In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1142
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
CHARLES THOMAS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 11 CR 415 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 14, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2016
____________________
Before POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Domingo Blount spearheaded a
narcotics‐trafficking ring with Defendant Charles Thomas
serving as security. Ultimately, law enforcement broke up
the ring and charged many of its participants, including
Thomas. After a series of disagreements with several attor‐
neys, Thomas represented himself at his trial. He called
Blount as a witness in his defense, and Blount denied Thom‐
as’s involvement in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury
2 No. 15‐1142
convicted Thomas of all counts. Thomas appeals, challeng‐
ing the district court’s denial of his request for substitute
counsel, the district court’s finding that he waived his right
to counsel, and the district court’s imposition of a 2‐level sen‐
tencing enhancement for suborning Blount’s perjured testi‐
mony. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2011, the government charged Thomas with
participating in a large‐scale heroin conspiracy orchestrated
by Blount. A grand jury returned an indictment against
Thomas on September 20, 2011, charging him with conspir‐
ing to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; pos‐
sessing narcotics with intent to distribute during a drug deal
on October 25, 2010, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and
using a cellular telephone during the October 25 narcotics
deal in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
A. Parade of Counsel
The start of prosecution marked the start of Thomas’s
protracted difficulties with his lawyers. Shortly after the
government filed the criminal complaint, Thomas retained
counsel, who filed an appearance. On March 13, 2012,
Thomas’s first attorney moved to withdraw because of irrec‐
oncilable differences between attorney and client. The dis‐
trict court granted the motion to withdraw and appointed a
second attorney.
One month later, Thomas’s second attorney moved to
withdraw after receiving a letter from Thomas indicating
that he did not want the attorney representing him any
longer. On May 10, 2012, the district court granted the mo‐
tion to withdraw and appointed a third attorney. But the
No. 15‐1142 3
third attorney also moved to withdraw one month after her
appointment because Thomas told her he did not want her
representing him any longer.
On July 12, 2012, the district court held a hearing on the
third attorney’s motion to withdraw. The district court ad‐
monished Thomas that it could not continue to appoint at‐
torneys indefinitely, but that it would grant the motion and
appoint a fourth attorney. Thomas expressed misgivings
about being appointed a fourth attorney, stating: “If they’re
not going to help me, I’m better off going pro se then.” (Tr. 8,
July 12, 2012.) The district court encouraged Thomas to ei‐
ther give the fourth attorney a chance or retain counsel.
Thomas agreed to let the fourth attorney (“Attorney 4”)
represent him, and the district court appointed Attorney 4.
Thomas, however, was not satisfied for long. On August 24,
2012, Attorney 4 moved to withdraw, claiming that Thomas
did not want his representation.
At a hearing on September 13, 2012, Thomas complained
that Attorney 4 was “not even looking into” issues Thomas
had raised. (Tr. 4, Sept. 13, 2012.) The district court ordered
Thomas to write a list of concerns and discuss it with his at‐
torney, and it postponed ruling on the motion to withdraw.
The district court said that it would not allow Thomas to
“cycle through lawyers” and that it would not appoint an‐
other attorney. (Id. at 13–14.) Attorney 4’s motion to with‐
draw was withdrawn on October 17, 2012, after Thomas in‐
dicated that they had resolved their differences.
That is until November 15, 2012, when Thomas again ex‐
pressed that he was having a conflict with Attorney 4 over
the propriety of filing a motion to dismiss the indictment.
4 No. 15‐1142
Thomas requested that the district court appoint him new
counsel. The district court refused, finding that Attorney 4
was “providing [Thomas] with adequate and sufficient and
able representation.” (Tr. 11, Nov. 15, 2012.) The district court
gave Thomas the choice to either continue with Attorney 4
or proceed pro se. Thomas refused both choices, prompting
the district court to order that Attorney 4 would continue
representation.
The case proceeded without issue until August 1, 2013,
when Thomas filed two pro se affidavits arguing that there
were factual errors in the complaint against him. Attorney 4
moved to strike the affidavits, arguing that the court should
not consider pro se filings from a represented party and that
the issues raised should be addressed at trial. After discuss‐
ing the motion at a hearing in which counsel and the district
court explained to Thomas why the issues he raised had to
be explored at trial, Thomas said, “I don’t want him as my
attorney.” (Tr. 6, Aug. 28, 2013.) The district court responded
that Attorney 4 had not engaged in any behavior that would
justify removing him as counsel, and therefore, Thomas
could either keep Attorney 4 or represent himself. Thomas
chose to represent himself, and the district court set a hear‐
ing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
B. First Faretta Hearing
The district court held its first Faretta hearing on Septem‐
ber 6, 2013. Thomas indicated that he did not want to repre‐
sent himself but that he wanted “[t]o get another attorney.”
(Tr. 2, Sept. 6, 2013.) The district court reiterated that it had
“been given no good reason why [Thomas was] dissatisfied
with appointed counsel.” (Id. at 4.) The district court pre‐
sented Thomas with three choices: keep appointed counsel,
No. 15‐1142 5
retain his own counsel, or represent himself. Thomas said
“No” to all three. (Id. at 5.)
The district court, relying on our opinion in United States
v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2001), deemed Thomas to have
chosen to represent himself through his rejection of either
keeping his appointed counsel or retaining his own lawyer.
The district court then instructed Thomas that through his
actions he was invoking his right to self‐representation and
waiving his right to appointed counsel. After going through
the Faretta inquiry and advising Thomas that it was “un‐
wise” to represent himself, the district court asked for the
final time whether Thomas would “like to continue to be
represented by [Attorney 4].” (Id. at 16.) Thomas said, “Yes,”
and withdrew his request to represent himself. (Id.)
C. Second Faretta Hearing
Thomas kept Attorney 4, and the case was set for trial on
December 2, 2013. But on November 25, 2013, coconspirator
Domingo Blount pled guilty to all counts. Blount refused to
implicate Thomas in his plea agreement, leading Thomas’s
counsel to file a motion to continue Thomas’s trial in order to
make Blount available to testify on Thomas’s behalf.
The trial was postponed, but Thomas’s disagreement
with Attorney 4 was not. On March 4, 2014, Thomas filed a
pro se “Motion for Attorney to Withdraw.” Thomas com‐
plained that his lawyer had not given him grand‐jury tran‐
scripts, intercepted phone transcripts, cooperators’ proffer
interviews, and Rule 3500 materials.
At a hearing on March 17, 2014, Attorney 4 explained
that he tried to meet with Thomas but that Thomas refused
to see him or respond to his emails. With respect to discov‐
6 No. 15‐1142
ery materials, counsel indicated that they had either not been
turned over from the government yet or that Thomas had
already been provided with the material.1 When asked
whether there was “any other basis … that [Thomas] ha[d]
for wanting to part ways with [Attorney 4],” Thomas re‐
plied: “I just don’t trust him, period. I don’t believe nothing
he say.” (Tr. 14–15, Mar. 17, 2014.) Finding no grounds to ex‐
cuse Attorney 4, the district court again explained Thomas’s
options. Thomas responded: “That’s why I want to file a mo‐
tion to proceed pro se.” (Id. at 16.) Thomas hesitated, howev‐
er, and it was resolved that if Thomas decided to proceed pro
se, he would file a motion with the court.
No such motion was filed. Five days prior to the sched‐
uled trial date, on May 7, 2014, the district court held a pre‐
trial conference. Thomas interjected that he had written a let‐
ter to the district court indicating that he “would go pro se.”
(Tr. 10, May 7, 2014.) The district court followed up, asking
“are you saying that you would like to represent yourself at
trial?” to which Thomas replied, “Yes.” (Id. at 11.)
The district court then conducted a second Faretta hear‐
ing, informing Thomas that he was invoking his right to self‐
representation and waiving his right to appointed counsel.
The district judge then asked a series of questions. Thomas
stated that he had not studied law or represented himself
1 The district court imposed a protective order on coconspirator proffers,
requiring that the documents not be kept in the Metropolitan Correc‐
tional Center in order to protect the safety of cooperators. The govern‐
ment did not produce: (1) grand‐jury transcripts of non‐testifying wit‐
nesses because Thomas is not entitled to them without showing particu‐
larized need and (2) finalized intercepted call transcripts because they
were not yet final.
No. 15‐1142 7
before, but that he had an eleventh grade education, had
watched two criminal trials, understood the charges and po‐
tential penalties, and understood that the rules of procedure
and evidence applied. Finally, the district judge advised
Thomas that “it is highly likely that a trained lawyer would
defend you better than you could defend yourself. I, there‐
fore, think it is unwise of you to try and represent yourself.”
(Id. at 22.) Thomas nonetheless chose to represent himself,
and the district court found that Thomas waived counsel
knowingly and voluntarily.
D. Jury Trial
Thomas’s case proceeded to trial. He represented himself,
but he was appointed standby counsel. The government pre‐
sented the testimony of fourteen witnesses and the record‐
ings from seventy‐three phone conversations.
In particular, the government presented testimony from
coconspirator Gabriel Bridges who testified that Thomas
served as security for Blount’s drug deals. Bridges testified to
specific drug deals on October 20, November 1, and Novem‐
ber 6, 2010, at a home on Karlov Avenue (“Karlov house”)
for which Thomas provided security. The government also
presented testimony from law enforcement officers who
conducted surveillance at the Karlov house. The officers
identified Thomas as driving Blount’s white Lincoln in the
area of the Karlov house on October 20 and November 6. On
November 1, 2010, an officer observed Thomas enter the
Karlov house and then exit it after receiving a call from
Blount that said “We gotta go.”
On October 25, 2010, an officer observed Blount’s Lincoln
in the area of the Karlov house. The government published
8 No. 15‐1142
an intercepted telephone call between Blount and Thomas
from October 25 in which Thomas indicated that he had
passed Armitage and Karlov but that he was on his way.
Shortly thereafter, an officer observed the white Lincoln pull
into the area. A few minutes later, Thomas called Blount to
warn of suspected law enforcement parked near the house.
Thomas called a single witness in his defense—Blount.
Blount testified that he had known Thomas for thirty years.
Blount admitted that he was at the Karlov house on October
20 and 25 and November 1 and 6, 2010. But, he testified that
he did not recall Thomas being there on those dates and that
Thomas did not act as security for him on any of those days.
When cross‐examined, Blount continued to deny that Thom‐
as was in the vicinity of the drug deals and that Thomas had
“never went” to the Karlov house. (Trial Tr. 966.) On redirect,
Thomas asked Blount whether on November 1, 2010, “did
Charles Thomas enter [the Karlov house]?” (Id. at 1011.)
Blount replied “Never.” (Id.)
The jury convicted Thomas of all counts.
E. Sentencing
Thomas’s sentencing began on January 5, 2015, with
Thomas’s standby counsel representing him in post‐trial
proceedings. The government argued that Thomas should be
subject to a 2‐level obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement for
suborning Blount’s perjured testimony. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The district court imposed the enhancement, discussing
its reasoning at length:
Blount’s testimony, his direct testimony was false.
He testified that Mr. Thomas was not at the drug
deals, that he wasn’t driving the white Lincoln, and
No. 15‐1142 9
that was plainly false, as proven by the audi‐
otapes … .
That testimony was material, because if the jury be‐
lieved Mr. Domingo Blount’s direct testimony, it
would have acquitted Mr. Thomas, at least in part
and perhaps in whole. …
And based on the circumstances, I’m going to find
that Mr. Thomas knew what Mr. Domingo Blount
was going to say. As I mentioned, I had arranged, I
believe at Mr. Thomas’s request, to have Mr. Blount
transferred to the MCC in sufficient enough time to
allow Mr. Thomas to meet with Mr. Blount to pre‐
pare for trial.
So, I think it was clear that Mr. Thomas—when Mr.
Thomas put Mr. Domingo Blount on the stand, …
he knew what Mr. Blount was going to say and he
knew what the truth was, he knew that Mr. Blount
was going to give false testimony.
(Sent. Tr. 15–16, Jan. 5, 2015.)
After the district court’s imposition of the enhancement,
Thomas faced a guidelines range of 262 to 324 months’ im‐
prisonment. The district court imposed a within‐guidelines
sentence of 262 months.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Thomas challenges three of the district court’s
rulings. First, he argues that the district court abused its dis‐
cretion by refusing to appoint him a fifth attorney. Second,
he argues that it erred in finding that he waived his right to
counsel. Third, he argues that the district court erred in im‐
posing the 2‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
Finding no error, we reject Thomas’s claims.
10 No. 15‐1142
A. Denial of Request for Substitute Appointed Counsel
When a defendant has been given the opportunity to ex‐
plain the reasons for seeking appointment of a new attorney,
we review the district court’s decision to deny that request
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d
543, 551 (7th Cir. 2005). The district court held a hearing on
Thomas’s motion requesting substitute counsel and allowed
Thomas to explain his reasons for wanting Attorney 4 re‐
moved. Therefore, we review the denial of substitute counsel
for an abuse of discretion.
In reviewing whether the district court abused its discre‐
tion in denying a request for substitute counsel, “we consid‐
er the following three nonexhaustive factors: (1) the timeli‐
ness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry
into the defendant’s motion; [and] (3) whether the conflict
was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication
preventing an adequate defense.” United States v. Bjorkman,
270 F.3d 482, 500 (7th Cir. 2001). Evaluation of these factors
shows that there was no abuse of discretion in denying
Thomas’s request.
We need not dwell on the timeliness of Thomas’s motion.
Although it was made on the eve of trial, the district court
was aware of the possibility of such a motion, and it does not
appear to have been an attempt to delay the proceedings.
Rather, Thomas had seemingly good‐faith (albeit mistaken)
concerns about the representation Attorney 4 provided.
Thus, we turn to the second factor—the adequacy of the
district court’s inquiry. Over the course of Thomas’s case, the
district court held several hearings due to Thomas’s repeated
problems with his lawyers. The district court’s final inquiry
No. 15‐1142 11
into Thomas’s concerns with Attorney 4 was extensive. The
district court discussed one‐by‐one each item of discovery
that Thomas claimed Attorney 4 had not provided to ensure
that Thomas was kept updated. Yet Thomas remained unsat‐
isfied. After the district court resolved the disputes over dis‐
covery, Thomas’s final complaint was that he “just don’t trust
[Attorney 4].” Thomas does not argue on appeal that there
were any grounds for Thomas’s distrust beyond those the
district court discussed.2 Because Thomas was able to ex‐
press his dissatisfaction—aided in no small part by the com‐
prehensive questioning from the district court—we find that
the district court made an adequate inquiry regarding
Thomas’s request for substitute counsel.
With respect to “whether the conflict was so great that it
resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an ade‐
quate defense,” Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 500, our inquiry is
made difficult in light of the fact that it was Thomas who re‐
fused to cooperate with Attorney 4. Instead, we have said
where the defendant’s lack of counsel was caused
by his own refusal to cooperate with the counsel
appointed for him and where the defendant was
made aware of the possible consequences of his re‐
fusal to cooperate, the district court’s decision not
to appoint new counsel for the defendant does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
2 Instead, Thomas argues on appeal that it was the district court’s protec‐
tive order and the government’s refusal to provide discovery that created
the conflict between Thomas and his attorney. There are no grounds in
the record upon which to conclude that the government and the district
court manufactured an attorney‐client conflict, and we swiftly reject such
an implication.
12 No. 15‐1142
United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2000). Like
the defendant in Irorere, Thomas went through several attor‐
neys and admitted that he refused to see Attorney 4 in pris‐
on. It was his own refusal to meet or cooperate with Attor‐
ney 4 that precipitated the district court’s denial of his re‐
quest for substitute counsel. That denial was no abuse of dis‐
cretion.
B. Waiver of Counsel
The necessary consequence of a district court’s denial of a
request to substitute counsel is that the defendant must
choose whether to (1) continue with appointed counsel, (2)
retain counsel, or (3) proceed pro se. A district court has dis‐
cretion to give such an ultimatum where it finds that the de‐
fendant has “waive[d] his right to counsel through his own
contumacious conduct,” which the court did in this case. Id.
at 826; see also United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653, 660–61 (7th
Cir. 2008); Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670–71.
There is some uncertainty about the standard of review
we apply where the district court finds that the defendant
waived counsel:
We have recently said we review a defendant’s
waiver of his right to counsel for an abuse of discre‐
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 775
(7th Cir. 2013). However, as [the defendant] points
out, there is also a line of cases in this circuit, which
has not been overruled, stating we review these de‐
cisions de novo. See, e.g., United States v. James, 487
F.3d 518, 527 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hoskins,
243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2001).
No. 15‐1142 13
United States v. Clark, 774 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2014). Be‐
cause there was no error in Thomas’s case under either
standard, we decline to resolve the discrepancy.
A defendant must waive his right to counsel knowingly
and intelligently. See Alden, 527 F.3d at 660. A knowing and
intelligent waiver, however, need not be explicit. “[S]o long
as the district court has given a defendant sufficient oppor‐
tunity to retain the assistance of appointed counsel, defend‐
ant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of
appointed counsel will establish a knowing and intentional
choice.” Id. (alteration in original and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In evaluating whether the defendant made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel, we consider:
(1) whether and to what extent the district court
conducted a formal hearing into the defendant’s
decision to represent himself; (2) other evidence in
the record that establishes whether the defendant
understood the dangers and disadvantages of self‐
representation; (3) the defendant’s background and
experience; and (4) the context of the defendant’s
decision to waive his right to counsel.
Id.
The district court conducted a thorough formal inquiry
into Thomas’s waiver of counsel in accordance with Faretta,
422 U.S. 806. In fact, over the course of Thomas’s criminal
case, the district court conducted two formal Faretta hearings.
At the hearings (and on many more occasions), the district
court warned Thomas of the danger of refusing counsel and
choosing to represent himself, and Thomas acknowledged
that he understood. The district court questioned Thomas
14 No. 15‐1142
about his education, background, understanding of the law,
and his understanding of the charges and possible penalties.
Thomas indicated that he had attended school until eleventh
grade, had watched two criminal trials, understood the
charges and potential penalties, and understood the applica‐
bility of the rules of procedure and evidence. Thomas
acknowledged that he was voluntarily deciding to represent
himself.
The district court’s finding that Thomas knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel is amply supported
by the record. Thomas’s argument on appeal that the district
court “forced” him to waive his right to counsel is unsub‐
stantiated. As held above, the district court’s denial of
Thomas’s request for substitute counsel was not an abuse of
discretion, and Thomas voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli‐
gently chose to proceed pro se.
C. Obstruction‐of‐Justice Enhancement
Thomas’s final challenge on appeal is to the district
court’s imposition of a 2‐level obstruction‐of‐justice en‐
hancement, which the district court imposed because Thom‐
as suborned the perjured testimony of Domingo Blount.
“We review the [district] court’s factual findings support‐
ing the obstruction of justice enhancement for clear error. …
We review de novo, however, whether those findings ade‐
quately support the application of the enhancement.” United
States v. DeLeon, 603 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted).
The district court may apply the obstruction‐of‐justice
enhancement “[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the admin‐
No. 15‐1142 15
istration of justice … and (2) the obstructive conduct related
to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant
conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The enhancement applies in situ‐
ations where the defendant “commit[s], suborn[s], or at‐
tempt[s] to suborn perjury.” § 3C1.1 n.4(B). To find that the
defendant suborned perjured testimony, there must be evi‐
dence that (1) the witness willfully provided false testimony,
United States v. Pabey, 664 F.3d 1084, 1095 (7th Cir. 2011); (2)
the false testimony is material, id.; and (3) the defendant
“aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, pro‐
cured, or willfully caused” the perjury, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 n.9.
The district court’s finding that Blount’s testimony was
false, and not the product of faulty memory, is not clearly
erroneous. Blount testified that Thomas never served as his
security and never entered the Karlov house. To the contrary,
several officers who conducted surveillance testified that
they saw Thomas outside the Karlov house on October 20
and 25, 2010, as well as November 1 and 6, 2010. On No‐
vember 1, officers observed Thomas enter the Karlov house.
Coconspirator Bridges testified that Thomas served as secu‐
rity for Blount. The government also presented phone calls
between Thomas and Blount. In particular, a call made on
October 25 recorded a conversation in which Thomas told
Blount that he had driven too far past the Karlov house, but
that he was on his way.
Given the testimony presented at trial from law enforce‐
ment, intercepted telephone calls, and coconspirator Bridg‐
es’s testimony, which established that Thomas was at the
drug deals, the district court did not commit clear error in
finding that Blount gave false testimony by testifying that
Thomas never went to the Karlov house nor provided securi‐
16 No. 15‐1142
ty. Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that
Blount’s testimony was not the result of a “faulty memory”
about drug deals occurring five years earlier. Instead, Blount
affirmatively denied that Thomas participated in drug deals
at the Karlov house, even in the face of surveillance and
phone call evidence.
Blount’s testimony was also material. If Blount’s version
of events—that Thomas never served as Blount’s security
and never went to the Karlov house—were believed, it
would likely influence the jury. At issue in the trial was
whether Thomas was present and served as security for
Blount during drug deals at the Karlov house. Blount’s tes‐
timony, if believed, would negate Thomas’s participation in
the drug deals at issue. The fact that the government ably
cross‐examined Blount, and that Blount’s testimony likely
harmed rather than helped Thomas, is of no moment. See
United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“A false statement is material if it has a natural tendency to
influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the
[jury.] The statement need not actually affect the decision. …
[The defendant’s] lie didn’t fool anyone, but that doesn’t
make it immaterial.” (first alteration in original) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Thomas “suborned” Blount’s perjured testimony. There
need not be evidence that Thomas instructed Blount to testi‐
fy falsely; rather, there need only be sufficient evidence to
conclude that Thomas used Blount in his defense knowing
that Blount would testify falsely. See Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1095
(“Even if [the defendant] did not actually ask or pressure
[the witness] to falsely testify, … he used [his] testimony as
No. 15‐1142 17
his main defense knowing that it was not true, which
amounts to suborning perjury.”).
The district court arranged for Blount to be housed near
Thomas in custody so he and Thomas could prepare for trial.
Thomas acknowledged to the court that he was in fact able
to speak with Blount, who testified he had known Thomas
for thirty years. In addition, Thomas knew that Blount had
refused to implicate him in the conspiracy during his plea
hearing. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Thomas of‐
fered Blount’s testimony even after he knew Blount would
falsely testify regarding Thomas’s role (or rather, lack there‐
of) in the drug transactions. Therefore, the district court did
not clearly err in finding that Thomas suborned perjured tes‐
timony.
Thomas also argues that the enhancement violates his
Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Undoubtedly
the enhancement is not “intended to punish a defendant for
the exercise of a constitutional right,” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 n.2,
but there is no constitutional right to present perjured testi‐
mony. United States v. Lowder, 148 F.3d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[A defendant’s] right to present witnesses in his own de‐
fense does not encompass a right to suborn perjury.”); see al‐
so United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (“[A] de‐
fendant’s right to testify does not include a right to commit
perjury.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Thomas’s convic‐
tion and sentence.