IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0526
Filed August 17, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF T.S.L.,
Minor children,
D.L., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph W. Seidlin,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Christine A. Bisignano, Windsor Heights, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Kimberly S. Ayotte of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, for minor
children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
In March 2016, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to
his child, T.S.L., born in 2007. The court found the State proved grounds for
termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and
(f) (2015); termination was in the child’s best interests; and no exceptions to
termination found in 232.116(3) applied. The father now appeals, arguing the
juvenile court should have granted him an additional six months to regain
custody of his child. He also challenges the grounds for termination found by the
court. We review his claims de novo. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110
(Iowa 2014).
Although the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence to
terminate the father’s parental rights under three paragraphs of section
232.116(1), we need only find the evidence supports termination on one of these
grounds to affirm. See In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if the statutory grounds for
termination are shown by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 434. This
burden of proof is met if there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the
correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. See id. at 435.
Parental rights may be terminated under section 232.116(1)(f) where the
following are found to have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
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(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the
present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the
child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.
The father does not dispute that the first three elements required for termination
under paragraph (f) have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Rather, he challenges only the fourth element—that the child could not be
returned to his care—explaining: “The father is not incarcerated, and testified that
he is not using illegal substances, and no evidence was presented that father[’]s
mental condition would result in the child not receiving adequate care.” However,
upon our de novo review, we find the State established the child could not be
returned to the father’s care and, for the same reasons, additional time for
reunification was not warranted. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (stating
permanency can be deferred six months if the court finds the reason for the
child’s removal from the child’s home “will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period”).
Here, the child and the child’s siblings, not at issue here, were removed
from the care of their mother in January 2014, following allegations that the
mother physically abused the children, among other things.1 At that time, the
father was incarcerated in federal prison. Ultimately, in approximately December
2014, the children were placed together in a foster home, where they have since
remained.
The father was incarcerated in 2013 after he pled guilty to the crimes of
“Distribution of a Mixture or Substance Containing Cocaine Base” and “Unlawful
1
The mother’s appeal of the termination of her parental rights to T.S.L. and the child’s
siblings was dismissed for failure to comply with Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure
6.201(1)(b).
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User in Possession of a Firearm.” The federal presentence investigation report
in that case advised that “based upon statements obtained from [the father]
during an interview on March 13, 2012,” the father began smoking marijuana at
age fifteen, smoking “up to half a gram of marijuana daily.” He was shot in the
back in 2009, and although he spent several months in the hospital recovering,
he continued to experience adverse physical effects and pain thereafter. The
father reported he had “used marijuana and crack cocaine in the past to self-
medicate” and had begun using crack cocaine at age twenty-one a few times a
month when his body was sore. Even though the record shows he did not make
any objections to those facts stated in the presentence report, the father denied
at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing that he reported using crack cocaine.
The father was released and placed in home confinement in June 2015.
He began visitation with the child, and from September to November 2015, he
consistently attended those visits, which—except for the first two—occurred at
his home, where he was confined. However, his visitation attendance became
inconsistent after he moved to supervised release on November 2, 2015, even
though the visits continued to take place at his home and he had no employment
to preclude him from attending and was not known to be participating in any
services. Eventually, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) learned
the father had admitted to using marijuana the day after he was moved to
supervised release and had tested positive for marijuana on November 19 and
December 1, 2015, in violation of the terms of his probation. He was referred to
a treatment facility by the probation office “for intensive outpatient treatment.” He
not only failed to communicate to the DHS that he tested positive for marijuana
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and was referred for treatment, he revoked his authorization for release of the
information to the DHS. Although the father claimed he revoked his authorization
because the DHS worker was “not doing her job right,” “late with her paperwork,”
and “playing with [his] case,” it is obvious he did so to prevent the DHS from
learning of his positive tests.
The father adamantly testified in January 2016 that he had only used
marijuana twice since he was released from prison—the two times he got caught
in November and December 2015—and that he would not test positive for illegal
substances at that time. However, he tested positive almost immediately; by the
time of the continuation of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing in March
2016, the father was back to home confinement due to three new urine screens
testing positive for marijuana. He was offered two options by his substance-
abuse-treatment counselor due to his positive tests, but the father declined
because “he already felt a significant amount of daily stress and that adding
additional treatment services would compound these feelings.” Yet, the father
also declined mental-health counseling because he did not think he needed it.
Significantly, the father’s testimony demonstrated he was unconcerned
about the effects the time he spent in prison and his missed visits had upon the
child. He minimized his missed visits as not being his fault or claimed he was not
provided the correct information. Because of his missed visits and the resulting
negative effect on the child, the father was then required to confirm he would be
present for a visit by 12:30 p.m. the day of the scheduled visit. The father often
failed to confirm the visit and once even missed a visit after he had confirmed it,
causing the child and service provider to arrive only to have to cancel the visit, to
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the child’s detriment. The father also did not think the child needed therapy or
medication, despite doctors recommending both and the child’s noted progress
since those treatments began. Even though the father had been out of the
child’s life for at least two years while in prison and had no idea of the child’s
behavioral issues at school, the father testified he did not believe the child
needed medication “[b]ecause there was nothing wrong with him before I left,
and I feel there’s nothing wrong with him now.”
The father claimed he was attending a parenting program he was directed
to attend by the juvenile court, but there was no proof of his attendance. He
testified he could not prove he went because “he did not know he needed to
register or sign in,” but when the program’s instructor was contacted for
verification, the instructor could not verify his attendance, advising the DHS
worker he had a small group of participants in his program and would have
known if someone was present but not registered.
Given the father’s dishonesty, continued use of illegal substances, and
lack of insight into how his actions affected the child, we find the State
established by clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned to
the father’s care at the time of the termination hearing. We are also unconvinced
the reason for the child’s removal would no longer exist if the father was given an
additional six months’ time. Though the father complains that the DHS worker’s
opinion—that the child needed permanency—was “conclusory,” “[i]t is well-
settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the
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child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). The father had ample
opportunities to demonstrate he could engage in services, refrain from substance
abuse, and attend all of his visits with the child, but chose to do so minimally, at
best. The father could not even refrain from using marijuana for two months,
despite his knowledge that using could mean being sent back to prison or
termination of his parental rights. The father continued to miss visits,
demonstrating he either lacks the understanding of, or does not care about, his
child’s distress when he fails to attend visits. This goes hand in hand with the
father’s failure to acknowledge the child’s need for therapy and medication. This
child has been in his adoptive foster home for over a year with his siblings, with
whom he shares strong bonds. This home has structure, and the child’s
behavioral issues have decreased substantially. It is clear that any additional
time in limbo would not be in the child’s best interests.
Because the State proved a ground for termination and a grant of
additional time for the father to work toward reunification is not justified under
these circumstances, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.