In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐2008
MARILYN ZORETIC,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
JOHN DARGE, Deputy Sheriff, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:10‐cv‐06011—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2016
____________________
Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Marilyn Zoretic and her family
were evicted from their apartment twice with the same evic‐
tion order. Zoretic sued the deputy sheriffs who carried out
the eviction, along with the owners of the unit who initiated
the eviction and their agents. Summary judgment was
granted to all defendants. On appeal, Zoretic argues that the
deputies lacked any legal authority to enter her residence, and
that the owners of the unit acted outrageously in initiating the
second eviction. Because the deputies did not meet their sum‐
mary judgment burden of demonstrating they were entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on Zoretic’s Fourth Amend‐
ment claims, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to
the deputies. But because Zoretic failed to create a material
2 No. 14‐2008
factual dispute about whether the owners of her unit were ex‐
treme and outrageous in pursuing her eviction, we affirm
summary judgment on her claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
I. BACKGROUND
As an initial matter, Zoretic failed to comply with North‐
ern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1(b) by providing a com‐
prehensible response to each numbered paragraph of the de‐
fendants’ 56.1(a) statements of material facts which the de‐
fendants argued entitled them to summary judgment. While
we liberally construe the pleadings of individuals who pro‐
ceed pro se, “neither appellate courts nor district courts are
obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking
for factual disputes.” See, e.g., Greer v. Bd. of Educ. 267 F.3d 723,
727 (7th Cir. 2001). We have repeatedly held that requiring
strict compliance with Rule 56.1 is not an abuse of the district
court’s discretion. Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368
F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2004). So like the district court, we rely on
the defendants’ statements of material facts.
A. The First Eviction
In 2006, Marilyn Zoretic, along with her husband and
three children, began renting a unit in the Castilian Court
complex in Glenview, Illinois. Their landlord, Marina Shef,
stopped paying condominium assessments and eventually
lost possession of the unit to Castilian in 2008. Shortly after
the court entered the order of possession, Castilian certified
the order with the Clerk of Cook County to evict all occupants
of the unit. At the time, Castilian was managed by Nimrod
Realty Group and represented by the Kovitz Law Firm.
Having received the eviction order, the Cook County Sher‐
iff evicted Zoretic and her family in January 2009. Later the
same day, Nimrod’s agent allowed Zoretic and her family to
reenter the unit, and agreed they would sign a lease so Zoretic
No. 14‐2008 3
could stay and pay $300 per month less in rent. But Zoretic
never signed the lease or paid rent again.
B. The Second Eviction
A month after the eviction and reentry, Nimrod was re‐
placed by First Merit Realty Company as the new property
manager for Castilian. Michael Bloom, a First Merit employee,
noticed that Zoretic never signed a lease with Castilian. He
sought legal advice from the Kovitz lawyers about the matter.
They emailed him on February 4 and told him that “if the ten‐
ant refuses to sign the lease we would replace the eviction or‐
der with the sheriff.”
Bloom then sent Zoretic a letter with the order of posses‐
sion, advising Zoretic that if she wanted to remain in the unit,
she needed to sign the new lease by February 10. He sent an‐
other letter on February 11, warning that Zoretic would face
eviction if she refused to sign the lease and did not leave the
apartment. After receiving no response, Bloom asked Kovitz
lawyers to take over the eviction process. On April 29, Kovitz
lawyers obtained a new date stamp from the Clerk of Cook
County on the original September 2008 order, and placed the
newly stamped order with the Cook County Sheriff.
On June 5, Deputy Sheriffs John Darge, Darrell Dyson, and
Kyle Tryba were assigned to execute the eviction order. They
arrived at Castilian around 2:00 p.m. and spoke with Edward
Carey, a Castilian agent who confirmed the unit to be evicted.
The deputy sheriff team then knocked on the door of the unit
and announced their presence. When no one answered, they
opened the door and entered the unit with their guns drawn,
where they found Zoretic and her husband. Seeing that they
were unarmed, the officers put down their weapons and
asked if anyone else was in the unit. Zoretic and her husband
were taken to the living room while the officers conducted a
protective sweep, searching for any individuals who may
have been hiding. While the deputy sheriffs were completing
paperwork to finalize the eviction, Zoretic informed Dyson
4 No. 14‐2008
that she had spoken with Chief Dicaro and Lieutenant Pon at
the sheriff’s office about the eviction. Dyson called Lieutenant
Pon, who told him to continue the eviction. After photo‐
graphing items that Zoretic asked to take with her, the officers
escorted Zoretic out of the unit, and gave possession to Carey.
Less than a week later, Zoretic sued in circuit court, and
was awarded possession of the unit until Castilian obtained a
lawful order to enforce her eviction. She and her family
moved back in, continued not to pay rent, and were eventu‐
ally evicted in March 2012.
C. Proceedings Below
Zoretic sued Darge, Dyson and Tryba in their individual
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they violated her
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the June 5
eviction. She also sued Sheriff Tom Dart in his official capacity
and Cook County for policies she alleged contributed to the
deprivation of her rights, and Castilian and First Merit for in‐
tentional infliction of emotional distress. All the defendants
filed for summary judgment, which the district court granted,
and Zoretic now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Zoretic argues that the court erred in granting
summary judgment to the defendants because there were
genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether the
eviction order was facially invalid at the time the officers en‐
tered her apartment, (2) whether First Merit and Castilian
acted extremely and outrageously in pursuing the second
eviction, and (3) whether Zoretic suffered emotional distress.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Ellis v. DHL Express, Inc., 633 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir.
2011).
No. 14‐2008 5
A. Deputies Did Not Meet Legal Burden at Summary
Judgment
Zoretic’s complaint alleged violations of the Fourth
Amendment due to the deputies’ alleged unlawful search of
her apartment, excessive force in breaking down the door to
the unit and entering her apartment with guns drawn, and
unlawful detention of her and her husband while they carried
out the second eviction.
In order for a search or seizure to comply with the Fourth
Amendment, it must be objectively reasonable. Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1985). The Fourth Amendment’s protec‐
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures is made ap‐
plicable to state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dklm v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 794 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2015). In
response to Zoretic’s claims that they violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the officers claim quasi‐judicial im‐
munity, arguing that all of their actions—entering the unit
with guns drawn, conducting a protective sweep of the prop‐
erty, and detaining Zoretic and her husband—were pursuant
to a facially valid eviction order.
On appeal, Zoretic challenges the legality of the eviction
order upon which the deputies relied, arguing that quasi‐ju‐
dicial immunity is unavailable to the deputies, and that they
lacked a legal justification for entering her unit. Zoretic argues
that because Castilian allowed her to reenter the unit after the
January eviction, it needed to obtain a new order to evict Zo‐
retic the second time. The circuit court order restoring posses‐
sion to Zoretic after the second eviction supports her argu‐
ment, finding that because Castilian allowed her to move back
into the unit after the first eviction, Castilian could not inter‐
fere with her right of possession to the unit until it obtained a
new eviction order.
The defendants argue that Zoretic never presented these
theories at summary judgment, so they are waived. See United
6 No. 14‐2008
States v. Ritz, 721 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2013) (theories not pre‐
sented by non‐moving party at summary judgment are
waived on appeal). But the district court can only grant sum‐
mary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It is true that Zoretic’s
arguments in her opposition to summary judgment were brief
and undeveloped. But even if she had made no argument at
all, before the burden shifted to her, the deputies needed to
demonstrate that no material facts were in dispute and that
they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gerhartz v.
Richert, 779 F.3d 682, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2015).
The deputies cite to Henry v. Farmer City State Bank for the
proposition that those performing ministerial acts under a
judge’s supervision and intimately related to judicial proceed‐
ings have quasi‐judicial immunity. 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th
Cir. 1986). Henry involved a suit against various state officers
who acted pursuant to a valid enforcement order. The suit al‐
leged that the officers wrongly entered the plaintiff’s home
and seized his property. Granting the officers absolute im‐
munity, we wrote that “the proper procedure for a party who
wishes to contest the legality of a court order enforcing a judg‐
ment is to appeal that order and the underlying judgment, not
sue the official responsible for its execution.” Id. at 1239.
The rationale for this quasi‐judicial immunity is that “offi‐
cials making quasi‐judicial decisions should be free of the har‐
assment and intimidation associated with litigation.” Richman
v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2001). Judicial officers are
entitled to quasi‐judicial immunity in one of two ways. First,
immunity might apply when they are sued for engaging in
“quasi‐judicial” functions, that is, functions that are similar to
those a judge performs. The touchstone of this analysis is
whether the officer is engaged in discretionary functions,
such as “resolving disputes between parties, or authorita‐
tively adjudicating private rights.” Snyder v. Nolan, 380 F.3d
No. 14‐2008 7
279, 288 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993); see also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416,
417 (6th Cir. 1988) (issuing arrest warrant is a “truly judicial”
act allowing quasi‐judicial immunity); Thompson v. Duke, 882
F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1989) (scheduling and conducting
parole hearing is a quasi‐judicial function). The second way
of obtaining quasi‐judicial immunity is engaging in a non‐dis‐
cretionary or administrative function, but at the explicit direc‐
tion of a judicial officer. See, e.g. Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d
755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989) (court personnel shielded from liability
in lawsuit over legality of transcript fees because they acted
at direct request of judges). By the defendants’ own admis‐
sion, the order they used to enforce the eviction had already
been executed in January, when possession transferred from
Shef to Castilian. Castilian then gave possession to Zoretic on
the basis of a new lease agreement. When she failed to sign a
lease or pay rent, Castilian never pursued a new eviction or‐
der, and so the court never entered an order granting Castilian
re‐possession of the property. In short, when the deputies en‐
tered Zoretic’s residence, they were not acting at the direction
of a judge. And we have held that where officers are not acting
pursuant to an enforceable order, they cannot receive quasi‐
judicial immunity. Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641 (7th Cir.
2003) (no quasi‐judicial immunity when state officials at‐
tempted to enforce out‐of‐state custody judgment which had
not been certified and filed in Illinois court).
With regard to the argument that the clerk’s new date
stamp empowered the deputies to undertake the second evic‐
tion, the defendants failed to provide authority that the clerk’s
office had the power to issue an eviction order on its own, and
we have found none. Certainly there is no evidence here that
the clerk’s office was adjudicating private rights between par‐
ties when it re‐stamped a used court order. See, e.g., Snyder,
380 F.3d at 287 (no immunity because entering pleadings into
a docket not the type of discretionary function normally at‐
tributed to judges). The clerk’s act of stamping the order was
8 No. 14‐2008
more akin to a ministerial act that did not require a judge’s
involvement at all. So we do not see a path for the deputies to
bootstrap a quasi‐judicial immunity defense for themselves to
a theory that the clerk possessed quasi‐judicial powers to ad‐
judicate a new eviction order.
It is possible the deputies at the scene on June 5 believed
they were enforcing a judge’s eviction order. But they were
not, and their mistake—even if reasonable—does not entitle
them to quasi‐judicial immunity. Even more problematic for
the defendants, their entire argument as to why the manner
in which they carried out the eviction was lawful is predicated
on the legality of the eviction order. With nothing more than
an order that had already been executed, they had no right to
enter the residence, or to search Zoretic’s belongings. And
while it may have been reasonable to enter the apartment
with guns drawn for safety reasons if they had been enforcing
an actual order, the same is not true for entering a civilian’s
home with guns pointed for no reason at all. So they failed to
meet their burden of showing that, as a matter of law, it was
objectively reasonable to enter Zoretic’s apartment, search it,
point their guns at the Zoretics, and detain them. Perhaps a
reasonable officer would not have known that the order was
not enforceable, but that is not the argument the defendants
made. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the
Fourth Amendment claims.
B. No Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Zoretic’s second argument on appeal is that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to First Merit Re‐
alty and Castilian on her claim that they intentionally inflicted
emotional distress on her and her family. She argues their pur‐
suit of the second eviction was extreme and outrageous be‐
cause she produced evidence that they knew that Zoretic re‐
gained possession of the unit after the first eviction. She also
argues she provided evidence of emotional damages.
No. 14‐2008 9
In order for a plaintiff to prevail under Illinois law in a tort
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, she must
demonstrate that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme
and outrageous, (2) the defendant either intended that his
conduct would inflict severe emotional distress, or knew
there was a high probability that his conduct would cause se‐
vere emotional distress, and (3) the defendant’s conduct in
fact caused severe emotional distress. Doe v. Calumet City, 641
N.E.2d 498, 506 (Ill. 1994). “Mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities are not actiona‐
ble as intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Cook v. Win‐
frey, 141 F.3d 322, 331 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omit‐
ted); see also Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th
Cir. 2009) (holding that principal’s actions to secure arrest of
plaintiffs to restore order in school was not outrageous, even
though he was mistaken about plaintiffs’ roles in disturb‐
ance).
We need not reach the issue of whether Zoretic provided
sufficient evidence that she suffered emotional distress be‐
cause we disagree with Zoretic that there was sufficient evi‐
dence to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether
the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous. Castil‐
ian and First Merit consulted with their attorneys about how
to handle the situation, and while they may have received bad
advice, they did not act with the requisite intent to be liable
for intentionally inflicting distress on Zoretic and her family.
There is no indication anywhere in the record that Castilian
and First Merit knew their attempts to evict Zoretic were not
in accordance with the law. The fact that they asked their at‐
torneys about how to properly evict Zoretic supports the op‐
posite inference. Summary judgment was proper on this
claim.
10 No. 14‐2008
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in
part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opin‐
ion.