Estate of: John Leslie Rupert

J-S40015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ESTATE OF: JOHN LESLIE RUPERT, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A/K/A JOHN L. RUPERT, LATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSBURY, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: BRYAN J. BOARDMAN

No. 2924 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order June 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 1513-0131

BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY AND MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2016

On appeal, Bryan J. Boardman challenges the propriety of the orphans’

court’s denial of a claim that he made against the Estate of John Leslie

Rupert. We affirm.

On January 11, 2013, John Leslie Rupert died testate. On January 23,

2013, the Register of Wills of Chester County probated his last will and

testament and issued letters testamentary to C. Barry Buckley. At the time

of his death, Mr. Rupert owned a one-half interest in property located at 137

McFadden Road, Pennsbury Township, Chadds Ford (“the real estate”).

Appellant possessed an option to purchase the decedent’s one-half interest

in the real estate, and it had to be exercised within six months of Mr.
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Rupert’s death. After the six-month period expired, and the option was not

exercised, Mr. Buckley deeded Mr. Rupert’s interest in the real estate to the

beneficiaries under the will.

Appellant, who has proceeded pro se throughout these proceedings,

thereafter filed a claim against the estate, petitioning for payment of

$217,572.89. His claim encompassed these four positions: 1) Appellant was

the sole owner of the real estate; 2) the estate was liable to Appellant for

rental paid to Mr. Rupert by two people who had trailers on the property as

well as for rental that Mr. Rupert owed Appellant based upon the fact that

Mr. Rupert alone occupied the real estate while he lived; 3) the estate was

liable to Appellant for waste occasioned by Mr. Rupert’s use of the real

estate; and 4) Appellant owned all of the personal property of decedent by

virtue of an agreement of sale executed by Mr. Rupert. After a hearing, the

claim was denied in its entirety.

Mr. Buckley filed an account, and Appellant filed exceptions. After

those exceptions were denied, Appellant filed the present appeal wherein he

raises these issues:

1. Did the Orphans’ Court commit an error of law or
otherwise abuse its discretion when it found, at the time of
Property purchase, Mr. (“Boardman”) and Mr. (“Rupert”) held
equal shares in the Property and that after Rupert’s demise,
Boardman and the Rupert Estate held the same equal shares in
the Property and that the Deed’s reddendum clause granting
Rupert a life estate, transferred “very little” or zero Property
ownership interest to Rupert and that “the Executor properly
distributed Mr. Rupert's share to his testamentary beneficiaries.”

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2. Did the Orphans’ Court commit an error of law or otherwise
abuse its discretion when it found Mr. Rupert was not the tenant
in possession of the Property even though the Deed states
“Under and subject to the right of John L. Rupert to live in the
property for the term of his natural life” and the Agreement of
Sale (“AOS”) states “JOHN L. RUPERT SHALL ENJOY LIFE
RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY.”

3. Did the Orphans’ Court commit an error of law or otherwise
abuse its discretion when it found any waste of the real Property
during occupation and use by deceased Rupert did not incur
liability against Rupert and that if any waste did occur then
Boardman is as liable as Rupert.

4. Did the Orphans’ Court commit an error of law or otherwise
abuse its discretion when it found Rupert’s personal property
was not included in the sale of the property even though the
AOS specifically states all personal property of deceased Rupert
was included in the sale. The Orphans’ Court found the only
personal property included in the sale was valueless items
scattered about the property.

5. Did the Orphans’ Court commit an error of law or otherwise
abuse its discretion when it found the Dead Man’s Statute
applies to Mr. Boardman’s testimony and therefore Appellant’s
relevant testimony should be ignored but then relies on
testimony of Appellant concerning matters between the
Appellant and the deceased Mr. Rupert, to form conclusions, for
example, to conclude Mr. Rupert did not enjoy exclusive
possession of the Property due to Mr. Boardman’s testimony he
visited with Mr. Rupert approximately five times a year.

Appellant’s brief at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).

Our standard of review in this matter is as follows:

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans' Court,
this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal
error and the court's factual findings are supported by the
evidence. Because the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder, it
determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we
will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of

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J-S40015-16

that discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the
same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. The Orphans'
Court decision will not be reversed unless there has been an
abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the
correct principles of law.

This Court's standard of review of questions of law is de
novo, and the scope of review is plenary, as we may review the
entire record in making our determination. When we review
questions of law, our standard of review is limited to determining
whether the trial court committed an error of law.

In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

Resolution of Appellant’s contentions revolves around the

interpretation of two documents and the circumstances surrounding their

execution. The first instrument is an agreement of sale dated August 20,

2005. At that time, the real estate was in the joint names of Mr. Rupert,

who was elderly and infirm, and his wife, Nancy A. Rupert. The Ruperts

were separated, and Mr. Rupert told Appellant, a neighbor, that he wanted

to sell her share of the house in order to satisfy her credit card debt. On

August 20, 2005, John L. Rupert and Nancy A. Rupert executed an

agreement of sale, as sellers, and John L. Rupert and Appellant executed

that document, as buyers. In the agreement of sale, Appellant agreed to

pay $115,000 for Mrs. Rupert’s share of the property. The Ruperts also

indicated that the agreement of sale encompassed certain personal property,

as follows:

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(A) INCLUDED in this sale and purchase price are all
existing items permanently installed in the Property free of liens,
including plumbing, heating, lighting fixtures (including
chandeliers and ceiling fans), water treatment systems, pool and
spa equipment, garage door openers and transmitters, television
antennas, shrubbery, plantings and unpotted trees, any
remaining heating and cooking fuels stored on the Property at
the time of settlement, wall to wall carpeting, window covering
hardware, shades and blinds, built-in air conditions, built-in
appliances, and the range/oven unless otherwise stated. Also
included: ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY OF JOHN L. RUPERT.

(B) LEASED items (not owned by Seller):

NONE

(C) EXCLUDED fixtures and items:

TRACTORS, BACKHOE, EXTRANEOUS OTHER EQUIPMENT,
TRAILER.

Estate’s Exhibit 1 at 2.

The agreement of sale contained an addendum, which set forth that

Mr. Rupert, following the sale, would retain “life rights to the property and

shall not vacate property upon settlement. Both Buyers shall hold title as

tenants in common without rights of survivorship and both parties interest

shall become part of their individual estates.” Id. at Addendum. The

Addendum accorded Appellant the right to purchase Mr. Rupert’s share of

the property, upon Mr. Rupert’s death, for $115,000, for a period of six

months.

On September 28, 2005, in accordance with the terms of the

agreement of sale and addendum, the real estate was deeded by John L.

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Rupert and Nancy A. Rupert, as grantors, to “Bryan J. Boardman and John L.

Rupert,” as grantees and as “tenants in common.” Estate’s Exhibit 2 at 1.

The consideration was $115,000. The grant to Appellant as a tenant in

common of the real estate was made, “Under and subject to the right of

John L. Rupert to live in the property for the term of his natural life.” Id. at

2. A corrective deed altering the legal description of the property was

executed on October 14, 2005. That deed omitted reference to Mr. Rupert’s

retention of a life estate in the property, as outlined in the agreement of sale

and initial deed.

Although the agreement of sale and initial deed unequivocally set forth

that Appellant purchased a one-half interest in the real estate that was

subject to Mr. Rupert’s life estate, Appellant suggests that he purchased the

real estate in its entirety in 2005 rather than a one-half interest.

When construing a deed, a court's primary object must be
to ascertain and effectuate what the parties themselves
intended. Mackall v. Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa.Super.
2002). The traditional rules of construction to determine that
intention involve the following principles. First, the nature and
quantity of the interest conveyed must be ascertained from the
deed itself and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud,
accident or mistake. Id. We seek to ascertain not what the
parties may have intended by the language but what is the
meaning of the words they used.

Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318, 326 (Pa.Super. 2005).

The language of the agreement of sale and deed is not subject to any

interpretation other than Appellant purchased a one-half interest in the real

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J-S40015-16

estate and held that interest in the property as a tenant in common with Mr.

Rupert. In addition, his one-half share of the property was subject to Mr.

Rupert’s life estate. Appellant’s position is that he must have bought the

entire piece of real estate since a one-half interest subject to a life estate

was of little or no value whereas he paid the Ruperts $115,000. Appellant,

however, did not present an appraisal of the property as of 2005 so that his

proposition is unsupported by any proof. While there are pictures of the

house, which was dilapidated, in the record, there was no appraisal of the

value of acreage in Chadds Ford.

In addition, Appellant did not level any claim that he was defrauded.

In the agreement of sale, he assented to the purchase of the interest in the

land outlined in the deed for $115,000. Appellant is bound by the terms of

his arrangement, even if it represented a poor financial decision. We

therefore reject Appellant’s first position.

The second averment herein is that Mr. Rupert was obligated to pay

Appellant fair rental value during the term of his occupation of the real

estate. Since Mr. Rupert allowed two people to park their trailers on the

property, Appellant also seeks rental that they paid or owed to Mr. Rupert

for exercising that privilege.1 In resolving this position, the orphans’ court

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It is not clear that the two women who lived in the trailers on the real
estate actually paid rent to Mr. Rupert.

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observed that Appellant presented no proof of any agreement by Mr. Rupert

to pay rent to Appellant while Mr. Rupert lived on the property or that

anyone paid rent to Mr. Rupert. It thus denied this claim.

We note the following. Mr. Rupert retained a life estate in the real

estate in the agreement of sale and first deed. The corrective deed, which

was filed solely to properly describe the land purchased, mistakenly omitted

mention of the life estate. It is established that the owner of a life estate is

legally entitled to all rental from the property in question during the term of

his or her life. See Guthrie v. Guthrie, 7 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa.Super. 1939).

Mr. Rupert, as life tenant of the real estate, owed Appellant no rental income

either himself or from anyone else who resided on the property. Hence,

Appellant’s second position on appeal lacks merit.

We address together Appellant’s third averment, that he was entitled

to waste occasioned by Mr. Rupert’s occupancy of the real estate, and his

fourth contention, that he was entitled to all of Mr. Rupert’s personal

property under the agreement of sale. We observe that it is established that

a claimant against an estate has the burden of proving his claim by direct

and positive evidence. In re Schleich's Estate, 134 A. 442, 443 (Pa.

1926).

On the issue of waste, the orphans’ court made two pertinent factual

findings. First: “Insufficient credible evidence was provided for the fair

market value of the Property at the time of the August 2005 [agreement of

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sale,] Mr. Rupert’s death or any other time.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/15 at

¶ 10. Second: “No credible evidence was presented establishing that Mr.

Rupert materially damaged or allowed material damage to the Property, that

the condition of the Property had materially deteriorated after the

[agreement of sale] was signed, or that the market value of the Property

had materially declined as a result of waste from the August 2005 sale until

Mr. Rupert’s death.” Id. at ¶ 29.

As to the personal property question, the orphans’ court noted: “No

credible evidence was presented as to what personal property Mr. Rupert

owned in August, 2005 and conveyed in the [agreement of sale].” Id. at ¶

13. It observed that the agreement of sale was a standard one for the

purchase of real estate. Thus, when referring to personal property, the

agreement’s intent most probably was that Mr. Rupert sold his furniture and

other tangible personal property in his home to Appellant. In light of the

orphans’ court’s factual findings as to the lack of evidence of waste and the

personalty encompassed by the agreement of sale, it is evident that

Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on these two claims. No relief is

due.

Finally, after consideration of the facts, briefs, and applicable law, we

affirm the orphans’ court’s application of the Dead Man’s Rule on the basis of

its June 25, 2015 opinion.

Order affirmed.

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J-S40015-16

Judge Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/18/2016

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Orphan's Court June 24th 2015 DECISION- ORDER---- Appendix A Pg 1

APPENDIX A Orphan's Court DECISION -ORDER June 24th, 2015 by John L. Hall, J,

IN THE COVRT OF" COJ\'fMON PLltt\S
c
CHESTER COCNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION

ESTATE OF JOHN LESL1E, RUPERT} a/k/a
JOHNL RUPERT, DECEASED

DECISlON

II. Proce, 486, 76
I A. 2d 191 199 ( 19 >O). Here, there w~s'nn credibl e "'.''.enee of fraud, accident or mistake,

, Neither the Deed nor Deed ot to1Tet.t1011 specify tho percentages of the. Property owned

by each tenant in common. Rather, they indicate only that Mr. Rupert and Mr .. Boardman have

equal status as tenants in common. This is consistent with the terms of the AOS, In accordance

with its 0"''11 terms (AOS, ~26) and contract la\\;, the :<\()S ca~iiiofbc changed'BY\jflf't'fsHmBnY,
Where a contract "is dear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents

alone." Welroth v. Harvey, 912 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa.Super, 2006). It is presumed that, unless

· stated otherwise, the ownership interest is equal. The amount of money contribuled by one of

the owners in the purchase of real property does 1101 dictate the percentage of ownership. Moore
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}

l v. Mtller, 910 A.2 I
Clauses explaining the transfer of personal property that had been arfixed to the
: I
I I real property were included in agreements in former times. Today, fixture
I\
clauses may be included in the section of the agreement that explain which
!i personal property, if any, is beingtransferred to the buyer as part of the
! transaction. Fixtures, having become part of the real estate, are inducted in the
sale unless specifically excluded.
l Ladner Pennsylvania Real Estate Law § l 4.04(f) (Ronald M, Friedman, ed.,
George T, Bisel Company, Inc. 61ll ed. 2013).

In addition to this clause, paragraph 26(B) of the AOS represents that Mr, Boardman, as Buyer,

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had inspected ull fixtures and personal property specifically scheduled within the AOS or waived

i · the right to do so.

In the context of mi A.OS of real estate and the localkm of the phrase "ALL PERSONA.L

PROPERTY OF JOHN L RUPBRT'l under paragraph 4(a), it is evident to this court that the

parties were referencing tangible personal property attached to or used 1)1:'l the real property itself.

Even if this phrase. were to he considered ambiguous and extraneous evidence were considered,

there is no credible evidence as to what other personal property was conveyed by Mr. Rupert to

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Brief Page 71
 Orphan's Court June 241h 2015 DECISION - ORDER---- Appendix A Pg 13

I Mr. Boardman beyond that attached to or, HS described by AOS ~4(A), "installed In" the
j
i,i Property. Although the parties included a list pf excluded tangible personal property1 no $UCh list I
l
I ofincluded Property was provided, In accordance with the AOS, Mr. Boardman had the right to !
/ inspect the included personal property _b\lt there fa up credible evidence that lie viewed anythiug I,

. \ other than the Property. This court declines to construe this phrase to mean all of Mr, Rupert 's

'! personal property, including the bank accounts and stocks which Mr. Boardman now seeks,

I located anywhere in the world \Vith whichhe died seized some nine yeais after th¢ AOS, 11
I I
Ii-·, Does the Estate pwe Mr. Bom·dmcmjor rental value ofthe subject property?
i
Mr, Boardman argues he is owed (he rental value of the Property for Mr. Rupert's

occupancy until Mr, Rupert died. This court finds this claim to be merirless and looks to the

1 AOS and the Deed, neither of which req uire, nor even mention, rent. Mr, Rupert was a tenant in
i
j common with the right to live on the Property for his life, Pursuant to the AOS, (43(h)), Mr.

Rupert was obligated to p,1y the property taxes but nothing else, If Mr, Rupert was obligated ro

I pay rent to Mr. Boardman, for hi~ occupancy, or the occupancy of others, the AOS 'would have

stated as such. This court may not add a new term to tht'.AOS,11

Mr: Boardma::i' s alleg~tion that ~1r.- Rupert !·~a~ e~~lusi ve possession of the Property
1
i because he was permitted to live there tor the rest ot his Me docs not equate to a duty to pay rent l I

) Consistent with the court's rejection that Mr. Rupert had exclusive possession of the Property,

generally. each tenant in common. is deemed to hold an undivided right of possession, allowing

I!
See The fork Group, Inc l'. Yorktown Caskets, Inc., 924 A.2d 1234 .. 124 7 (Pa.Super. 2 Q 07)
(" .. writ!ng cousritutes the agreement between the parties, and its terms and agreements cannot be added
to or subtracted from b>' parol evidence." (citations omitted) See also Welroth , •. Harvey, 912 A.2d at
866.

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Brief Page 72
 Orphan's Court June 24th 2015 DECISION -ORDER---- Appendix A Pg 14

each to occupy the whole in common with the other tenants in co min on. See Estate of Engel,

413 Pa. 475, 478, 198 A.2d 505, 507 (1964) (well established that tenants in common "own and

possess in equal shares an undivided interest in the whole property. ") See gmerally 86 C..J .S.

l I Tenancy in Common §§kt Thai. Mr. Rupert had his right lo possession extended through his

II
l I

lifetime provided him very little rights that he did not otherwise own as a tenant in common.

i j This additional right might only have provided him a material benefit if, in response to ~1
I'
1 partition action, he had sought to remain on the Property as a life tenant. P<1.R.C:P. l 564. No

such action was ever instituted. Moreover, outside the context of partition, even ifMr, Rupert

were deemed to have exclusive possession, such possession was implicitly agreed to by Mr.
! .
l j Boardman, and neither the A OS. the Deed, the Deed of Correction nor any credible evidence
!i .
l I supports a duty by Mr. Rupert to pay rent. Consequently, rent cannot Jl £he
H
! i Property. Generally, co-tenants in connnon have a ·right and au equal duty to make repairs to the I
1
common property. See generally 86 CJ.S. Tenancy in Common §86, There is 110 evidence that
i:_i,

i :

Mr. Rupert ever denied his neighbor. Mr. Boardman.eccess rothe Property. Indeed Mr.
I . . .
Boardman often entered onto the Property. Consequently, the allegation Uw1 Mr, Rupert owed !

money to Mr. Boardman for waste fa unproven. I
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ti!t
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i.
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Brief Page 74
 Orphan's Court June 24th 2015 DECISION - ORDER ---- Appendix A Pg 16

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di j ORDER
: f

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: I
I A ND NOW, this 24tb day of June, 2015, following consideration of the evidence
! I

iitI adduced during the April 8, 2015 hearing, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the

I! Claim and Objections are DENIED and OVERRULED us merirless, the Petition for

fI Accounting is DENI ED as moot 12 and the Motion is GRANTED. 13

iql BY THE COURT:

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I The parties agreed that the Estate could file the informal Account to which .M.r. Boardman could
j tile his Objections,
l i~ The court is kH with the distinct impression that Mr. Boardman has been contemplating and
<-rafting his arguments lo acquire Mr. Rupert's sham of the Property Jong before Mr. Rupert died, His
efforts to utilize his well thought out positions to his advantage began :50. 27'14.

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Brief Page 75
 Circulated 07/27/2016 10:13 AM
Orphan's Court October 28, 2015 MEMORANDUM OPINION---- Appendix C Pg 1

APPENDIX C - Orphan's Court October 28, 2015 MEMORANDUM OPINION

IN TIIR COlJl{T OF COMMON PLl~AS
CIIESTIW. COUNTY, Pl~NNSYLVANIA
Ol{PIIANS' COlJRT DIVISION

RSTATJ'l: NO. 1513-0131

Ji:STATti: OF .JOHN LESLIE nUPP:RT, n/1