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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-13-0005863
09-MAY-2016
09:04 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MAX C.K. BOWMAN,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-13-0005863
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-13-0005863; CASE NO. 3DTC-13-067572)
MAY 9, 2016
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
I. Introduction
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Max C.K. Bowman (Bowman)
applied for a writ of certiorari from the Intermediate Court of
Appeals’ (ICA) March 25, 2015 judgment on appeal entered pursuant
to its February 27, 2015 opinion (opinion). The ICA affirmed the
District Court of the Third Circuit’s (district court)
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November 7, 2013 judgment of conviction.
Bowman is a farmer who was transporting cabbages
following a harvest in the back of his uncovered truck. When he
was on the highway, some of the produce spilled out onto the
road. A police officer cited Bowman under Hawai#i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 291C-131, which prohibits spilling loads on
highways.
During his bench trial, Bowman testified that he fell
under an exemption for vehicles carrying agricultural produce,
which is contained in subsection (c) of HRS § 291C-131. Although
the exemption requires that the owner of the vehicle provide for
the reasonable removal of all produce spilled on the highway,
Bowman testified that he felt that it would not have been
reasonable in this case to risk life and limb in order to
retrieve a few leaves of cabbage in the middle of the highway.
The State did not present any evidence rebutting this testimony.
At the end of the trial, the district court found Bowman guilty
and issued him a fine, stating that if Bowman had picked up the
cabbage he would have been acquitted.
The ICA affirmed the district court’s holding. On
appeal before this court, Bowman argues that the ICA gravely
erred in holding that he was required to present evidence on
every element of the defense before he met his burden of
production. Bowman also argues that the ICA erred in upholding
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the district court’s ruling that the prosecution met its burden
of proof.
We conclude that the ICA did not err in holding that
evidence needed to be adduced as to every element of the defense
in order for Bowman to meet his burden of production. However,
because we conclude that “reasonable removal” under HRS § 291C-
131(c) requires removal of spilled agricultural produce only when
the removal is reasonable, we hold that Bowman met his burden of
production. Further, there is no evidence that the prosecution
met its burden of proof in negating the elements of Bowman’s
defense. Thus, the ICA erred in affirming the district court’s
holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Bowman’s
conviction. Therefore, the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the
district court’s judgment of conviction are reversed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Before the District Court
On November 7, 2013, Bowman was orally arraigned in
court as follows:
On or about the 28th day of August, 2013, in Hamakua, state
and county of Hawai#i, Max Bowman was the operator of a
motor vehicle being moved on a highway, which vehicle was
not so constructed, covered, or loaded as to prevent any of
its load from dropping, sifting, leaking, blowing, spilling,
or otherwise escaping therefrom, thereby a violation of
Section 291C-101(a) (sic), Hawai#i Revised Statutes as
Amended.
HRS § 291C-131 (2007 Repl.) states in full:
(a) No vehicle shall be moved on any highway, unless the
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vehicle is so constructed, covered, or loaded as to prevent
any of its load other than clear water or feathers from live
birds from dropping, sifting, leaking, blowing, spilling, or
otherwise escaping therefrom, except that sand may be
dropped for the purpose of securing traction, or water or
other substance may be sprinkled on a highway in cleaning or
maintaining the highway.
(b) No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway when
any load thereon is not entirely within the body of the
vehicle; provided that this prohibition shall not apply if
the load is securely fastened by means of clamps, ropes,
straps, cargo nets, or other suitable mechanical device to
prevent such load from dropping onto the highway or from
shifting in any manner and, further, no vehicle shall be
operated on any highway with any load thereon projecting
beyond the extreme width of the vehicle.
(c) Vehicles carrying agricultural produce from fields
during harvesting shall be exempt from the requirements of
this section but the owner of the vehicle must provide for
the reasonable removal of all such produce spilled or
dropped on the highway.
(d) No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway with
any load if the load is not entirely covered by a cargo net,
tarpaulin, canopy, or other material designed to cover the
load to prevent the load from escaping from the vehicle,
where the load consists partially or entirely of loose
paper, loose rubbish, plastics, empty cartons, dirt, sand,
or gravel.
(e) Vehicles transporting a granular load consisting of
dirt, sand, or gravel on any highway shall not be required
to cover their granular load if the granular load does not
extend, at its peak, above any point on a horizontal plane
equal in height to the top of the side, front, or rear part
of the cargo container area that is the least in height.
(f) No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any highway with
a load consisting of rocks, stones, or boulders if the load,
at its peak, extends above any point on a horizontal plane
equal in height to the top of the side, front, or rear part
of the cargo container area that is the least in height.
(g) Violation of this section shall be considered an offense
as defined in section 701-107(5), shall not be subject to
the provisions of chapter 291D, and shall subject the owner
or driver of the vehicle, or both, to the following
penalties without possibility of probation or suspension of
sentence:
(1) For a first violation, by a fine of not less than
$250 and not more than $500.
(2) For a second violation involving a vehicle or
driver previously cited under this section within one
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year:
(A) Suspension of the vehicle registration or
suspension of the license of the driver, or
both, for not less than five working days but
not more than ten working days; and
(B) A fine of not less than $500 and not more
than $750.
(3) For a third or subsequent violation involving a
vehicle or driver previously cited under this section
within one year:
(A) Suspension of the vehicle registration or
suspension of the license of the driver, or
both, for a period of thirty calendar days; and
(B) A fine of not less than $750 and not more
than $1,000.
In imposing a fine under this subsection, the court, in its
discretion, may apportion payment of the fine between the
driver of the vehicle and the owner of the vehicle according
to the court’s determination of the degree of fault for the
violation.
For the purposes of this subsection, a truck-trailer
combination and tractor-semitrailer combination, as they are
defined in section 286-2, shall be considered as one
vehicle.
During the bench trial,1 Officer Romeo Fuiava (Officer
Fuiava) testified that on August 28, 2013 at around 2:00 p.m., he
was driving on Route 19 toward Hilo. Officer Fuiava observed a
green flatbed pickup truck driving past him with a load of open
containers filled with either cabbage or lettuce. Officer Fuiava
later determined that Bowman was the person operating the truck.
Officer Fuiava passed Bowman, and about a half a mile to a mile
up the road, Officer Fuiava began seeing cabbage or lettuce on
and to the side of the road. Officer Fuiava testified that he
1
The Honorable Melvin H. Fujino presided.
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had passed this same location about a half hour to forty-five
minutes earlier and there had not been any cabbage. Officer
Fuiava did not see any other vehicles with lettuce or cabbage.
Officer Fuiava then turned around and caught up to Bowman in
Pa#auilo at Earl’s store. Officer Fuiava stopped Bowman and
wrote him a citation. The State did not call any other
witnesses.
Bowman then took the stand and testified as follows:
Well, with, you know, respect to our prosecuting attorney, I
just feel like I’ve been mischarged. It was referred under
Section 291C-131(a), which is where he got the no vehicle
shall be moved on any highway unless the vehicle is so
constructed, dropping, sifting. Anyway, the provision I
feel is more applicable is 131(c): “Vehicles carrying
agricultural produce from fields during harvesting shall be
exempt from the requirements of this section, but the owner
of the vehicle must provide for the reasonable removal of
all such produce spilled or dropped on the highway.”
. . .
I’m a farmer. I was carrying agricultural produce from my
field during harvesting, at which point some of it did spill
on the highway. As far as the reasonable removal section
goes, it couldn’t have been much. It was trimmings. I
actually drove past that section of the road later in the
day, did not see any of it. I can only imagine the wind
blew it off the road to decompose in a matter of days on the
side, or it had been run over sufficiently and evaporated on
the road. It could not have been more than one pound or two
pounds of cabbage, maybe 20 leaves. And if reasonable
removal is any indication, I feel risk of life and limb,
running onto the road, grabbing three or four leaves of
cabbage as opposed to letting it decompose naturally does
not sound reasonable to me.
On cross-examination, Bowman testified that it was about 5:45 or
6:00 p.m. when he returned to look into the removal of the
cabbage.
At the end of the hearing, the following was stated:
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THE COURT: . . . The Court will find in this case that under
Section 291C-131(c), that there’s no doubt in this Court’s
mind that the items that are alleged to have been blown from
the truck was – the officer testified that it was lettuce,
but it’s actually cabbage. Section 291C-131(c) applies to
you’re exempt as far as the requirement from storing these
items as stated by covering your load basically, if you have
any type of canvas or anything like that. That’s what the
exemption is.
Now, in this case the next step that the Court would ask is
whether or not you reasonably removed all of these products
that were spilled or dropped on the highway, and in this
case the Court will find that you didn’t. You just left it
on the road. So had you gone and picked it up, you would
have been acquitted of this charge. You understand?
MR. BOWMAN: All right.
THE COURT: That’s what the law is. You’re pretty much
except [sic] from having to cover this load, but if it
falls, you’re going to have to go and pick it up.
MR. BOWMAN: Sure. Again if in the Court’s opinion
reasonable removal entails running onto the highway to pick
up 20 leaves of cabbage, then absolutely.
The district court found that the State proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and entered judgment in favor of the State.
Bowman received a $250 fine plus a $7 driver education fee.
B. Proceedings Before the ICA
In his opening brief before the ICA, Bowman argued that
the oral charge was insufficient because it charged him under HRS
§ 231C-131(a) and did not include the elements of subsection (c)
that he was convicted of. Bowman asserted that because he put
forth evidence that he was exempt under HRS § 231C-131(c), the
burden was shifted to the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that his effort to remove spilled produce was
not reasonable. Bowman also argued that the prosecution had
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failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of HRS
§ 231C-131(c) because there was no evidence that Bowman was the
owner of the truck, the prosecution did not dispute Bowman’s
assertion that running into the highway to remove the cabbage
rather than leaving it to decompose was not reasonable, and the
prosecution did not show that leaving the cabbage to disintegrate
on the highway was not reasonable removal. And because there was
no evidence that Bowman owned the vehicle, he questioned whether
he could be convicted for a criminal offense for the failure of
some other person to act.
In its answering brief, the State argued that it did
not need to charge Bowman with HRS § 291C-131(c) because it is a
defense and not a separate offense. The State then argued that
because subsection (c) is a non-affirmative defense, the initial
burden to raise the defense was on the defendant. And, although
the State was then required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
facts negativing the defense, it did not have to introduce
further evidence or call additional witnesses to do so. The
State asserted that Bowman never claimed that he was the owner or
took steps to remove the cabbage from the road. The State argued
that it disproved Bowman’s defense under HRS § 291C-131(c) by
demonstrating that he did not make any effort to remove the
cabbage from the road.
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In his reply brief, Bowman argued that interpreting
subsection (c) as a defense would mean that a driver could be
convicted for the failure of a third party (the owner) to provide
reasonable removal. Bowman argued that it was more logical to
interpret the statute as a violation against the owner of the
vehicle for his/her failure to remove the produce. Bowman also
re-asserted that risking life and limb to retrieve the cabbage
leaves was unreasonable, and that the State did not dispute this.
On February 27, 2015, the ICA issued an opinion
affirming the district court’s judgment. The ICA began its
analysis by considering whether HRS § 291C-131(c) constitutes an
offense or a defense. It first noted that under the plain
language of the statute, HRS § 291C-131(a) represents a general
requirement that all vehicles be constructed or covered to
prevent spilling and subsection (c) is an exception to these
requirements for vehicles transporting produce after harvest.
The ICA then examined the legislative history of HRS § 291C-131
and noted that its purpose was to prevent the spilling of loads
from vehicles on highways and that the agricultural exception was
included in the original statute because the legislature believed
that the application of HRS § 291C-131 would cause great hardship
to the agricultural industry.
The ICA further noted that although the legislature
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later enacted subsection (g) in 1986, which states that a
violation of HRS § 291C-131 is an offense that subjects the
owner, driver of the vehicle, or both to graduated penalties,
there was nothing to support the conclusion that the legislature
intended subsection (c) to be an offense. The ICA stated that it
would lead to an absurd result if it were to interpret subsection
(c) as an offense because some of the factual elements of the
subsection, such as whether the vehicle was carrying produce
during harvest, are within the knowledge and control of the
defendant, and the State would not have the information necessary
to properly charge the defendant. The ICA also noted that under
this court’s case law, subsection (c) is a defense rather than an
offense because it is an exception that appears somewhere other
than in the enacting clause of the criminal statute. Therefore,
the ICA held that “subsection (c) constitutes a defense for which
Bowman carried the initial burden of production.”
Because the ICA concluded that subsection (c) is a
defense, it held that the State was not required to include its
elements in the oral charge. The ICA then held that “there was
sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that
Bowman did not reasonably remove the spilled produce and,
therefore, did not avail himself of the subsection (c) defense to
his subsection (a) charge.” In response to Bowman’s contention
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that the State failed to present any evidence that Bowman was the
owner of the vehicle or that it was reasonable for Bowman to
remove the cabbage, the ICA stated the following:
Because subsection (c) constitutes a defense, Bowman carried
the burden of production to produce evidence in support of
his subsection (c) defense. Thus, any failure to present
evidence as to one of the elements of subsection (c) is
fatal to Bowman’s defense and not the State’s case-in-chief.
There was sufficient evidence to support Bowman’s
conviction. The district court did not make a ruling as to
whether Bowman satisfied the “owner” requirement of
subsection (c), as defined under HRS § 291C-1 (2007 Repl.).
Instead, the district court determined that Bowman’s
subsection (c) defense failed because Bowman failed to
reasonably remove the spilled produce.
During his trial, Bowman testified that when he
returned to the location where he spilled his cabbage
trimmings three to four hours after receiving his citation,
he “did not see any of [the trimmings]” on the road and felt
that “risk of life and limb, running onto the road, grabbing
three or four leaves of cabbage as opposed to letting it
decompose naturally [did] not sound reasonable . . . .” In
response, the district court found that Bowman did not act
reasonably when he “just left [the trimmings] on the road.”
The district court reasoned that “had [Bowman] gone and
picked it up, [he] would have been acquitted of this
charge.”
In a footnote, the ICA noted that because it “affirm[ed] the
district court’s determination that Bowman did not provide for
the reasonable removal of the spilled produce, [it] need not
determine whether Bowman produced evidence as to the “owner” of
the vehicle so to overcome his burden of production.”
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Statutory Interpretation
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
that we review de novo. Similarly, a trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewable de novo under the
right/wrong standard. Under the de novo standard, [the
appellate] court must examine the facts and answer the
pertinent question of law without being required to give any
weight or deference to the trial court's answer to the
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question. In other words, we are free to review a trial
court's conclusion of law for its correctness.
State v. Kelekolio, 94 Hawai#i 354, 356, 14 P.3d 364, 366 (App.
2000) (citations omitted).
This court has repeatedly stated that, when
interpreting a statute, an appellate court’s
foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.
And where the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, [a court's] only duty is to give effect to [the
statute's] plain and obvious meaning.
State v. Wells, 78 Hawai#i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets in original
omitted). Accordingly,
we must read statutory language in the context of the entire
statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its
purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a
statute, an ambiguity exists[.]
In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be
compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.
Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of
legislative history as an interpretive tool.
[The appellate] court may also consider the reason and
spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the
legislature to enact it to discover its true meaning. Laws
in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be
construed with reference to each other. What is clear in
one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is
doubtful in another.
State v. Young, 107 Hawai#i 36, 39-40, 109 P.3d 677, 680-81
(2005) (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and
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ellipses in original omitted; formatting altered) (quoting State
v. Kaua, 102 Hawai#i 1, 8, 72 P.3d 473, 480 (2003)).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence
is well established; namely, whether, upon the evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in
full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, the
evidence is sufficient to support a prima facie case so that
a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Sufficient evidence to support a prima
facie case requires substantial evidence as to every
material element of the offense charged. Substantial
evidence as to every material element of the offense charged
is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to
support a conclusion. Under such a review, we give full play
to the right of the fact finder to determine credibility,
weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact.
State v. Grace, 107 Hawai#i 133, 139, 111 P.3d 28, 34 (App. 2005)
(formatting altered) (quoting State v. Ferrer, 95 Hawai#i 409,
422, 23 P.3d 744, 757 (App. 2001)).
IV. DISCUSSION
There are two issues before this court. The first is
whether the ICA erred when it concluded that evidence needed to
be presented as to every element of the defense in order for
Bowman to carry his burden of production. The second is whether
the ICA erred when it upheld the district court’s ruling that the
prosecution met its burden of proof in negating the elements of
Bowman’s defense.
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A. The ICA did not err in holding that evidence needed to be
adduced as to every element of the defense in order for
Bowman to carry his burden of production.
In his application for writ of certiorari, Bowman
argues that because HRS § 291C-131(c) is a non-affirmative
defense, pursuant to State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai#i 85, 976 P.2d
399 (1999), he only needed to put forth some evidence, no matter
how weak or inconclusive, in order to meet his burden of
production. Bowman argues that the ICA gravely erred when it
stated that a failure “to present evidence as to one of the
elements in subsection (c) is fatal to Bowman’s defense and not
the State’s case-in-chief” because this court “has never required
the defendant to provide evidence for each and every element of a
defense as part of its burden of production.”
In its response brief, the State argues that the ICA
did not gravely err because it did not heighten the defendant’s
burden of production but simply pointed out that “if a defense
has certain elements, Defendant has the initial burden to produce
that evidence - no matter how weak, inconclusive, or
unsatisfactory - that places a defense in issue.” The State also
notes that in Stocker, this court addressed the parental
discipline defense and identified the specific elements of the
defense that a defendant needed to produce. The State argues
that “[t]hus, this Court has essentially ruled that a defendant
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bears the initial burden to produce some evidence of each element
of a defense before the burden shifts to the prosecution to
disprove a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Bowman’s argument that this court “has never required
the defendant to provide evidence for each and every element of a
defense” is unsupported. Although the defendant is not required
to provide evidence for each and every element of a defense, the
record must contain some evidence thereof. For example, in
Stocker, the defendant was charged with harassment for slapping
his son and claimed that his actions were justified by the
parental discipline defense under HRS § 703-309(1) (1993), which
states in relevant part:
Use of force by persons with special responsibility for
care, discipline, or safety of others. The use of force
upon or toward the person of another is justifiable under
the following circumstances:
(1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other
person similarly responsible for the general care and
supervision of a minor, or a person acting at the
request of the parent, guardian, or other responsible
person, and:
(a) The force is employed with due regard for
the age and size of the minor and is reasonably
related to the purpose of safeguarding or
promoting the welfare of the minor, including
the prevention or punishment of the minor’s
misconduct[.]
This court then stated that the parental discipline defense was
available to Stocker so long as some evidence was adduced,
no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory it might
be . . . which was probative of the facts that (1) Stocker
had parental authority over [the child], . . . (2) the force
at issue was employed with due regard for the age and size
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of the minor, . . . and (3) the force was reasonably
proportional to the misconduct being punished and reasonably
believed necessary to protect the welfare of the
recipient[.]
90 Hawai#i at 95, 976 P.2d at 409 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Therefore, this court
required that there be some kind of evidence adduced as to every
element of the defense before the State was required to disprove
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See also State v.
Crouser, 81 Hawai#i 5, 10, 911 P.2d 725, 730 (1996) (“Crouser was
charged with abuse of a family or household member, in violation
of HRS § 709-906. . . . To invoke the defense of justification
under HRS § 703-309, Crouser was required to make a showing that
the record contained evidence supporting the following elements .
. .”) (emphasis added).
Thus, while Bowman was only required to make a showing
that the record contained some evidence, no matter how weak or
inconclusive, evidence needed to be adduced as to every element
of the defense. The ICA did not err or deviate from the burden
of production standard when it held that the failure to present
evidence as to one of the elements of the defense would be fatal
to Bowman’s case.
B. The ICA erred when it affirmed the district court’s holding
that the prosecution met its burden of proof.
Although Bowman was required to make a showing that the
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record contained some evidence as to every element of the defense
under HRS § 291C-131(c), the question still remains as to whether
the ICA gravely erred by upholding the district court’s ruling
that the prosecution met its burden of proof. Bowman argues that
the district court failed to shift the burden onto the
prosecution to disprove that his conduct was reasonable once he
met the burden of production.
The defense under subsection (c) can be broken down
into four basic parts: 1) vehicle carrying agricultural produce,
2) from fields, 3) during harvesting, and 4) owner of the vehicle
must provide for the reasonable removal of all such produce
spilled or dropped on the highway. As stated above, Bowman
simply needed to put forth some evidence as to every element of
the defense to meet the burden of production. Bowman
specifically testified that: 1) he was a farmer, and his truck
was carrying cabbages; 2) he was coming from his field; and 3) he
had just harvested his cabbages. As for the fourth element, even
though there was no direct evidence from either witness as to
whether Bowman was the owner of the vehicle, Bowman was the
driver of the truck, he was carrying his own cabbages, and he
raised this particular defense. Therefore, there seems to be
some circumstantial evidence that Bowman was the owner of the
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vehicle.2
The difficult issue is whether Bowman provided for the
reasonable removal of the cabbages spilled on the highway.
Based on the transcript of the bench trial, it is difficult to
determine whether the district court found that Bowman met his
burden of production as to this element. After Officer Fuiava
and Bowman testified, the court stated:
Section 291C-131(c) applies to you’re exempt as far as the
requirement from storing these items as stated by covering
your load basically, if you have any type of canvas or
anything like that. That’s what the exemption is.
Now, in this case the next step that the Court would
ask is whether or not you reasonably removed all of these
products that were spilled or dropped on the highway, and in
this case the Court will find that you didn’t. You just
left it on the road. So had you gone and picked it up, you
would have been acquitted of this charge.
. . .
That’s what the law is. You’re pretty much except
[sic] from having to cover this load, but if it falls,
you’re going to have to go and pick it up.
It is unclear whether the district court made these statements in
finding: 1) that Bowman had not met the burden of production on
this element because the statute required that he make some kind
2
Additionally, despite the wording of subsection (c), it appears
that the driver of a vehicle could benefit from this defense based on the
penalty provision in the statute that includes “driver.” See HRS § 291C-
131(g) (providing that “[v]iolation of this section shall be considered an
offense . . . and shall subject the owner or driver of the vehicle, or both,
to the following penalties”) (emphasis added). Because both the owner and/or
the driver of the vehicle can be subject to penalties for violating this
statute, it follows that a driver of the vehicle could also qualify for the
defense. It is undisputed that Bowman was driving the vehicle. Thus, Bowman
qualifies for this defense without having to adduce evidence that he was the
owner of the vehicle.
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of removal and he did not and, therefore, the defense did not
apply, or 2) that Bowman met the burden of production but the
State disproved it beyond a reasonable doubt because, in this
case, it would have been reasonable for Bowman to remove the
cabbage. We address both of these possibilities in turn.
1. Bowman met his burden of production on this
element because we understand HRS § 291C-131(c) to
require removal only when reasonable.
First, the district court appears to have interpreted
HRS § 291C-131(c) to require that some kind of removal of spilled
produce be performed in every case before the defense could be
raised. This is evidenced by the court’s comment that if Bowman
had “gone and picked [the trimmings] up, [he] would have been
acquitted of this charge.” However, there seems to be at least
two understandings of “reasonable removal of all such produce
spilled or dropped.” The first, adopted by the district court
and the ICA, is that there must be removal of some kind, but it
need only be to an extent that is reasonable. The second, as
proposed by Bowman, is that the phrase means that removal is only
necessary when it is reasonable.
We believe that the district court’s interpretation of
“reasonable removal” is too narrow, and are persuaded by Bowman’s
argument that it was unreasonable for Bowman to risk “life and
limb” on a busy highway in order to pick up cabbage trimmings,
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especially if the trimmings posed no threat to the safety of
other motorists and would naturally decompose on their own. This
interpretation of the statutory language is supported by its
legislative history.
As the ICA notes, the purpose of HRS § 291C-131 was to
“prevent the spilling of loads from vehicles on highways” because
“vehicles with uncovered cargo are . . . posing potential traffic
hazards and damage to other vehicles.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No.
346-76, in 1976 House Journal, at 1431. Thus, the main stimulus
behind this legislation appears to be the “potential traffic
hazards” posed by uncovered loads.
Subsection (c) of this statute provides an exemption to
the general requirement for vehicles transporting cargo, allowing
vehicles carrying agricultural produce from fields to travel
uncovered as long as there is a reasonable removal of spilled
produce from the highway. This subsection was enacted so as not
to “cause great hardship to the agricultural industry” and
specifically “the Hawai#i sugar industry.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep.
No. 308, in 1977 Senate Journal, at 986-87. One logical
conclusion that can be drawn from this commentary is that
subsection (c) was added so that the sugar industry could
transport uncovered sugar cane stalks from the fields after
harvest as long as the industry provided “reasonable removal” of
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the stalks that fell off the trucks in order to prevent
“potential traffic hazards and damage to other vehicles.”
Here, Bowman’s cabbage trimmings are arguably not
potential traffic hazards, especially when compared with the
sugar cane stalks originally contemplated under this statute.
And while it would be reasonable to remove sugar cane stalks from
a highway in order to prevent an accident or vehicle damage, it
might not be reasonable to remove cabbage trimmings, especially
if the attempted removal is on a busy highway and is itself risky
for both the person attempting the removal and the motorists
driving on the highway.
For these reasons, we hold that “reasonable removal”
means that removal of spilled produce is only necessary when
reasonable. Such factors as the type and amount of agricultural
produce spilled, the danger of the spilled produce to motorists
traveling on the highway, and the risk to the person removing the
produce should be considered when determining whether removal is
reasonable.
Based on this understanding of the meaning of
“reasonable removal,” the next step is to determine whether
Bowman produced some evidence as to this element to satisfy his
burden of production. Bowman testified that he could not have
spilled more than two pounds of cabbage, or approximately twenty
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leaves, and that when he returned to the highway between two and
three hours later, he did not see any of it. He also testified
that he did not think it was reasonable to go onto the road and
risk life and limb in order to recover cabbage leaves instead of
letting them decompose naturally. Therefore, Bowman adduced some
evidence that he did not need to pick up the cabbage trimmings
because it would not have been reasonable, and by allowing the
cabbage to decompose naturally, he did provide for reasonable
removal.
As such, Bowman met his burden of production under
HRS § 291C-131(c) to show “reasonable removal.” To the extent
that the district court and the ICA held otherwise, they erred.
2. The evidence does not support a finding that the
State disproved Bowman’s defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Second, if the district court found that the defense
could be raised even when there was no removal, but nonetheless
found that the State had disproved the defense beyond a
reasonable doubt, this finding is not supported by substantial
evidence.
As Bowman has contended, the State did not present
additional evidence after Bowman testified that he did not think
it was reasonable to risk life or limb in order to pick up
cabbage trimmings that decomposed naturally. The State did not
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re-call Officer Fuiava to describe whether the highway was busy
or empty at the time of the citation. Nor did the State
introduce any other evidence that would disprove Bowman’s claim
that it would not have been reasonable to go back and remove the
cabbage trimmings. Therefore, absent any evidence of that
nature, and without more specific findings by the district court
on the record, it does not appear that the State carried its
burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, even though it is difficult to determine if
the district court based its holding on a determination that
Bowman did not meet his burden of production or on a
determination that the State carried its burden of disproving
Bowman’s defense, the ultimate result is that the district court
erred under either possibility. For this reason, we reverse the
ICA and the district court’s holding that there was sufficient
evidence to support Bowman’s conviction.3
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that under HRS § 291C-131(c),
“reasonable removal” should be interpreted to mean that removal
of spilled agricultural produce on a highway is only necessary
when the removal is reasonable. Because Bowman adduced some
3
As a result of this holding, Bowman is entitled to a refund of
$257 in fines paid.
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evidence to show that his removal of cabbage trimmings from the
highway would have been unreasonable, and because the State did
not produce evidence disproving this defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, we hold that the ICA erred in affirming the district
court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to
convict Bowman under HRS § 291C-131. For these reasons, the
ICA’s judgment on appeal, which affirmed the district court’s
judgment of conviction, is reversed.
Benjamin E. Lowenthal /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
and Jo Kim for petitioner
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Dale Y. Ross
for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
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