FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 19, 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-8030
PEDRO MORENO, (D.C. No. 2:02-CR-00125-NDF-2)
(D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, GORSUCH and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Pedro Moreno, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s denial
of his motion to correct sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Exercising
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we vacate the district court’s order denying the
motion and remand for entry of an order dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
I
In July 2002, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Moreno and
seven other individuals with conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to
distribute, over 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A). On December 16, 2002, Moreno entered into a written plea agreement
with the government pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C).1 The plea agreement
stated, in pertinent part, that “both the Defendant and the United States w[ould]
recommend that the court sentence the Defendant to a 20 year period of imprisonment, [to
be followed by] five years of supervised release,” and that “if the court d[id] not accept
this binding plea agreement recommendation, [Moreno] w[ould] be allowed to withdraw
his plea of guilty.” ROA, Vol. II at 210. The district court accepted the plea agreement
and allowed Moreno to formally enter a guilty plea that same day.
The probation office subsequently prepared a presentence investigation report
(PSR). The PSR calculated Moreno’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range to be 325 to
405 months based upon a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I. Id.
at 296. Neither party filed objections to the PSR.
On April 21, 2003, the district court, consistent with the parties’ plea agreement,
sentenced Moreno to a term of imprisonment of 240 months, to be followed by a five-
1
That Rule has since been recodified as Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
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year term of supervised release. In doing so, the district court departed downward three
levels from the total offense level calculated in the PSR, i.e., from a total offense level of
41 to 38, in order to arrive at an advisory Guidelines sentencing range that encompassed
the 240-month sentence called for by the plea agreement.
II
On March 7, 2016, Moreno filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(2). Id., Vol. I at 76. Moreno argued in his motion that he was entitled to a
reduced sentence in light of the United States Sentencing Commission’s issuance of
Amendment 782. Amendment 782 reduces by two the base offense level provided by
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for most quantities of drugs, and applies retroactively to convictions
based on the earlier version of § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782.
The district court denied Moreno’s motion. In doing so, the district court
recounted its original sentencing calculations, which it adopted from the PSR, and its
three-level downward departure from the total offense level in order to “allow Moreno to
fall into a guideline range encompassing a sentence of 240 months.” Id. at 85-86. The
district court in turn stated that “[t]hese facts establish [that it] based Moreno’s sentence
on the [terms of the] Plea Agreement, not on the drug guideline calculation.” Id. at 86.
Further, the district court concluded that “even if [it] were to take a two level reduction
from Moreno’s original [total offense level] of 41, with a Criminal History Category I,
Moreno’s guideline range would be 262-327 months, a considerably longer sentence than
he received under the Plea Agreement.” Id.
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Moreno filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court failed to
recognize that “the plea agreement was based on a base [offense] level of 38 after it
applied USSG 3E1.1(a) and (b) Exceptance [sic] of Responsibility.” Id. at 88. Moreno
further argued that “[b]y claiming [his] new base [offense] level would be 39, the [district
court] ignore[d] the fact [Moreno] would still be entitled to a 3-point reduction under
USSG 3E1.1(a)-(b).” Id. “Taking away the 3-point reduction,” Moreno argued, “would
be basically a new sentencing hearing because the plea agreement would be void, which it
is not.” Id.
The district court denied Moreno’s motion for reconsideration. As in its original
order denying Moreno’s motion, the district court began by outlining in detail its
Sentencing Guidelines calculations:
Defendant’s base offense level was 38, he received a two (2) level
enhancement for the possession of a deadly weapon, and a four (4) level
enhancement based on his role as organizer leader in the conspiracy. At
that point Defendant’s adjusted offense level was 44. Defendant then
received a three (3) level reduction for acceptance of responsibility for a
total offense level of 41, Criminal History Category I, and a corresponding
guideline range of 324 to 405 months (PSR at ¶ 67). To be clear this
includes the three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Id. at 94-95. Therefore, the district court reiterated, “[t]o allow Moreno to get a sentence
of 240 months, [it] was required to depart three levels from Moreno’s total offense level
of 41, to an offense level 38.” Id. at 95. “This reduction,” the district court stated, “was
taken to allow Moreno to fall into a guideline range encompassing a sentence of 240
months as required under the plea agreement.” Id. Thus, the district court concluded,
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“[t]hese facts establish [that it] based Moreno’s sentence on the Plea Agreement, not on
the drug guideline calculation.” Id.
Shortly after the district court issued its order denying Moreno’s motion for
reconsideration, Moreno filed a notice of appeal.
III
On appeal, Moreno challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to
correct sentence. “Because he argues without the aid of counsel, we have read his
pleadings liberally.” United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2013).
“And, because the scope of a district court’s authority under § 3582(c)(2) is a question of
law, our review of the district court’s order[s] is de novo.” Id.
A term of imprisonment, once imposed, cannot be modified by a district court in
the absence of express statutory authority to do so. Id. Section 3582(c)(2) serves as one
such grant of authority. Id. It states:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon
motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its
own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
In Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 525 (2011), the Supreme Court
addressed the question of “whether defendants who enter into plea agreements” pursuant
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to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) “that recommend a particular sentence as a condition of
the guilty plea may be eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2).” As we noted in Graham,
this question “proved fractious for the Freeman Court,” with the plurality and the dissent
each garnering four votes. 704 F.3d at 1277. “Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence,” which
“charted a middle ground between the plurality and the dissent, . . . is the narrowest
grounds of decision and [thus] represents the Court’s holding.” Id. at 1277-78.
In the context of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Justice Sotomayor concluded,
“it is the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of imprisonment to
which the defendant is sentenced.” 564 U.S. at 535. That is because, she explained, “[a]t
the moment of sentencing, the court simply implements the terms of the agreement it has
already accepted.” Id. at 535-36. Thus, she concluded, “the term of imprisonment
imposed pursuant to a [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement is, for purposes of § 3582(c)(2),
‘based on’ the agreement itself.” Id. at 536. “To hold otherwise,” she emphasized,
“would be to contravene the very purpose of [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreements—to bind the
district court and allow the Government and the defendant to determine what sentence he
will receive.” Id.
Justice Sotomayor cautioned, however, that “[t]hese conclusions . . . do not mean
that a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement can
never be reduced under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 538 (emphasis in original). “[S]ome [Rule
11(c)(1)(C)] agreements,” she noted, “may call for the defendant to be sentenced within a
particular Guidelines sentencing range.” Id. “In such cases, the district court’s
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acceptance of the agreement obligates the court to sentence the defendant accordingly,
and there can be no doubt that the term of imprisonment the court imposes is ‘based on’
the agreed-upon sentencing range within the meaning of § 3582(c)(2).” Id. “Similarly,”
Justice Sotomayor noted, “a plea agreement might provide for a specific term of
imprisonment—such as a number of months—but also make clear that the basis for the
specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the offense to which the
defendant pleaded guilty.” Id. at 539. “As long as that sentencing range is evident from
the agreement itself,” Justice Sotomayor concluded, “for purposes of § 3582(c)(2) the
term of imprisonment imposed by the court in accordance with that agreement is ‘based
on’ that range.” Id. In either of these scenarios, Justice Sotomayor emphasized, “the
defendant is eligible for sentence reduction” pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) “[i]f th[e]
[applicable] Guidelines range is subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”
Id. at 538-39.
All of which leads to the question of what Moreno’s plea agreement stated with
respect to sentencing. The plea agreement did not call for Moreno “to be sentenced
within a particular Guidelines sentencing range.” Id. at 538. Instead, it stated “that both
[Moreno] and the United States w[ould] recommend that the [district] court sentence
[Moreno] to a 20 year period of imprisonment” and “five years of supervised release.”
ROA, Vol. II at 210. And, although the plea agreement made fleeting and unnecessary
references to the Sentencing Guidelines—specifically to the use of relevant conduct under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 and to Moreno’s entitlement to a three-level reduction pursuant to
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U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility—it did not “make clear that the basis
for the specified term [wa]s a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the offense to
which the defendant pleaded guilty.” 564 U.S. at 539. Indeed, the PSR’s sentencing
calculations, which were ultimately adopted by the district court without objection by
either party, establish that the 20-year sentence specified in the plea agreement could not
have been the simple product of routine Guidelines calculations. This is confirmed by the
district court’s statements, both at the time of sentencing and more recently in denying
Moreno’s motions, that it had to depart downward three offense levels in order to reach
an advisory Guidelines sentencing range that would accommodate the parties’ proposed
sentence.2 In light of these facts, we agree with the district court that Amendment 782 did
not render Moreno eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).
The only disagreement we have with the district court’s ruling is that, rather than
denying Moreno’s motion to correct sentence, the district court should have dismissed it
for lack of jurisdiction. That is because § 3582(c)(2) grants jurisdiction to a district court
only “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based
on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Consequently, we must vacate the district court’s
order and remand with directions to enter an order dismissing Moreno’s motion for lack
2
Because the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory in nature, United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), it was unnecessary in our view for the district court to
depart downward in order to arrive at an advisory Guidelines sentencing range that would
accommodate the stipulated sentence set forth in the plea agreement.
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of jurisdiction.
IV
Moreno’s request for oral argument is DENIED. The district court’s order
denying Moreno’s motion to correct sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is
VACATED and the case REMANDED to the district court with directions to enter an
order dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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