NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 9 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA A. CRAIG, No. 14-15930
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01056-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: SILVERMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and ANELLO,** District
Judge.
Lisa A. Craig appeals the district court’s ruling in favor of the Commissioner
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael M. Anello, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
of Social Security affirming the denial of Craig’s application for supplemental
security income and disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s order in a social security case de
novo, and will uphold the disability determination of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
Craig argues that she is unable to perform her past relevant work as a bank
underwriter due to her depressive disorder. Though she experienced symptoms of
depression for many years prior to the alleged onset date of her disability, Craig
claims that starting in March 2010 her condition worsened to the point where she
could no longer work. The ALJ determined that Craig did not have a severe mental
disability that impacted her ability to perform work. The ALJ’s conclusion was
supported by substantial record evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4).
The ALJ based his findings on over two years of medical records. Between
March 2009 and November 2011, Craig received treatment from healthcare
professionals who evaluated her using descriptive measures as well as numerical
2
“global assessment functioning” (GAF) scores.1 At the majority of her
appointments Craig was assigned a GAF score of 55, which indicates moderate
difficulty in social or occupational functioning. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1003 n. 4. In
April of 2011, Craig was hospitalized after an episode of suicidal ideation. Upon
admission to the hospital Craig appeared to be seriously impaired, but upon her
release care providers noted that her mood and functioning were much improved.
At subsequent appointments in May, September and November of 2011, treatment
providers again rated Craig’s GAF at 55 and reported that, while her depression
symptoms remained moderate, she was able to carry on her daily activities.
Craig faults the ALJ’s reliance on GAF scores. Although GAF scores alone
do not measure a patient’s ability to function in a work setting, Garrison, 759 F.3d
at 1003 n. 4, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has endorsed their use as
evidence of mental functioning for a disability analysis. SSA Administrative
Message 13066 (“AM-13066”) (effective July 22, 2013). The ALJ here did not use
Craig’s GAF scores as an isolated measure of her ability to perform work, but
rather as a method of quantifying treatment physicians’ qualitative assessments of
1
GAF scores reflect a clinician’s “rough estimate of an individual’s psychological,
social, and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for
treatment.” Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (9th Cir.1998).
3
her overall functioning. The ALJ did not err by relying in part on these scores.
Craig further faults the ALJ for discounting a treating physician’s evaluation
while giving controlling weight to the evaluation of an examining physician.
Where a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted, an ALJ must provide specific
and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
1161 (9th Cir. 2014). Dr. Krabbenhoft, an examining physician, evaluated Craig in
November of 2010 and opined that while she was mildly limited in certain social
interactions, she had no limitations on her memory, understanding, adaptation, or
ability to sustain concentration. In February of 2011, a second assessment was
performed by Dr. Dy, a treating psychiatrist who had previously met with Craig in
September and October of 2010. Dr. Dy’s assessment concluded that Craig had
“moderately severe” limitations in the areas of performing complex tasks and
responding to customary work pressures, as well as moderate limitations in her
abilities to relate to other people and perform in a routine work setting. At Craig’s
hearing before the ALJ, a vocational expert opined that a person with the
limitations described in Dr. Krabbenhoft’s report would be able to perform Craig’s
past relevant work, but a person with the symptoms described by Dr. Dy would
not.
4
The ALJ gave controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Krabbenhoft because
it was “consistent with the claimant’s work history and medical record as a whole.”
The ALJ specifically noted that Craig’s “allegedly disabling mental impairment
was present at approximately the same level of severity prior to her alleged onset
date,” and that Craig’s GAF scores remained stable at 55 throughout the course of
her treatment. Though Craig’s hospitalization raises the possibility that her
symptoms may have worsened following Dr. Krabbenhoft’s evaluation, her
consistent post-hospitalization GAF scores of 55 led the ALJ to view this episode
as isolated. Therefore, the ALJ’s reasons for adopting Dr. Krabbenhoft’s
assessment were specific, legitimate and supported by substantial evidence.2 See
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). These justifications were
also “clear and convincing” reasons to discount Craig’s symptom testimony. 3 See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113.
AFFIRMED.
2
Further, the ALJ did not err by considering Dr. Krabbenhoft’s finding related to
cognitive functioning, since the assessment also took into account Craig’s
emotional impediments.
3
We do not address Craig’s arguments regarding her credibility because the ALJ
did not make an explicit adverse credibility finding as to her mental symptoms.
5