FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 26 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAW RAHMAN, No. 14-35966
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00410-RSL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
AMERICAN TIRE DISTRIBUTOR INC;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Shaw Rahman appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his employment action alleging national origin and religious discrimination under
Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Pavoni v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 789 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rahman’s hostile
work environment claim because Rahman failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the complained of conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive work
environment. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-43 (9th
Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII and explaining that courts look at “all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rahman’s national
origin and religious discrimination claims because Rahman failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the defendants’ proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. See
Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 654, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2002)
(setting forth the burden-shifting scheme applied to Title VII employment
discrimination claims); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d
1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (courts only require that an employer honestly believes
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its reasons for taking an adverse employment action); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace
& Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (employee’s subjective beliefs of his own
job competence are insufficient to show pretext).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rahman’s
retaliation claim because Rahman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether he was engaged in a protected activity prior to being terminated. See
Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth
elements of retaliation claim under Title VII); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(describing what constitutes protected activity under Title VII).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rahman’s motion to
recuse because Rahman failed to identify any basis for recusal. See Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”); United States
v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review
and bases for recusal).
We reject as without merit Rahman’s contentions regarding his alleged
breach of contract claim, alleged violations of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the district court’s striking of his surreply.
Rahman’s motions, filed on August 28, 2015 and November 27, 2015, are
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denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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