey
contends that “[b]ecause the modification was made without
the oversight of a grand or petit jury, the amendment violated
Robey’s constitutional rights.” (Appellant Br. 33–34.) Robey
raises his claim under the Fifth Amendment, which provides,
“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a … crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const.
amend V; see also United States v. Soskin, 100 F.3d 1377, 1380
(7th Cir. 1996) (“Under the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the possible bases for conviction are limited to
those contained in the indictment.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Because Robey did not preserve this claim in district court,
it is forfeited, and we review only for plain error. United States
v. Perez, 673 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2012). For plain error, a
defendant must show the following: “(1) an error or defect (2)
that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substan‐
tial rights (4) and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Robey cannot show error, plain or otherwise, be‐
cause the district court’s dismissal of nineteen of twenty‐five
12 No. 15‐2172
counts of the indictment prior to trial only narrowed the in‐
dictment against him, a practice that has been expressly up‐
held by the Supreme Court and this court.
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that
“where an indictment charges several offenses, or the com‐
mission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from
the jury’s consideration of one offense or one alleged method
of committing it does not constitute a forbidden amendment
of the indictment.” 471 U.S. 130, 145 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the same vein, this court has also explicitly
stated, “[n]arrowing the indictment so that the trial jury de‐
liberates on fewer offenses than the grand jury charged does
not constitute amendment.” Soskin, 100 F.3d at 1380 (altera‐
tion in original and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
under the precedent of the Supreme Court and this court, the
district court’s dismissal of nineteen counts of Robey’s indict‐
ment prior to trial was not a forbidden amendment.
In fact, Robey’s argument is the same as the one expressly
rejected by the Miller Court. Robey claims a constitutional vi‐
olation because the court dismissed nineteen counts of the in‐
dictment prior to trial. In other words, Robey is contending
“not that the indictment failed to charge the offense for which
he was convicted, but that that the indictment charged more
than was necessary.” Miller, 471 U.S. at 140. The Miller Court
rejected this argument, declaring that the defendant “was
tried on an indictment that clearly set out the offense for
which he was ultimately convicted,” and consequently, there
was “no deprivation of [the defendant’s] substantial right to
be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned
by a grand jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
No. 15‐2172 13
Miller Court’s response, which this court has applied consist‐
ently, defeats Robey’s claim. See e.g., Perez, 673 F.3d at 669 (cit‐
ing Miller, 471 U.S. at 144).
Robey’s attempts to distinguish Miller from the present
case are unpersuasive. Robey argues that the entire indict‐
ment in Miller was sent to the petit jury and asks this court to
“draw [a distinction] between indictment modifications that
occur with jury oversight and those that occur without.” (Ap‐
pellant Reply. Br. 13.) Robey’s argument is meritless and un‐
dermined by his own reply brief. As Robey concedes, this
court has allowed modified indictments to be presented to a
petit jury without resubmission to a grand jury. See e.g., Perez,
673 F.3d at 669; United States v. Graffia, 120 F.3d 706, 711 (7th
Cir. 1997); Soskin, 100 F.3d at 1381.
Robey subsequently argues that this court allows presen‐
tation of a modified indictment to a petit jury without resub‐
mission to a grand jury “only when the modifications do not
materially affect the substance or scale of the charges al‐
leged.” (Appellant Reply Br. 13 (emphasis added).)
Robey misstates the law. Instead, this court has clearly ar‐
ticulated what does and does not constitute an impermissible
amendment—“[n]arrowing the indictment so that the trial
jury deliberates on fewer offenses than the grand jury charged
does not constitute amendment. But the indictment may not
be broadened so as to present the trial jury with more or dif‐
ferent offenses than the grand jury charged.” United States v.
Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations and in‐
ternal quotation marks omitted). In the present case, the dis‐
trict court’s dismissal of nineteen of twenty‐five counts of the
indictment prior to trial narrowed, rather than broadened, the
14 No. 15‐2172
indictment such that the trial jury deliberated on fewer of‐
fenses than charged by the grand jury. Accordingly, the in‐
dictment was not impermissibly amended.
C. Relevant Conduct at Sentencing
Finally, Robey argues that the district court erred at sen‐
tencing by ruling that Robey’s theft of ten uncharged vehicles,
in addition to the four charged vehicles from his conviction,
constituted relevant conduct.
A district court must find relevant conduct by a prepon‐
derance of the evidence. United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959,
963 (7th Cir. 2015). “Whether uncharged offenses amount to
relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines is a factual
determination, which we review for clear error.” Id. This court
will not “second guess the district court unless, after review‐
ing the record as a whole, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (internal quota‐
tion marks omitted).
In assessing whether uncharged activities constitute rele‐
vant conduct, this court has applied the advisory sentencing
guidelines. E.g., id. Under the sentencing guidelines, in theft
cases, a defendant’s offense level is based in part on the “loss”
caused by the defendant’s conduct. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1); see
also United States v. Hill, 683 F.3d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 2012). This
includes the loss caused by the offenses of conviction, as well
as “all acts and omissions … that were part of the same course
of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of convic‐
tion.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Baines,
777 F.3d at 963. A “common scheme or plan” requires that two
or more offenses be “substantially connected to each other by
No. 15‐2172 15
at least one common factor; such as common victims, com‐
mon accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus op‐
erandi.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.9(A); see also Baines, 777 F.3d at 963.
Additionally, even if they do not meet the requirements of a
common scheme or plan, offenses may still qualify as part of
the “same course of conduct” if they are “sufficiently con‐
nected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion
that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series
of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.9(B); see also Baines, 777 F.3d at
963.
In the present case, at sentencing, the district court did not
commit clear error in finding that the ten uncharged vehicles
constituted relevant conduct.
The evidence at trial and sentencing support a finding of
a “common scheme or plan,” § 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(B), because
there were multiple commonalities that substantially con‐
nected the charged and uncharged vehicles. There was a com‐
mon purpose behind stealing and altering the identities of all
fourteen vehicles—selling them. Furthermore, there was a
common modus operandi applied to both the charged and un‐
charged vehicles. At trial, the jury heard how Robey altered
the identities of the four charged vehicles with counterfeit
VINs and supporting documents. The jury also was shown
evidence that Robey created this false identity using comput‐
ers, printers, a scanner, photo paper, vehicle title and license
plate templates, carbon paper sales contracts, and a type‐
writer. In particular, the jury was shown typewriter ribbon
from Robey’s home that contained identifying information
for the four charged vehicles, including make, model, year,
color, mileage, and counterfeit VIN that matched stickers af‐
fixed to the stolen vehicles. At sentencing, the government
16 No. 15‐2172
proffered evidence of the same modus operandi for the ten un‐
charged vehicles, including counterfeit documents and type‐
writer ribbon containing the make, model, year, color, mile‐
age, and counterfeit VIN. As a result, at sentencing, the court
confirmed that “all the 14 [charged and uncharged] vehicles
… [were] identified by reviewing the documents and materi‐
als and the typewriter ribbon in Mr. Robey’s possession pur‐
suant to the search warrant[.]” (Sent. Tr. 19, May 20, 2015.)
The evidence presented at trial and sentencing is more
than sufficient to support the district court’s finding of a “pat‐
tern of relevant conduct that far exceeded in its details the
four cars that were stolen that were before the jury.” (Id. at
20.) As such, the district court did not commit clear error in
finding that the ten uncharged vehicles constituted relevant
conduct.
Robey’s main argument against a “common scheme or
plan,” focuses on the temporal “gap” between the charged
and uncharged vehicles. Robey’s assertion is belied by the rec‐
ord—there was only a four‐month “gap” between the latest
uncharged vehicle stolen on December 16, 2010 and the earli‐
est charged vehicle on April 17, 2011. (PSR ¶ 21.) Further‐
more, the multiple commonalities discussed above “more
than suffice” to overcome any alleged temporal “gap” and
support the court’s relevant conduct determination. Baines,
777 F.3d at 963–64 (rejecting defendant’s temporal gap argu‐
ment as “hollow” because the offenses were connected by
“multiple common factors”)
Robey’s remaining arguments assert that the additional
vehicles did not arise from “the same course of conduct,”
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(B). However, we need not address these ar‐
guments because as discussed, the court’s relevant conduct
No. 15‐2172 17
determination was adequately based on a finding of a “com‐
mon scheme or plan,” § 1B1.3(a)(2) n.9(A). See § 1B1.3(a)(2)
n.9(B) (“Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common
scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same
course of conduct.”).
Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Robey’s conviction and sen‐
tence are AFFIRMED.