FILED
Aug 17 2016, 6:51 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. O’Connor Gregory F. Zoeller
O’Connor & Auersch Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert Weathers, August 17, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1601-CR-3
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Shatrese M.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Flowers, Judge
The Honorable David M. Seiter,
Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1504-F5-13181
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] On April 15, 2015, a Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy initiated a traffic stop
after observing that the expiration date on a vehicle’s license plate was not
visible. The vehicle in question was being driven by Appellant-Defendant
Robert Weathers. During the traffic stop, it was discovered that Weathers did
not have a valid driver’s license. Weathers was placed under arrest for driving
without a license. The deputy eventually decided to impound the vehicle in
question after Weathers failed to find someone to retrieve the vehicle. The
deputy then completed a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle, during
which the deputy recovered a handgun.
[2] The next day, Weathers was charged with Class A misdemeanor carrying a
handgun without a license and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended.
The handgun charge was subsequently elevated to a Level 5 felony by virtue of
Weathers’s prior felony conviction. The handgun was admitted into evidence
at trial, over Weathers’s objection. Weathers was subsequently found guilty of
both Level 5 carrying a handgun without a license and Class A misdemeanor
driving while suspended.
[3] On appeal, Weathers contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the handgun into evidence, arguing that the warrantless inventory
search conducted by the deputy was unreasonable and thus violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Weathers
alternatively contends that even if the handgun was properly admitted into
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evidence, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his Level 5 felony conviction.
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
handgun at trial and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Weathers’s
conviction for Level 5 felony possession of a handgun without a license, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] On April 15, 2015, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Osnel Andre was
patrolling the west side of Indianapolis when he spotted a black Chevy
Trailblazer (“the vehicle”). Deputy Andre observed that the expiration date for
the vehicle’s registration was obscured. After following the vehicle for a short
time, and not being able to see the expiration date on the license plate, Deputy
Andre initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle stopped about sixteen to eighteen
inches from the curb. Deputy Andre made contact with the driver, who was
subsequently identified as Weathers, and asked for his license and registration.
Weathers provided Deputy Andre with the vehicle’s registration but informed
Deputy Andre that he did not have a driver’s license. Deputy Andre reviewed
the information provided by Weathers and determined that the vehicle was not
registered to Weathers and that Weathers’s driver’s license was suspended.
Deputy Andre then placed Weathers under arrest for driving while suspended.
[5] After placing Weathers under arrest, Deputy Andre gave Weathers, who had
been alone in the vehicle, the opportunity to find someone to retrieve the
vehicle. Weathers was unable to do so within the time provided by Deputy
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Andre. Deputy Andre thereafter decided that it was necessary to impound the
vehicle. He then called for backup and asked Weathers whether there was
“anything in [the vehicle] that (Inaudible) get anything out of the [vehicle]
(Inaudible) -- guns and drugs in the [vehicle] before I seek to search the [vehicle]
before I impound the vehicle[.]” Tr. p. 19. Weathers responded that there was
a handgun inside the vehicle.1
[6] Deputy Andre approached the vehicle, looked inside, and observed the barrel of
the handgun located where Weathers had indicated, i.e., between the driver’s
seat and the center console. After securing the handgun, Deputy Andre
completed a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle. He found nothing of
value in the vehicle other than the handgun and the vehicle’s registration.
Deputy Andre subsequently learned that Weathers did not have a license for the
handgun that was recovered from the vehicle.
[7] On April 16, 2015, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) charged
Weathers with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license and
Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. The State subsequently sought
to have the handgun charge elevated to a Level 5 felony by virtue of Weathers’s
prior felony conviction. Weathers waived his right to a jury trial.
1
We note that although Weathers was handcuffed and under arrest at the time he made this statement,
Weathers did not argue at trial or on appeal that his statement was made in violation of his right against self-
incrimination.
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[8] The trial court conducted a bench trial on November 12, 2015. During trial,
Weathers objected to and moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the
warrantless search of the vehicle. This included the handgun which, again, was
recovered during the search. The trial court initially denied Weathers’s motion
to suppress, but subsequently changed its ruling and took the matter under
advisement. On December 8, 2015, the trial court denied Weathers’s motion to
suppress and found him guilty of Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a
license and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. The trial court
sentenced Weathers to a term of five years, with two of those years suspended.
This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Weathers raises two contentions on appeal. First, Weathers contends that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial.
Alternatively, Weathers contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license conviction. We will
discuss each contention in turn.
I. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[10] Weathers contends that the handgun recovered from the vehicle should not
have been admitted into evidence because it was discovered in violation of his
Fourth Amendment Rights. Although Weathers argues on appeal that the trial
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court should have granted his motion to suppress the handgun, Weathers
appeals following the conclusion of his trial. We will therefore consider his
appeal as a request to review the trial court’s decision to admit the handgun into
evidence at trial. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (citing
Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014)).
The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of
evidence. [Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013)].
We review its rulings “for abuse of that discretion and reverse
only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial
rights.” [Id. at 260]. But when an appellant’s challenge to such a
ruling is predicated on an argument that impugns the
constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises
a question of law, and we consider that question de novo. Kelly
v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013).
Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 40-41. Further, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on
the admissibility of evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal search, we do
not reweigh the evidence but defer to the trial court’s factual determinations
unless clearly erroneous. Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1114-15 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016) (citing Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009)), trans.
denied. “We view conflicting evidence most favorable to the ruling, and we
consider ‘afresh any legal question of the constitutionality of a search and
seizure.’” Id. (quoting Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 869).
B. The Fourth Amendment
[11] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
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houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures....” “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness[.]’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). We
approach cases involving warrantless searches with the basic
understanding that “searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d
485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88
S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted)). Where
there is no clear practice concerning the constitutionality of a
search, the reasonableness of the search is judged by balancing
“the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and
... the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
299-300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).
Wertz v. State, 41 N.E.3d 276, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
Application of the Fourth Amendment has been extended to the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hansbrough, 49 N.E.3d
at 1114-15.
C. Warrantless Inventory Search of an Impounded Vehicle
[12] In this case, Weathers does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop or
contest Deputy Andre’s decision to impound the vehicle. Instead, he asserts
that the inventory search conducted by Deputy Andre was unreasonable.
Weathers therefore argues that the subsequent search of the vehicle was invalid
and the evidence obtained was inadmissible.
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[13] Warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable and may be excused only
upon a showing of circumstances that yield a diminished expectation of
privacy. Wertz, 41 N.E.3d at 280. “The State bears the burden of proving that a
warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.” Trotter
v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Taylor v. State, 842
N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006)). “Whether a particular warrantless search violates
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case.” Id. (citing Rush v. State, 881 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008)).
[14] The inventory search of an impounded vehicle is one such exception to the
warrant requirement “since it serves an administrative, not investigatory,
purpose—because when police lawfully impound a vehicle, they must also
perform an administrative inventory search to document the vehicle’s contents
to preserve them for the owner and protect themselves against claims of lost or
stolen property.” Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016).
[15] The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless inventory search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d
427, 431 (Ind. 1993)).
Our evaluation [of the reasonableness of a warrantless inventory
search] requires that “we examine the evidence favorable to the
trial court’s decision, with all disputes resolved in favor of the
ruling,” and also consider “any uncontested evidence favorable
to the appellant.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 434. And we will overturn
the trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.
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Id. But the ultimate determination of “reasonableness” is a
constitutional legal question meriting independent consideration
by this Court. Id.
Id. (brackets added).
i. Impoundment
[16] Proper impoundment is the “threshold question” to a valid inventory search.
Id. (citing Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431).
Impoundment is reasonable if it is authorized either by statute or
the police’s discretionary community-caretaking function. [Fair,
627 at 431-32]. Impoundment pursuant to a statute is necessarily
reasonable because the Legislature has deemed that citizens’
privacy interests in their cars yield to State interests in those
circumstances, making police inventorying a necessary collateral
administrative function. Discretionary impoundment, by
contrast, is an exercise of the police community-caretaking
function in order to protect the car and community from hazards.
Discretionary impoundments, too, may be reasonable—but as we
recognized in Fair, and more recently in Taylor, they are
vulnerable to constitutional reasonableness challenges because of
their potential for misuse as pretext for warrantless investigative
searches under the guise of inventory. See Fair, 627 N.E.2d at
435; Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 331-33. Unless the impoundment is
proper, then, an inventory search is per se unreasonable and any
contraband found during the search is inadmissible “poisoned
fruit.”
Id. at 375.
[17] With respect to the validity of Deputy Andre’s decision to impound the vehicle,
the record reveals that after initiating a valid traffic stop, Deputy Andre
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discovered that Weathers’s driving privileges had been suspended and that he
was driving without a valid driver’s license. Deputy Andre then placed
Weathers under arrest for driving while suspended. Deputy Andre gave
Weathers the opportunity to have someone come and retrieve the vehicle and
only decided to impound the vehicle when no one came to get the vehicle. The
vehicle could not remain where it was because it was parked approximately
sixteen to eighteen inches from the curb in a position in which it could
potentially impede traffic. Again, Weathers does not contest the validity of
Deputy Andre’s decision to impound the vehicle. Given these facts together
with the need for law enforcement to provide unobstructed roadways, we agree
that Deputy Andre’s decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable.
ii. Search
[18] Having determined that Deputy Andre’s decision to impound the vehicle was
reasonable, we turn our attention to Deputy Andre’s search of the vehicle.
[T]he lawful custody of an impounded vehicle does not of itself
dispense with the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in
regard to the searches conducted thereafter. Instead, to pass
constitutional muster, the search itself must be conducted
pursuant to standard police procedures. [Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987)]. The
rule that standardized criteria or established routine must exist as
a precondition to a valid inventory search is designed to ensure
that the inventory is not a pretext “for a general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). In order
to perform this function, the procedures must be rationally
designed to meet the objectives that justify the search in the first
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place, Isom v. State (1992), Ind. App., 589 N.E.2d 245, and must
sufficiently limit the discretion of the officer in the field. Wells,
495 U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 1635; People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d 715,
594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362 (1993). Searches in
conformity with such regulations are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. [South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)]. Thus, to
defeat a charge of pretext the State must establish the existence of
sufficient regulations and that the search at issue was conducted
in conformity with them.
Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435.
[19] In the instant matter, Weathers argues that Deputy Andre’s search of the
vehicle was unreasonable because Deputy Andre did not conduct the search in
conformity with applicable department procedures. Specifically, Weathers
claims that Deputy Andre failed to comply with the requirement that he
compile a written inventory of all items found in the vehicle.
[20] Again, in order for a warrantless inventory search to pass constitutional muster,
the search “must be conducted pursuant to standard police procedures.”
Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also Fair, 627
N.E.2d at 435.
Searches performed in conformity with standard police
procedures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
[Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. 1999)]. However, the
State must present more than conclusory testimony of an officer
that the search was conducted as a routine inventory. [Stephens v.
State, 735 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied];
Rabadi v. State, 541 N.E.2d 271, 275 (Ind. 1989). “The
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circumstances surrounding the intrusion must also indicate that
the search was part of established and routine department
procedures which are consistent with the protection of the police
from potential danger and false claims of lost or stolen property
and the protection of the property of those arrested.” Rabadi, 541
N.E.2d at 275.
Edwards, 762 N.E.2d at 133. We recently concluded, however, that a “failure to
follow established police policy does not necessarily establish that the inventory
was a pretext” and that “[i]nventory searches are not always unreasonable
when standard procedures are not followed.” Whitley v. State, 47 N.E.3d 640,
646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Jackson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008)), trans. denied.
[21] In Whitley, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Frederick Lantzer initiated
a traffic stop of a pick-up truck because it displayed a passenger car license plate
which was registered to a different vehicle. Id. at 642. Whitley, who was
driving the vehicle, admitted to Officer Lantzer that he lacked a valid driver’s
license. Id. Because Whitley lacked a valid driver’s license and the truck was
partially in the roadway, Officer Lantzer determined it was necessary to
impound the truck. Id. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Tim
Huddleston then conducted an inventory search of the truck. Id. During the
search, Officer Huddleston discovered drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine,
and prescriptions drugs for which Whitley did not have a prescription. Id.
Officer Huddleston did not complete any paperwork in relation to the search
and neither Officer Lantzer nor Officer Huddleston listed the items found in the
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truck in their personal notebooks. Id. at 643. Officer Lantzer listed some, but
not all, of the items found in the truck in his probable cause affidavit filed in
relation to Whitley’s arrest. Id. at 648.
[22] On appeal, Whitley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence relating to the drugs and drug paraphernalia found during the
inventory search. Id. at 646. Specifically, Whitely argued that the search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Officers Lantzer and
Huddleston failed to complete a written inventory of the items found during the
search in their personal notebooks as was required by department policy. Id.
We concluded that the circumstances of the case presented more than a minor
deviation from the applicable policy, as it was apparent that Officer Huddleston
ceased inventorying the remaining contents of the truck after finding the
contraband. Id. at 648. However, because no evidence suggested that Officer
Huddleston was looking for evidence of a crime when he began searching the
truck at Officer Lantzer’s request and there was a photographic record of the
contents found in the truck, the Officers’ failure to list all items found in the
truck in their personal notebooks as was required by policy, did not, in itself,
render the search pretextual. Id. We therefore concluded that the search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
[23] Here, the applicable policy concerning the impoundment and subsequent
inventory search of vehicles provides as follows with respect to inventory
searches:
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A. Whenever an officer takes a vehicle into custody, an
inventory search will be conducted prior to impoundment and a
detailed listing of any property found in the vehicle will be made.
****
B. All property discovered during an inventory search, including
those found in closed containers, will be listed in the officer’s
personal notebook.
State’s Ex. 9, pp. 7.3-5, 7.3-6. The record demonstrates that Deputy Andre had
knowledge of the policy relating to inventory searches. The record, however,
lacks any indication that Deputy Andre followed the portion of the policy
requiring him to create a detailed listing of any property found in the vehicle as
it is void of any indication that Deputy Andre filled out an inventory slip after
conducting the search of the vehicle. We are therefore left with the question of
whether Deputy Andre’s failure to comply with this portion of the policy
renders his search unreasonable.
[24] In considering whether Deputy Andre’s apparent failure to comply with the
portion of the policy requiring him to complete a written inventory following
his warrantless search of the vehicle, we note that it does not seem
unreasonable to require that an officer conducing a warrantless search follow
any and all written policies for conducting such a search. To hold otherwise
would potentially create a slippery slope which would require law enforcement
and the courts to determine whether a particular policy was of such importance
that a failure to follow said policy would render a search unreasonable. On the
other hand, under the specific facts of this case, we note that reversal on this
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ground alone would not appear to be consistent with the purpose of the
applicable portion of the policy.
[25] The parties indicate that the purpose of the requirement that an officer complete
a written inventory is to protect both the individual and the deputy. With
regard to the individual, the written inventory protects the individual from the
potential theft of any valuable item found in the vehicle. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at
330. With regard to the deputy, the written inventory protects the deputy from
an allegation that the deputy took any item of value from the vehicle. Id.
[26] Here, however, Weathers does not contest the fact that the handgun was
recovered from the vehicle or that it was recovered from the exact location
where he told Deputy Andre it was located. Further, when Deputy Andre
approached the vehicle, he could see the barrel of the handgun in plain view.
Deputy Andre’s apparent failure to complete a written inventory had no bearing
on any of these facts. As such, upon review, we are unable to see how
Weathers was prejudiced by Deputy Andre’s apparent failure to complete a
written inventory of all items found in the vehicle. We are also unconvinced
that Deputy Andre’s apparent failure to complete a written inventory of all
items found in the vehicle suggests that his rationale for completing the
warrantless inventory search was a pretext for completing an unlawful search.
We therefore conclude that despite Deputy Andre’s apparent failure to strictly
follow all aspects of the relevant procedure, his warrantless inventory search of
the vehicle was not unreasonable. See Whitley, 47 N.E.3d at 648 (providing that
given the facts and circumstances surrounding the warrantless inventory search
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of the vehicle, the officers’ failure to list all items found in the vehicle in their
personal notebooks as required by the applicable departmental policy did not, in
itself, render the search pretextual, and therefore, the search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[27] Weathers alternatively contends that even if the trial court acted within its
discretion in admitting the handgun into evidence, the evidence is insufficient to
sustain the elevation of his conviction for possession of a handgun without a
license from a Class A misdemeanor to a Level 5 felony. For its part, the State
contends that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the elevation of Weathers’s
conviction for possession of a handgun.
[28] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
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reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
[29] Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1 provides that “a person shall not carry a
handgun in any vehicle or on or about the person’s body without being licensed
under this chapter to carry a handgun.… A person who knowingly or
intentionally violates this section commits a Class A misdemeanor. However,
the offense is a Level 5 felony … if the person … has been convicted of a felony
within fifteen (15) years before the date of the offense.” Thus, in order to prove
that Weathers committed the elevated Level 5 felony offense, the State was
required to prove both that Weathers possessed a handgun without a license
and that he had been convicted of a felony within the preceding fifteen years.
[30] Weathers asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that
he had been convicted of a felony within the preceding fifteen years. Review of
the record, however, demonstrates that regardless of what evidence was offered
by the State, Weathers, by counsel, stipulated to the fact that Weather’s had a
prior felony conviction within the statutorily proscribed timeframe.
Specifically, the record provides as follows:
[Trial Court]: [Defense Counsel], I am going to go ahead
and order a PSI just so that we are covered if it is a Level 5
felony.
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[Defense Counsel]: I don’t have any objection to that.
[Trial Court]: I am assuming is there a stipulation once we
get to that phase? If I find him guilty of the A misdemeanor,
have you guys stipulated to the second phase, or are we going to
do the second phase that day?
[Defense Counsel]: I believe there is. That’s fine, Judge, we’ll
resolve it with the stipulation.
Tr. pp. 56-57. The record further provides:
[The State]: [Defense Counsel] indicated to the court the
last time that he would stipulate to the prior.
[Trial Court]: Okay.
[Defense Counsel]: And that’s correct[.]
Tr. p. 61. The State also offered certain documents which it claimed proved
that Weathers had a prior felony conviction within the statutorily proscribed
timeframe. Weathers did not object to the admission of these documents and
the documents were admitted into evidence. The trial court subsequently found
sufficient evidence to prove that Weathers had a prior felony conviction within
the statutorily proscribed timeframe and, as a result, elevated Weathers’s
conviction for possession of a handgun to a Level 5 felony.
[31] In light of the fact that Weathers, by counsel, stipulated to having a prior felony
conviction within the statutorily proscribed timeframe, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain Weathers’s conviction for Level 5 felony
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possession of a handgun without a license. Weathers’s claim to the contrary
effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which
we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435. Further, to the extent that
Weathers claims that he merely stipulated to the admission of the documents
offered by the State, we conclude that contrary to Weathers’s claim, the record
clearly demonstrates that Weathers stipulated to having a prior felony
conviction.
[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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