United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
WILFREDO GARAY-SIERRA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Kendys Pimentel Soto and Kendys Pimentel Soto Law Office on
brief for appellant.
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Sung-Hee Suh,
Deputy Attorney General, Amanda B. Harris, Attorney, Criminal
Division, Appellate Section, United States Department of Justice,
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez–Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson Pérez–
Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division,
and Kelly Zenón-Matos, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief
for appellee.
August 5, 2016
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Stage Setting
A grand jury indicted Wilfredo Garay-Sierra (Garay) for
carjacking a "Mitsubishi Nativa," with intent to cause death and
serious bodily harm, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2), and carrying and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, see id.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), Garay pled guilty to carjacking and
to possessing — but not brandishing — the firearm.1
In projecting Garay's total offense level, the parties
(among other things) agreed to a series of enhancements —
including, pertinently, a 4-level enhancement because a victim of
the carjacking suffered "serious bodily injury." See USSG
§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B).2 The parties did not agree on a particular
guideline sentencing range for the carjacking count. But they did
agree that Garay would recommend a 40-month prison sentence, and
that the government would recommend a sentence within the to-be-
1Because Garay pled guilty, we pull the background info from
the plea agreement, the unchallenged parts of the presentence
report ("PSR"), and the transcripts from the relevant court
hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Romero–Galindez, 782 F.3d
63, 65 n.1 (1st Cir. 2015).
2We refer to the November 2014 edition of the sentencing
guidelines, the version in effect at the time of sentencing. See
United States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 817 F.3d 30, 32 n.1 (1st
Cir. 2016).
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calculated sentencing range. Because Garay accepted
responsibility for possessing a firearm, the parties also agreed
to recommend the mandatory-minimum sentence of 60 months in prison
— the mandatory-minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm is 84
months, by the way. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The
parties also agreed that the sentences had to run consecutively.
And Garay agreed to waive his right to appeal if the judge
"accept[ed]" the agreement and "sentenc[ed] him according to its
terms, conditions, and recommendations."
The probation office's PSR recommended (among other
things) that Garay get the 4-level enhancement for the carjacking
count, noting that "the victims suffered serious bodily injury."
Skipping over details not relevant to the issues on appeal, we
note that the PSR then suggested that the judge use a 70-87 month
sentencing range for this count. The PSR also incorrectly
indicated that 84 months — section 924(c)'s mandatory minimum for
brandishing — applied. Neither party objected to the PSR.
At the sentencing hearing — and consistent with the plea
agreement — Garay's counsel asked the judge for a 40-month prison
term on the carjacking count, saying his client's youth, being a
father, struggles with drug addiction and depression, and below-
average IQ justified a downwardly-variant sentence. Living up to
the terms of the agreement, the government asked for a sentence
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within the range for that count. And both Garay and the government
asked for the 60-month mandatory minimum for the firearm crime.
After listening to the parties' sentencing pitches, the
judge accepted the PSR's calculations for the counts — i.e., the
judge adopted the PSR's 70-87 month sentencing range for the
carjacking count and the mandatory minimum of 84 months for the
firearm count. The judge then ran through the relevant sentencing
factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Garay's
characteristics and history (his youth, drug addiction, limited
intellectual capacity, bouts with depression, etc.), the
seriousness of the offense (noting, for example, that an accomplice
of Garay had sexually assaulted one of the carjacked victims in
Garay's presence), plus the need to deter criminal conduct, protect
the public, promote respect for the law, and deliver just
punishment. And when all was said and done, the judge imposed a
within-guidelines prison sentence of 70 months for the carjacking
crime, and a consecutive 84-month prison sentence for the firearm
crime.
From this 154-month sentence, Garay appeals. He first
argues that the appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement is
not enforceable, noting for example that the judge's sentence for
the firearm offense (84 months) differed from what the parties
recommended in the agreement (60 months). He then argues that the
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70-month prison stint for the carjacking offense is procedurally
unreasonable — first, because the judge wrongly concluded that the
serious-bodily-injury enhancement applied and second, because the
judge neither adequately considered factors favoring a lower
sentence nor satisfactorily explained the reasons for the
sentence. And last he argues that because he pled guilty to
possessing a firearm rather than brandishing a firearm, the judge
botched matters by sentencing him for brandishing a firearm (again,
brandishing carries a higher mandatory minimum than possessing).
For its part, the government agrees with Garay that,
when it comes to the firearm count, the judge reversibly erred in
imposing a sentence for brandishing a gun. And when it comes to
the carjacking count, the government says, we should enforce the
waiver-of-appeal clause because the sentence imposed by the judge
jibed with the parties' recommendation — but even if it did not,
the government adds, the judge erred neither in applying the
serious-bodily-injury enhancement nor in explaining the sentence's
length.
Garay argues in reply that because the judge did not
follow "all" of the plea agreement's terms (because the judge chose
a sentence for the firearm count that exceeded the parties'
recommendation), "the waiver of appeal is inapplicable in toto."
And to the extent there is any ambiguity about the way in which
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the appeal-waiver clause works, he says that we should interpret
the provision to let "the appeal . . . proceed."
Waiver
We opt not to referee the appeal-waiver dust-up: because
we can easily deal with Garay's sentencing-error claims, we will
assume "[f]or ease of analysis" that the appeal-waiver proviso
"does not bar the maintenance of this appeal." See United States
v. Dávila–Tapia, 491 Fed. App'x 197, 198 (1st Cir. 2012); see also
United States v. Sánchez–Maldonado, 737 F.3d 826, 827–28 (1st Cir.
2013).
Carjacking Sentence
As the parties acknowledge, we must review Garay's
procedural-reasonableness claims for plain error (rather than for
abuse of discretion), because he did not raise them below. So
Garay "must show (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) prejudice, and
(4) an outcome that is a miscarriage of justice or akin to it,"
United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 797 (1st Cir. 2006) — a
difficult-to-meet standard that "is not appellant friendly,"
United States v. Bermúdez–Meléndez, No. 14-2209, 2016 WL 3525423,
at *2 (1st Cir. June 28, 2016).
Enhancement
We start with Garay's claim that the judge stumbled by
enhancing his carjacking sentence under the serious-bodily-injury
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enhancement. See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). This enhancement applies
if "any victim sustained . . . Serious Bodily Injury." Id. Serious
bodily injury "occur[s] if the offense involved conduct
constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242
or any similar offense under state law." USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L).3
That is our case. According to the unobjected-to facts in the
PSR, Garay drove the car around while a carjacking cohort —
referred to as "Minor 1" — sat in the back seat with one of the
carjacked victims, put his fingers in her vagina, and forced her
to perform oral sex on him (him being Minor 1). Given this
concatenation of circumstances, we find no plain error in the
judge's decision to apply this enhancement.
Explanation
Garay argues for the first time on appeal that the judge
inadequately explained the thinking behind the carjacking sentence
3 Broadly speaking, § 2241 criminalizes aggravated sexual
abuse, and § 2242 criminalizes sexual abuse — both of which require
causing another to engage in a sexual act. The key elements of
§ 2241 are "knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a
sexual act . . . by threatening or placing that other person in
fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily
injury, or kidnapping; or attempt[ing] to do so." § 2241(a)(2).
And the key elements of § 2242 are "knowingly . . . caus[ing]
another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing
that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing
that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to
death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping) . . . or attempt[ing]
to do so." § 2242(1).
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and insufficiently considered his "personal characteristics and
his participation in the offense," factors, he says, that justified
a lighter sentence. We do not buy it.
It perhaps goes without saying — though we say it anyway
— that sentencers must consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
But they "need not give each factor equal billing." United States
v. Denson, 689 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2012). And when it comes to
explaining the reasons for a sentence, "brevity" must not be
mistaken for "inattention" — especially so when, as here, the
sentence falls within guideline range. United States v. Dávila–
González, 595 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
v. Turbides–Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Shifting from the general to the specific, we repeat
what Garay's judge did: As we said earlier, the judge discussed
Garay's characteristics and history — e.g., his young age,
fatherhood status, battles with drug addiction and depression, and
intellectual deficiencies, the very factors that Garay said called
for a variant sentence. The judge also considered the seriousness
of the offense — mentioning (among other things) how one of Garay's
carjacking collaborators had sexually attacked a female victim in
Garay's presence. And the judge emphasized that any sentence
imposed had to advance certain purposes, like respect for the law,
just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public.
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Critically too, any holes in the judge's reasoning — and we don't
see any, frankly — can be plugged by "comparing what was argued by
the parties or contained in the [PSR] with what the judge did."
United States v. Ocasio–Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Jiménez–Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st
Cir. 2006) (en banc)); cf. United States v. Colón de Jesús, No.
15-1962, 2016 WL 4056033, at *3 (1st Cir. July 29, 2016). Given
what we have said, this facet of Garay's procedural-reasonableness
claim is a nonstarter too.
Still hoping to persuade us otherwise, Garay argues that
the fact that he did not attack anyone should have counted in his
favor. The argument implies that he was an innocent bystander in
all this. But his chauffeuring Minor 1 around while Minor 1
sexually abused the female victim in the backseat, for example,
does not put Garay in the innocent-bystander category.
As before, we find no procedural error — certainly no
plain procedural error.4
4 To the extent Garay suggests 70 months is substantively
unreasonable — in a single, unilluminating sentence, he hints that
the judge may have created a sentencing disparity between him and
"other participants in the offense" — the suggestion is waived by
"perfunctory" treatment. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 1990).
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Firearm Sentence
Section 924(c)(1)(A) clearly says that a conviction for
possessing a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of
violence" triggers a 60-month mandatory minimum prison sentence,
while a conviction for brandishing a firearm triggers an 84-month
mandatory minimum prison term. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i),
(ii). The indictment, remember, charged Garay with carrying and
brandishing a firearm. But Garay pled guilty only to possessing
a firearm. And the parties jointly recommended that the judge
impose a 60-month sentence for the firearm count. Nevertheless,
and without a peep of protest from the parties, the judge concluded
at sentencing that "[b]ecause the weapon was brandished, the
minimum term of imprisonment for [the firearm count] is 84 months."
Given controlling caselaw, see, e.g., Alleyne v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162-63 (2013), the judge plainly erred in this
instance.
Wrap Up
For the reasons recorded above, we affirm Garay's
sentence on the carjacking count, vacate his sentence on the
firearm count, and remand for resentencing.5
5 The judgment on appeal says that Garay pled guilty to
brandishing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). On remand, the judge should amend the judgment
to reflect that Garay pled guilty to possessing a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
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