COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00248-CR
NO. 02-15-00249-CR
NO. 02-15-00250-CR
NO. 02-15-00251-CR
NO. 02-15-00252-CR
NO. 02-15-00253-CR
JOEL GAUCIN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1323113D, 1323114D, 1344214D, 1344215D, 1345864D,
1345865D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Joel Gaucin appeals from his convictions for evading arrest or
detention with a vehicle, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and multiple
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
aggravated robberies with a deadly weapon. We affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
Gaucin was indicted for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle and the
aggravated assault of Sergio Luna, both occurring on April 15, 2013; for the
aggravated robberies with a deadly weapon of Penella Thompson and Caitlyn
Mackey, both occurring on July 10, 2013; and for the aggravated robberies with a
deadly weapon of Julia Walker and Crystal Jones, both occurring on September
27, 2013. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011),
§ 38.04(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2016). In open court on March 25, 2015, Gaucin
waived his right to a jury at both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases, and
he pleaded guilty to the indictments without the benefit of a plea-bargain
agreement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.13 (West Supp. 2016),
art. 26.14 (West 2009). Before accepting his guilty pleas, the record reflects that
the trial court admonished Gaucin in writing of the consequences of his pleas.
See id. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2016). The written plea admonishments included
a judicial confession, which Gaucin signed: “I have read the indictment . . . filed
in this case and I committed each and every act alleged therein . . . . I am guilty
of the instant offense as well as all lesser included offenses. . . . I swear to the
truth of all of the foregoing . . . .” The trial court accepted Gaucin’s guilty pleas
and then recessed to allow for the completion of a presentence investigation
report.
2
On July 10, 2015, the trial court held Gaucin’s sentencing hearing. The
State did not call any witnesses during the hearing. Gaucin called three
witnesses, and he also took the stand himself. After hearing closing arguments
from both sides, the trial court found Gaucin guilty of the charged offenses and
assessed punishment at concurrent sentences of five years’ confinement for the
evading arrest offense, ten years’ confinement for the aggravated assault
offense, and thirty-five years’ confinement for the aggravated robbery offenses.
Gaucin’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel, accompanied by a brief in support of that motion. In the brief,
counsel states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous and without
merit. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of
the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Gaucin
filed a pro-se response to the Anders brief. The State filed a letter brief and
agreed with Gaucin’s attorney that the appeal is frivolous.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
have an obligation to undertake an independent examination of the record.
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). In this
evaluation, we consider the record, the arguments raised in the Anders brief, and
any issues the appellant points out in his pro se response. See United States v.
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Wagner, 158 F.3d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, Gaucin’s pro se
response, and the State’s letter brief. We agree with counsel and the State that
this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that
arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–
28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 26, 2016
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