FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 26 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL ANGELO LENA, No. 15-15011
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-02498-JD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SAN QUENTIN STATE PRISON; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Michael Angelo Lena appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-
courts and due process claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may
affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
Dismissal of Lena’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Lena was
represented by court-appointed counsel in his state criminal appeal. See Storseth v.
Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981) (availability of court-appointed
counsel satisfies the constitutional obligation to provide meaningful access to the
courts).
The district court properly dismissed Lena’s due process claim arising from
unauthorized property deprivations because Lena had an adequate postdeprivation
remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)
(“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does
not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss
is available.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California
[l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property
deprivations.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Lena’s complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See
2 15-15011
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to
amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-15011