COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA109
Court of Appeals No. 15CA0682
Adams County District Court No. 14CR1195
Honorable John E. Popovich, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Demetre Cardell Boulden,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE MILLER
Furman and Navarro, JJ., concur
Announced July 14, 2016
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Molly E. McNab, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah Quinn, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Demetre Cardell Boulden, appeals the trial court’s
entry of judgment of conviction upon a jury verdict finding him
guilty of driving under restraint. We conclude that under People v.
Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034 (Colo. 2000), the mere mailing of the notice of
revocation is not sufficient to establish the knowledge element of
the offense of driving under restraint. We therefore vacate the
judgment and sentence and remand with directions.
I. Background
¶2 A police officer pulled defendant over for driving a car with a
broken headlight. When the officer checked with dispatch on the
license plate number of the car, he learned that the car had been
reported as stolen. Defendant’s driving record indicated that his
driver’s license had been suspended seven months before he was
pulled over.
¶3 Defendant was charged with second degree aggravated motor
vehicle theft and driving under restraint. Following a jury trial, he
was convicted of driving under restraint and acquitted of motor
vehicle theft.
1
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶4 Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to
find defendant guilty of driving under restraint. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
¶5 The People contend that defendant did not preserve this
argument and that we should accordingly apply plain error review.
In People v. McCoy, 2015 COA 76M, ¶ 6, a division of this court
concluded that sufficiency of the evidence claims are not subject to
plain error review. We agree. In any event, defendant moved for
judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief
based on insufficiency of the evidence of defendant’s mental state.
The trial court denied the motion, expressly finding that there was
sufficient evidence of defendant’s knowledge for purposes of the
driving under restraint charge. Where a defendant raises an issue
sufficiently to give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the
claim raised on appeal, we conclude the claim is sufficiently
preserved. See People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 55. Accordingly,
plain error review does not apply.
¶6 The evidence is sufficient if, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have
2
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010).
B. Law
¶7 Driving under restraint occurs when “[a]ny person who drives
a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this
state with knowledge that the person’s license or privilege to drive,
either as a resident or a nonresident, is under restraint for any
reason other than conviction of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD is
guilty of a misdemeanor.” § 42-2-138(1)(a), C.R.S. 2015 (emphasis
added). “Restraint” includes revocation or suspension of the
driver’s license. § 42-2-138(4)(b).
¶8 Knowledge is an essential element of the crime of driving
under restraint. See Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891, 896 (Colo.
1987); People v. Parga, 964 P.2d 571, 572 (Colo. App. 1998). In
Jolly, the supreme court held that knowledge is an element in all
criminal cases in which notice of a final agency action depriving a
licensee of the driving privilege is an essential element of the
charge, even if, as was then the case, the statute does not
specifically mention knowledge. Jolly, 742 P.2d at 895; see also
People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Colo. 1983).
3
¶9 Several years later, the General Assembly expressly added the
knowledge element to the driving under restraint statute, as quoted
above. Ch. 207, sec. 3, § 42-2-130(1)(a), 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws
938. It also included a definition of knowledge applicable to driving
under a restraint that encompasses both actual and constructive
knowledge. § 42-2-130(4)(a), 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws at 939; see also
Parga, 964 P.2d at 574. That definition is currently codified in
section 42-2-138(4)(a) and provides as follows:
“Knowledge” means actual knowledge of any
restraint from whatever source or knowledge of
circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable
person to be aware that such person’s license
or privilege to drive was under restraint.
“Knowledge” does not mean knowledge of a
particular restraint or knowledge of the
duration of restraint.
¶ 10 The second part of the definition of knowledge, while referring
to the use of an objective reasonable person standard, still “requires
that the particular defendant possess knowledge of those
circumstances that would trigger a reasonable person to believe his
license was under restraint.” Ellison, 14 P.3d at 1036-37 (emphasis
added). The defendant must be “actually aware of specific
circumstances.” Id. at 1037. In Ellison, the supreme court
4
explained that while a defendant who saw mail arrive from the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), but refused to open it, might
have actual knowledge of circumstances that would lead a
reasonable person to believe his license was under restraint, a
defendant who inadvertently threw away mail from the DMV
without seeing it could not have the same actual knowledge. Id. at
1037, 1039. While some states make driving under restraint a
strict liability crime, Colorado’s “knowledge” requirement limits
punishment to “those who are subjectively aware of circumstances
that would lead a responsible driver to realize his license was under
restraint and thus not continue to drive.” Id. at 1039.
¶ 11 The prosecution admitted into evidence a certified copy of
defendant’s Colorado driver history. The history showed that
defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended effective September
9, 2013, and had not been reinstated since that time. Attached to
the driver history is a page entitled “Verification of Mailing of
Notices/Orders,” which includes a list of names and addresses.
The following statement appears at the top of the page: “by checking
off the name and initialing the statement, the mail room verifies
that these notices/orders were deposited in the U.S. Mail First
5
Class.” Defendant’s name and address are listed on the page, and a
handwritten check mark appears next to the entry with his name.
A handwritten initial and date appears at the top of the page.
¶ 12 In closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the knowledge
requirement of driving under restraint:
If you remember back in jury selection, we
talked about a driver’s license, what you need
to do to have a valid driver’s license. And we
talked about insurance. Everybody knows
that they need insurance on their vehicle and
that if their insurance lapses they will not have
a valid driver’s license anymore. Demetre
Boulden knew his driver’s license was under
restraint.
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor reiterated, “you can infer that
notice being sent to [defendant’s last known] address, a reasonable
person should have known his license was suspended.”
¶ 13 In an administrative driver’s license revocation proceeding, it
is sufficient for the DMV to mail by first-class mail a notice of
revocation to the driver’s last known address on record with the
DMV, which would then be deemed received by the driver three
days after being sent. §§ 42-2-119(2), -126(6)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2015.
No provision in the Motor Vehicle Code creates a comparable
presumption for purposes of criminal proceedings. See Well
6
Augmentation Subdistrict of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399, 419 (Colo. 2009) (“When the General
Assembly includes a provision in one section of a statute, but
excludes the same provision from another section, we presume that
the General Assembly did so purposefully.”). Ellison clarifies that
mere proof of mailing is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt a defendant’s knowledge of restraint of his driver’s privilege.
14 P.3d at 1039. Here, the prosecution presented no evidence on
the issue of knowledge beyond the driving record and the mailing
certification.
¶ 14 The People cite People v. Espinoza, 195 P.3d 1122, 1128 (Colo.
App. 2008), in support of the proposition that a driving record is
sufficient evidence that a defendant had knowledge that his license
had been revoked. We note that in Espinoza the driving record in
question included proofs of service notifying the defendant it was
unlawful for him to operate a motor vehicle in Colorado and stating
that he was a habitual traffic offender. Id. The defendant had been
previously convicted of multiple traffic offenses, as evidenced by his
habitual traffic offender status. Id.; see also § 42-2-202, C.R.S.
7
2015. Upon being stopped by police, defendant fled by foot.
Espinoza, 195 P.3d at 1128.
¶ 15 Thus, in Espinoza the record established that (1) the
defendant had previously been convicted of multiple traffic offenses
(he would necessarily have known of those convictions) and (2) he
fled the scene when apprehended, a fact from which the jury could
have inferred defendant’s consciousness of guilt that he drove with
knowledge of his license revocation. See People v. Gee, 2015 COA
151, ¶ 26 (evidence of flight may be relevant to show consciousness
of guilt).
¶ 16 By contrast, however, the only evidence in the record of this
case bearing on the driving under restraint charge is (1) the driving
record, indicating only that defendant’s license had been suspended
on September 9, 2013, and not reinstated; and (2) the verification of
mailing, showing that a single notice of that suspension had been
mailed to his last known address on file. The prosecution presented
no evidence that defendant had ever seen or was aware of either
document or of the suspension of his license.
¶ 17 Accordingly, even viewing all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that no reasonable jury
8
could have found that the prosecution proved the knowledge
element of driving under restraint.
III. Remaining Issues
¶ 18 In light of our conclusion that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the conviction for driving under restraint, we need not
address defendant’s evidentiary arguments.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 19 Defendant’s conviction and sentence for driving under
restraint are vacated, and the trial court is directed on remand to
enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE NAVARRO concur.
9