United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1166
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN FEY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Lisa Aidlin for appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
August 16, 2016
BARRON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Jonathan Fey was
convicted for his failure to register as a sex offender under the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a). He now challenges a number of the special
conditions of supervised release that the District Court imposed
in connection with the sentence for that conviction. For the
reasons set forth below, we vacate the condition restricting Fey's
contact with children but affirm the remaining conditions that he
challenges.
I.
Fey's obligation to register pursuant to SORNA stems
from an incident that took place in 1999. In August of that year,
Fey -- then 29 years old -- rented a motel room to host a party
with his co-workers, one of whom was V.P., a 16-year-old girl.
Fey provided V.P. with alcohol and then raped her after she passed
out. As a result of that incident, Fey was convicted in
Massachusetts state court of (1) rape and (2) indecent assault and
battery on a person over 14 years of age. Fey served nine years
in prison and was released on June 9, 2010.
After his release from prison, Fey registered as a sex
offender on five separate occasions. After June 22, 2011, however,
he failed to continue to update his registration. In July 2011,
a warrant was issued for his arrest based on Fey's failure to
register. Fey was eventually located and arrested in Ohio in May
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2014. At the time of his arrest, Fey was living with his fiancée
and her four minor daughters.
Fey pleaded guilty to the SORNA violation on October 28,
2014, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
At his sentencing, the District Court imposed a period of
imprisonment of eighteen months, a five-year period of supervised
release, and a number of conditions of supervised release, three
of which Fey now challenges on appeal.
II.
We assess the validity of a special condition of
supervised release by applying 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and §5D1.3(b)
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v.
Pabon, 819 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2016). Those provisions "require
that special conditions cause no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of supervised
release, and that the conditions be reasonably related both to
these goals and to the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant." Id. (quoting
United States v. Del Valle–Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2015)).
In imposing a special condition, "the district court is
'required to provide a reasoned and case-specific explanation for
the conditions it imposes.'" Id. (quoting Del Valle–Cruz, 785
F.3d at 58). Such an explanation both is required by statute, see
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and facilitates our review on appeal, Pabon,
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819 F.3d at 31. If the sentencing court does not explicitly
provide such an explanation, however, we will not automatically
vacate the condition. Id. Instead, we will attempt to "infer the
court's reasoning from the record." Id. "In all cases, however,
the sentence must find 'adequate evidentiary support in the
record.'" Id. (quoting Del Valle–Cruz, 785 F.3d at 58).
A.
Fey first challenges a condition restricting his right
to associate with minors. That condition reads:
The defendant shall have no direct or indirect contact
with children under the age of 18, except in the presence
of a responsible adult who is aware of the nature of the
defendant's background and current offense, and who has
been approved by the [probation office].
Fey argues that the District Court erred in failing to provide an
explanation for this condition and that the District Court's
reasoning cannot be inferred from the record. The parties dispute
whether Fey objected on this ground below and further dispute the
standard of review. We need not resolve that dispute, however, as
we conclude that Fey can meet the more demanding plain-error
standard that the government asks us to apply. That standard
requires him to show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was
clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's
substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United
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States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
The government concedes that the District Court "did not
expound on its reasons" for imposing this associational condition.
Indeed, the District Court simply stated: "[T]his is a draconian
order, but I fear that I must impose it." The government contends,
however, that the District Court's "reasoning is readily inferred
from the record." We disagree.
In Pabon, we noted that "we have vacated associational
conditions where the defendant's prior sex offense occurred in the
distant past, the intervening time was marked by lawful social
activity, and the district court did not otherwise explain the
need for such restrictions." 819 F.3d at 31 (citing Del Valle-
Cruz, 785 F.3d at 59-64). Here, the offense that triggered Fey's
registration requirement, which occurred in 1999, is a remote one.1
Cf. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d at 53, 59 (finding it "troubling"
that the District Court had imposed associational conditions
fifteen years after the defendant's underlying sex conviction).2
1
We note also that, according to the presentence report, the
triggering offense occurred at a time when Fey was struggling with
alcohol abuse. The record indicates that he has been sober since
1999.
2We take the government's point that Fey has spent
approximately thirteen of the seventeen years since Fey's most
recent sex offense in prison. But we disagree with the government
that, as a result, "the temporal connection between Fey's most
recent prior sex offense and the no contact with minors condition
is compelling." Although the years of incarceration are relevant
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In addition, Fey has not committed any sexual or violent crimes in
the intervening years. According to the record, the only unlawful
activities in which Fey has engaged between 1999 and today were
his failures to register as a sex offender and a violation of the
probation condition restricting him from living with children.
Cf. id. at 60 & n.10 (vacating a similar condition even though the
defendant had been convicted four times, including once for
domestic battery, in the intervening years since his conviction
for a sex crime); United States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 534 (1st
Cir. 2015) (upholding a similar condition in part because the
sentencing court had noted that "the defendant had what may have
been one of the most profuse criminal histories the court had ever
seen"). And, although the condition does not "place an outright
ban on [Fey's] association with minors," it operates not "in
limited contexts" but in all contexts. Pabon, 819 F.3d at 31-32.
Nevertheless, the government argues that other aspects
of the record make the District Court's unstated reasoning plain.
See id. at 31 (noting that we have upheld associational conditions
even when the defendant has not committed a sex offense or
to an analysis of the danger Fey may pose to the public, they do
not transform an offense that took place seventeen years ago into
one that took place four years ago. Cf. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d
at 52, 59 (focusing on the time between the underlying conviction
and the imposition of the challenged condition without discounting
that time based on the years the defendant had spent in jail in
between).
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substantial other criminal activity in recent years when the
defendant's conduct "otherwise indicates an enhanced risk to
minors"). The government first notes that Fey's triggering offense
was for rape and that it was not his first sex offense. Rather,
in 1989, when Fey was 19 years old, he was convicted of sexual
assault in the third degree on the basis of a relationship he had
with his 14-year-old girlfriend.3 Next, the government points out
that the record shows that, in consequence of that conviction, Fey
was ordered to have no further contact with his 14-year-old
girlfriend after the 1989 conviction and yet was seen in his car
with her about a year later. The government further notes that
the record shows that, as a condition of his probation for his
1999 rape conviction, Fey was also ordered to "have no unsupervised
contact with children under the age of 18, other than his own
child" and was prohibited "from sleeping in a residence in which
there was a minor, other than his own child, under the age of 18,
even with an adult present." But, notwithstanding those
restrictions, Fey admits that he was living with his fiancée and
her four minor daughters prior to his 2014 arrest.
In pressing this contention, the government contends
that our decision in Del Valle-Cruz, in which we vacated a similar,
unexplained associational condition imposed on another defendant
3
This conviction apparently did not trigger any requirement
to register as a sex offender.
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who had been convicted of a SORNA violation, is not to the
contrary. The government rightly points out that Fey has committed
both more (two as opposed to one) and more serious (rape as opposed
to sexual battery) sex offenses than had Del Valle-Cruz and that
Del Valle-Cruz had not violated prior no-contact orders while Fey
has (by living with his fiancée's daughters in 2014 and by
contacting his underage girlfriend in 1990).
But while we agree with the government that the record
here provides greater support for upholding the associational
condition than did the record in Del Valle-Cruz, the associational
condition imposed here -- in addition to having a weak temporal
connection with Fey's sex offense -- is very broad. It prohibits
Fey from having unapproved "direct or indirect contact" with all
children: male children, female children, and children of all ages,
whether or not they are members of Fey's family. Yet, as Fey
points out, the record reveals no instances in which Fey committed
a sex offense of any kind against boys, against pre-pubescent
children, or against members of his family. And the government
has made no argument that Fey is a danger to such children. Cf.
United States v. Vélez-Luciano, 814 F.3d 553, 564 (1st Cir. 2016)
("The record reflects that Vélez–Luciano only poses a threat to
young girls -- nothing suggests he has any predilection towards
males."). Thus, given that the District Court did not give any
explanation, we conclude that the District Court committed a clear
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or obvious error, thus satisfying the first two prongs of the
plain-error standard Fey must meet. See United States v. Perazza-
Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 2009).
And Fey has also satisfied the third and fourth prongs
of the plain-error test. As we explained in Perazza-Mercado, when
a District Court provides no explanation for a condition that does
not find apparent support in the record, "there is a reasonable
probability that the court might not have imposed the prohibition
if it had fulfilled its obligation to explain the basis for the
condition or at least made sure that the record illuminated the
basis for the condition." Id. And, as we further explained, "[w]e
cannot endorse the summary imposition of such a significant
prohibition," unexplained by the District Court and without
apparent grounding in the record, "without impairing the
'fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings.'" Id. at 79 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 461
F.3d 15, 44 (1st Cir. 2006)). Thus, although restrictions on Fey's
ability to interact with such children might conceivably be
justifiable under § 3583(d), we conclude this associational
condition must be vacated.4
4 Because we conclude that the condition must be vacated on
this ground, we need not address Fey's contention that the
condition represents an over-delegation of authority by the
District Court to the probation office.
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B.
Fey next challenges a condition that relates to his
employment. That condition, as orally imposed by the District
Court at the sentencing hearing,5 is the following.
[The defendant] shall not be employed in any capacity
that may cause [him] to come into direct contact with
children except under circumstances approved in advance
by the Probation Office and [he] shall not participate
in any volunteer activity that may cause [him] to come
in direct contact with children except under
circumstances approved in advance by the Probation
Office.
The District Court again did not provide any
particularized explanation for this condition. And Fey again
contends that the record does not support the condition. But we
do not agree, even assuming (contrary to the government's
contention) that this challenge is preserved and thus subject to
review for abuse of discretion.
Although the District Court did not spell out its
reasoning, the record here plainly indicates that Fey could pose
a danger to children in the employment context. Fey's prior sex
offense involved raping an underage co-worker after providing her
with alcohol at a party that he was hosting for his co-workers.
5This condition does not appear in the written judgment, but
Fey makes no argument that it was not actually imposed. And for
good reason. We have said that, where the conditions imposed
orally "'conflict in a material way' with the conditions that ended
up in the judgment," "the oral conditions control." United States
v. Santiago, 769 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States
v. Sepúlveda–Contreras, 466 F.3d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 2006)).
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Thus, a condition requiring that he seek approval from probation
before accepting a job or volunteer activity that would bring him
into direct contact with minors is reasonably related to his
criminal history. Cf. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d at 57 ("Because
Del Valle–Cruz's underlying conviction arose from an incident that
took place in his workplace, with a minor volunteer, these two
[employment] restrictions are at least reasonably related to his
history and characteristics.").
Fey argues that the condition should be vacated because
it, like the general associational condition discussed above, does
not differentiate between types of children to whom Fey arguably
poses some risk and others -- like boys and young children -- to
whom he apparently does not. But this condition is less sweeping
than the more general associational condition. It operates only
in the "limited context[]" of employment. See Pabon, 819 F.3d at
31-32. In addition, Fey must seek that approval only before
accepting a job that would put him in "direct," rather than "direct
or indirect" contact with children. There is thus no reason to
believe that such a requirement will impose the kind of significant
restriction on Fey's liberty that the more general associational
condition (which uses the "direct or indirect" formulation) would.
Accordingly, because the District Court's reasoning for imposing
this condition can be inferred from the record, we conclude that
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the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
condition without an express explanation.
Fey also makes a number of arguments based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b)(5) and §5F1.5 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
These arguments, which he unmistakably did not raise below, fail
as well. Even if Fey is correct that this condition is an
occupational restriction subject to § 3563(b)(5) and §5F1.5 and
that the District Court failed to abide by the terms of those
sections in imposing that condition, he cannot show plain error,
as he must to prevail on this newly pressed challenge. See
Padilla, 415 F.3d at 218. As set forth above, to meet the plain-
error standard, Fey must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which
was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the
defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Id. (quoting Duarte, 246 F.3d at 60). But Fey has
made no argument that any error the District Court committed in
imposing this condition affected his substantial rights or
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings. Thus, he has not met his burden on plain-
error review and we have no basis on which to vacate the condition.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (explaining
that, on plain-error review, "[i]t is the defendant rather than
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the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice.").6
C.
Fey's final challenge is to the condition that reads, in
pertinent part: "The defendant shall participate in a sexual
specific evaluation or sex offender specific treatment, conducted
by a sex offender treatment provider, as directed and approved by
the Probation Office." On appeal, Fey appears to challenge the
imposition of both sexual specific evaluation and sex offender
specific treatment. But the government argues that he
affirmatively waived his objection to both aspects of this
condition in the course of a colloquy with the District Court. We
agree.
The relevant colloquy proceeded as follows.
Fey's Counsel: I would ask . . . that the Court allow
Probation to have Mr. Fey go under a sex offender
evaluation, and I've had that on other occasions, and
the reason I like the evaluation is if they have an
evaluation and they have information that comes back
saying this doctor says this man needs treatment, they
can come back to the Court. However, when you attach
the horse to the cart, the cart tends to get pulled along
because it's all one in the same, meaning that the
treatment --
The Court: But Probation doesn't have to direct it and
Probation -- it is as directed and approved by Probation.
6 Fey briefly adverts to an argument that the District Court
erred by delegating authority to probation to oversee his
employment, but he has not developed that argument and so we deem
it waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990).
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Probation doesn't require it in every sentence.
Probation tailors it to the situation as they see it.
So, this is not a mandatory thing. It is something that
Probation may ask for and if it does, he can object.
Fey's Counsel: Fine. I'll cross that bridge. I would
object, though, to [other conditions] . . . .
Through this exchange, Fey disclaimed any objection to
the imposition of a sexual specific evaluation by requesting that
such an evaluation take place. He then affirmatively abandoned
any objection to the sex offender treatment portion of the
condition upon being told that he could object at a later date if
probation does in fact direct such treatment. Having
"intentional[ly] relinquish[ed] . . . [his] known right" to object
to either aspect of the condition, Fey cannot now re-assert that
right on appeal. Id. at 725, 733.7 As the District Court
instructed him at sentencing, he is free to object at a later date
if he is in fact ordered to undergo sex offender treatment.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the condition
restricting Fey's "direct or indirect contact with children under
the age of 18" and remand for re-sentencing limited to a re-
examination of that condition.
7For the same reason, Fey waived any argument that, as he
now asserts, this condition represented an improper delegation of
authority by the District Court to the probation office.
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