[Cite as Manninen v. Alvarez, 2016-Ohio-5471.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
CHARLES MANNINEN, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2016-01-017
: OPINION
- vs - 8/22/2016
:
VICTORIA ALVAREZ, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY AREA III COURT
Case No. CVI 2012-00174
Charles Manninen, 140 Gross Street, #114, Marietta, Ohio 45750, plaintiff-appellee, pro se
Joseph R. Matejkovic, 9078 Union Centre Blvd., Suite 350, West Chester, Ohio 45069-
4879, for defendant-appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Victoria Alvarez, appeals from the decision of the Butler
County Area III Court, which awarded attorney fees of $1,849 in favor of plaintiff-appellee,
Charles Manninen, following a landlord-tenant dispute. For the reasons detailed below, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.1
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we hereby sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for
purposes of issuing this opinion.
Butler CA2016-01-017
{¶ 2} This appeal follows this court's remand in Manninen v. Alvarez, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2013-06-106, 2014-Ohio-75 ("Manninen I"). The following facts from that
appeal are still relevant:
On February 10, 2012, Manninen filed a small claims action
against defendant-appellee, Victoria Alvarez, for the recovery of
a $600 security deposit Manninen paid to lease an apartment
from Alvarez. Manninen claimed, pursuant to R.C. 5321.16, that
Alvarez failed to properly refund the security deposit in a timely
manner. After a contested hearing, the magistrate rendered his
decision on October 3, 2012, ruling in favor of Manninen and
finding Alvarez had wrongfully withheld $427.13 from
Manninen's security deposit. In compliance with R.C. 5321.16,
the magistrate ordered Alvarez pay to Manninen the wrongfully
withheld sum of $427.13 plus an additional $427.13 in damages
for a total of $854.26 plus interest and court costs. As to
attorney fees, the magistrate found no evidence had been
presented on the matter but ruled that Manninen "may file a
Motion on the [attorney fees] issue and allow [Alvarez] to
respond, or the parties can agree to have a hearing on a (sic)
matter." The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision
without objection on November 5, 2012.
On December 13, 2012, Manninen moved for an order awarding
attorney fees. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of Dwight
Packard II, as well as attachments of billing records (the
"Packard Affidavit"). Packard averred that, in his capacity as a
partner at the law firm representing Manninen, he could verify
that Joshua Morrow had been Manninen's attorney, that
Manninen had incurred reasonable fees based upon Morrow's
services, and that the billing records attached to the affidavit
reflected the charges owed by Manninen.
On December 20, 2012, the trial court scheduled a "hearing for
attorney's fees" for January 16, 2013. A magistrate presided
over the hearing and ultimately denied Manninen's motion,
finding: (1) attorney fees are "optional" under R.C. 5321.16, and
(2) that, "although there was no evidence" presented, the
"matter was brought and defended by both parties in the good
faith belief that they had valid claims and defenses," and,
therefore, attorney fees are not appropriate.
Manninen timely objected to the magistrate's decision, arguing
attorney fees are mandatory under R.C. 5321.16, and sufficient
evidence was presented through the Packard Affidavit to
warrant an award of attorney fees. Manninen did not order or
provide a transcript of the January 16, 2013 hearing to the trial
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court. The trial court held a hearing on Manninen's objections
on April 19, 2013.
On May 24, 2013, the trial court sustained in part and overruled
in part Manninen's objections to the magistrate's decision. The
trial court found that an award of attorney fees is mandatory
under R.C. 5321.16 so long as the moving party has established
the fees to which he is entitled. Thus, the trial court rejected the
portion of the magistrate's decision finding that attorney fees are
optional under R.C. 5321.16. However, because Manninen did
not provide a transcript of the January 16, 2013 magistrate
hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), the trial court
overruled Manninen's objection as related to the denial of an
award of attorney fees.
Id. at ¶ 2-6.
{¶ 3} On appeal, this court reversed the trial court's decision by explaining that the
rules of evidence are inapplicable in such small claims proceedings and therefore "an
informal presentation of evidence is permissible and the Packard Affidavit attached to
Manninen's motion for attorney fees was competent evidence." Id. at ¶ 24. As the trial
court erroneously excluded the Packard affidavit, this court found that the Packard Affidavit
was properly before the trial court and "may alone be sufficient evidence to support an
award of attorney fees." Id. at ¶ 24. Accordingly, we remanded the matter for the trial court
to consider the Packard Affidavit, determine whether there was sufficient to support an
award of attorney fees, and, if so, determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees. Id.
{¶ 4} Following remand, the trial court considered the Packard Affidavit and
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support and award attorney fees. Based
upon consideration of the Packard Affidavit, as well as this court's determination in
Manninen I finding Alvarez presented no evidence in opposition to attorney fees, the trial
court determined that an award of $1,849 for attorney fees was reasonable in accordance
with R.C. 5321.16. Alvarez now appeals the decision of the trial court, raising a single
assignment of error for review.
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{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY
GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
{¶ 6} In her sole assignment of error, Alvarez argues the trial court erred by granting
Manninen's motion for attorney fees. We disagree.
{¶ 7} As we noted in Manninen I, "[t]he Ohio Supreme Court has held, '[u]nder R.C.
5321.16(B) and (C), a landlord who wrongfully withholds a portion of a tenant's security
deposit is liable for damages equal to twice the amount wrongfully withheld and for
reasonable attorney fees.'" Manninen I, 2014-Ohio-75 at ¶ 17, quoting Smith v. Padgett,
32 Ohio St.3d 344 (1987), paragraph three of the syllabus. "Such liability is "mandatory."'
Id. Upon a finding that a landlord has wrongfully withheld a portion of the tenant's security
deposit, the trial court "shall determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be
awarded on the basis of the evidence presented." Padgett at paragraph four of the syllabus.
"A trial court's determination of the proper amount of attorney fees awarded in a R.C.
5321.16 action shall not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Id. at 349. "R.C.
5321.16(C) permits the trial court, as the trier of fact, to make its own assessment 'of what
is reasonable on the basis of the evidence presented.'" Manninen I at ¶ 17, quoting Lacare
v. Dearing, 73 Ohio App.3d 238, 241 (11th Dist.1991).
{¶ 8} In the present case, the trial court held a hearing on attorney fees. Alvarez
did not present any evidence in opposition to the attorney fees. In fact, the only evidence
presented regarding the issue of attorney fees was contained in the Packard Affidavit, which
this court found was competent evidence to consider and "may alone be sufficient evidence
to support an award of attorney fees." Manninen I at ¶ 24. In his affidavit, Packard averred
that, in his capacity as a partner at the law firm representing Manninen, he could verify that
Joshua Morrow had been Manninen's attorney, that Manninen had incurred reasonable fees
of $1,849 based upon Morrow's services, and that the billing records attached to the affidavit
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reflected the charges owed. The trial court, after considering the uncontested evidence,
determined that $1,849 was a reasonable fee in accordance with R.C. 5321.16 and entered
judgment accordingly.
{¶ 9} Based on our review, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting $1,849
for reasonable attorney fees after considering the Packard affidavit. The Packard affidavit
was sufficient to prove the issue of attorney fees and the trial court's assessment of
reasonable costs was appropriate. Despite this, Alvarez again argues that Packard was
not an independent witness, the Packard Affidavit was not alone sufficient to support the
award of attorney fees, and Manninen did not present any other evidence necessary to
support a fee award. Those arguments, however, are without merit as this court determined
in Manninen I that the Packard Affidavit was admissible and may be sufficient to support an
award of attorney fees. If Alvarez wished to contest the reasonableness of the averments
contained in Packard's affidavit, then she could have presented evidence to rebut those
assertions.
{¶ 10} Nevertheless, Alvarez also claims that she was denied due process of law
because, following this court's remand Manninen did not diligently advance the case for
final resolution and the trial court did not enter a final judgment entry until nearly 23 months
later. However, after review, we conclude that Alvarez's due process rights were not denied
based upon the delay in final resolution of this matter. Alvarez was not prejudiced by the
delay in the proceedings and was, at all times, on notice of the pending litigation.
{¶ 11} Nor do we find any merit to Alvarez's claim that she was prejudiced or denied
due process of law because the magistrate and judge originally assigned to this case
recused from the case "without any advance notice to the parties or any opportunity to be
heard on the recusal, and without offering any explanation for the recusal." The trial court
was not required to explain its decision to recuse or provide the parties with notice or an
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opportunity to be heard on that decision. Simply stated, after a thorough review of the
record, we find no evidence to suggest that Alvarez was denied due process of law in the
resolution of this matter. Accordingly, we find Alvarez's sole assignment of error is without
merit and is overruled.
{¶ 12} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
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