15-2537
Ramjiawan v. Lynch
BIA
Montante, IJ
A089 010 600
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
24th day of August, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DENNIS JACOBS,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SOHAN RAMJIAWAN, AKA DAVE
RAMJIAWAN,
Petitioner,
v. 15-2537
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Samuel N. Iroegbu, Albany, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S.
Ferrier, Assistant Director; Matt A.
Crapo, Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Sohan Ramjiawan, a native and citizen of Guyana,
seeks review of a July 28, 2015, decision of the BIA affirming
a March 11, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
pretermitting asylum as untimely and denying withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Sohan Ramjiawan, No. A089 010 600 (B.I.A. July
28, 2015), aff’g No. A089 010 600 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Mar. 11,
2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural history in this case.
We have reviewed the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the
sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of
review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
Because Ramjiawan does not challenge the agency’s
pretermission of asylum, the only claims before us are
withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Yueqing Zhang v.
Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)
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(explaining that claims not raised in a brief are abandoned).
Ramjiawan asserted that he was threatened and that he fears harm
in Guyana because his cricket team won a cricket match in 2003.
A valid past persecution claim can be based on harm other
than threats to life or freedom, “includ[ing]
non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,” Beskovic v.
Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), but the harm
must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment,”
Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.
2006). In evaluating a past persecution claim, the agency
must consider the harm suffered in the aggregate. Poradisova
v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005).
The agency did not err in finding that Ramjiawan’s
experiences in Guyana did not rise to the level of persecution.
His claim of past persecution rested on unfulfilled threats
directed at him, and an assault on his brother-in-law. These
incidents, even considered cumulatively, did not constitute
persecution against Ramjiawan. See Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y
General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that
unfulfilled threats do not amount to persecution); Tao Jiang
v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that
asylum applicant cannot establish persecution based on harm to
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a family member unless the applicant was “within the zone of
risk when the family member was harmed, and suffered some
continuing hardship after the incident.”).
Absent past persecution, an alien may establish
eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT relief by
demonstrating a likelihood of future persecution and torture.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2), (c)(2); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft,
357 F.3d 169, 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2004). The agency reasonably
found that Ramjiawan’s claim of a likelihood of persecution
and torture was speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS,
421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid
support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear is
speculative at best”).
Ramjiawan failed to identify with specificity the group he
claims will harm him in Guyana—he first testified that a 12-man
rival cricket team threatened him and later that a large unnamed
gang operating throughout Guyana threatened him. Ramjiawan
did not claim to have been threatened in over a decade.
Moreover, he did not corroborate his assertions that gang
members looked for him at his brother’s house in Guyana in 2011,
or that the gang that threatened him operates throughout Guyana.
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Based on this record, the agency reasonably found that
Ramjiawan had not demonstrated a likelihood of persecution or
torture so as to establish his eligibility for withholding of
removal and CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2), (c); see
also Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178, 184-85; Jian Xing Huang,
421 F.3d at 129. We need not consider the agency’s alternative
basis for denying withholding of removal: that Ramjiawan failed
to demonstrate that the harm he suffered and the fears he had
were on account of a protected ground. See INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies
are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which
is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the petitioner’s
motion for a stay of removal is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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