ALD-368 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1955
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DARREN TALBERT,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; DELAWARE COUNTY, PA;
JOHN J. WHELAN, District Attorney, Delaware County, PA;
MARY A. BRENNAN, Judge, Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, PA;
MICHAEL MATTSON, Assistant District Attorney, Delaware County, PA;
SHAKA JOHNSON, Defense Attorney, Phila., PA;
TODD M. MOSSER, Defense Appellant Attorney, Phila., PA;
D. DANIEL WOODY, Assistant District Attorney, Delaware County, PA;
AMATO SANITA, Defense Attorney, Phila., PA;
ANTHONY E. STENFENSKI, Defense Attorney., Phila., PA;
KRISTINE A. MCALEER, Undercover Police Agent, Upper Darby Township, PA;
TIMOTHY BERHARDT, Undercover Police Agent, Upper Darby Township, PA;
JOHN NEWS, Undercover Police Agent, Upper Darby Township, PA;
BRAD A. ROSS, Police Agent, Upper Darby Township, PA;
JEFF DIETZ, Pennsylvania State Trooper, Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab;
CHRISTINE BRENNAN, Ballistics Expert, Pennsylvania State Police Crime Lab;
CECILA CACCIOLA, Manager, Lima Regional Laboratory, Middletown, PA;
IRENA B. ELESHKOVITCH, Forensic Scientist (II), Lima Regional Laboratory,
Middletown, PA; ALICE MARLIN, Forensic Scientist (I), Lima Regional Laboratory,
Middletown, PA;JOHN/JANE DOE, Alleged Confidential Informant,
Employed by Upper Darby Township Police Dept., Upper Darby Township, PA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2:16-cv-01041)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 4, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 9, 2016)
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OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Darren Talbert appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint. We will
summarily affirm.
I.
In February 2016, at the earliest,1 Talbert filed a complaint accusing some 20
defendants of various civil rights and tort violations arising out of his 2012 arrest and
subsequent criminal prosecution in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Talbert alleged false
arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful conviction, imprisonment based on false
evidence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He sought damages and other
relief, relying on federal civil rights and racketeering laws, as well as state-law provisions
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants included prosecutors,
defense attorneys, law-enforcement officials, a judge, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and Delaware County.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Talbert, a state prisoner, signed his complaint February 24, 2016; it was received by the
District Court on March 3, 2016. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
2
The District Court dismissed the case with prejudice, pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, determining that most of Talbert’s claims are barred
because his convictions have not been invalidated, that his allegations did not state a
claim, that his complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, and that his state claims
could not be brought alone in federal court after his other claims were dismissed. Talbert
sought reconsideration, and the District Court denied the motion. Talbert appeals.2
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In considering a dismissal
pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we exercise de novo review.
See, e.g., Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Generally, our review of
an order denying a motion for reconsideration is for an abuse of discretion, but to the
extent the denial is based on the interpretation or application of law, our review is
plenary. See Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985). We
may summarily affirm the District Court’s rulings if there is no substantial question
presented on appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
The District Court concisely identified the grounds for dismissing Talbert’s
complaint, and we will affirm for substantially the same reasons. As the District Court
concluded with regard to Talbert’s civil rights claims asserting that the defendants
2
In his notice of appeal, Talbert only specified the order dismissing his complaint.
However, he attached to his notice of appeal both the order dismissing his complaint and
the order denying reconsideration. We will treat his appeal as challenging both orders.
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falsified evidence, conspired to deprive him of a fair trial, or otherwise violated his
constitutional rights in a way that led to his convictions and imprisonment, Talbert must
first succeed in having his convictions set aside before he can seek relief on these claims.
The Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the prisoner can show that the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994). Talbert has made no such showing here.
To the extent Talbert’s civil rights claims do not implicate Heck, we agree with
the District Court that they are time barred under the applicable Pennsylvania statute of
limitations. In addition, the District Court did not err in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Talbert’s state law claims once it dismissed his other
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Talbert’s remaining federal claims do not warrant
further discussion beyond the District Court’s opinion.
Finally, Talbert sought reconsideration based on his pro se status, his
imprisonment, and his lack of understanding of the law. The District Court denied the
motion and maintained that Talbert could not cure his complaint by amendment. Because
Talbert did not demonstrate any basis for granting the motion, such as an intervening
change in controlling law, new evidence, or the need to correct clear error of law or fact
or prevent manifest injustice, the District Court did not err in denying the motion. See
Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
IV.
4
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing
Talbert’s complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration.
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