IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1625
Filed August 17, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TODD ALAN WOODWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Christopher C. Foy,
Judge.
Todd Woodworth appeals the sentence imposed following a stipulated
agreement entered into between the State and Woodworth at postconviction
relief proceedings. AFFIRMED.
Sarah A. Reindl of Reindl Law Firm, Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Todd Woodworth appeals the sentence imposed following a stipulated
agreement entered into between the State and Woodworth at postconviction
relief (PCR) proceedings. We affirm.
On September 21, 2015, a hearing was held for purposes of sentencing
Woodworth for his 2004 convictions for first-degree arson and second-degree
arson.
The offenses occurred more than a decade ago. On two separate
occasions, Woodworth was involved in setting fire to homes. On December 16,
2002, the State charged Woodworth, as a principal or aider/abetter, with first-
degree arson, second-degree arson, five counts of attempted murder, and two
counts of conspiracy involving the fires set on two of his neighbors’ properties.
The date of offense for the first-degree arson charge (count 1) was October 11,
2001, and the date of offense for the second-degree arson offense (count 5) was
October 13, 2001. Woodworth rejected a plea offer. A jury trial was held, and
Woodworth was found guilty of all charges. The conspiracy counts merged with
the arson convictions, and on January 20, 2004, the district court sentenced
Woodworth to serve the sentences on counts 1 through 3 concurrently to each
other but consecutively to the concurrent sentences imposed on counts 5
through 8.
On direct appeal, among other things, Woodworth challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence of four of the five convictions for attempted murder.
State v. Woodworth, No. 04-0096, 2006 WL 228769, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 1,
3
2006). We concluded there was substantial evidence to support the attempted-
murder convictions. Id. at *3-6.
In a PCR action, Woodworth asserted he would have taken the State’s
plea offer had he been properly informed as to the sentences involved in the plea
agreement. On February 2, 2015, an order was filed in the PCR action, which
provided in part:
The parties reached an agreement whereby the application for
postconviction relief will be dismissed and the defendant will be
resentenced to count I, first degree arson, a class “B” felony, and
count V, second degree arson, a class “C” felony, following the
completion of the presentence investigation report [PSI]. At the
time of sentencing, the State will recommend that these sentences
run concurrently inasmuch as that offer was made to the defendant
prior to the original trial commencing in this matter. The court
advised the defendant on the record that any recommendation by
the State was not binding upon this court. The parties have
previously stipulated that the assistance of trial counsel was
ineffective and the defendant had been incorrectly advised
regarding the potential consequences of the offer.
Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court entered an order granting the
PCR application and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.1
At the time of sentencing on January 12, 2016, Woodworth had served
twelve years in prison. The PSI recommended consecutive sentences on the
two arson convictions. Per the stipulation, the State recommended the
sentences be run concurrently. Woodworth argued for concurrent sentences.
The sentencing court observed,
1
We do not have access to the record of the PCR action or any record for that matter to
explain the unusual resolution of the PCR action, that is, the parties stipulated to a
dismissal but the court granted the PCR. But clearly, a dismissal would not have
afforded the ability to resentence the defendant, which was the essence of their
agreement due to prior ineffective assistance of counsel.
4
And it’s the court’s opinion that even though the other crimes
that the jury found Mr. Woodworth guilty of have since been, um,
dropped, withdrawn, basically addressed in the agreement that was
reached as part of the disposition in the postconviction relief action
brought by Mr. Woodworth, I don’t think as a judge that I can ignore
the fact that the State presented evidence that a jury found
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Woodworth had,
um, attempted to murder [named people].”
....
And while it appears to the Court you have made significant
strides towards rehabilitation during your incarceration, um, given,
um, the conduct that you engaged in, even if I focus only on the
arson offenses for which I’m sentencing you, these were two
separate offenses, happened on two separate days and showed a
disregard on your part for, um, certainly others’ property.
The court imposed a twenty-five year term on count 1 and a ten-year term
on count 5, which were to be served consecutively to each other. The court
emphasized:
It’s clear from the—the PSI that you are attempting to make
constructive positive use of your time. That you’re trying to find
help and assistance that will allow you to stay on the right track
once you are released. . . .
For the reasons I’ve stated earlier though, I do believe that
consecutive sentences are most appropriate in this case, primarily
due to the seriousness of the crimes themselves and the fact that
they were committed on separate dates. It wasn’t part of a single
course of conduct. And I think to . . . to send the appropriate
message to others that . . . the court will treat these offenses
seriously. It’s—It’s necessary to run the sentences consecutive.
Woodworth appeals, claiming the court improperly considered the
attempted-murder convictions because they “were dropped as part of successful
postconviction relief.”
A sentencing court may not consider an unproven or unprosecuted
offense in sentencing a defendant unless there are facts presented to show the
defendant committed the offenses or the defendant admits to the charges. State
v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Iowa 2013). This case, however, comes to
5
us in a unique procedural posture. We agree with the sentencing court that it
was not required to ignore charges that had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury and affirmed on appeal. State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399,
401 (Iowa 2000) (“We have recognized that, ‘when a challenge is made to a
criminal sentence on the basis that the court improperly considered unproven
criminal activity, the issue presented is simply one of the sufficiency of the record
to establish the matters relied on.’ The standard of proof during the sentencing
stage is lower than the standard used during trial.” (citations omitted)). We
affirm.
AFFIRMED.