Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13548
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cv-00421-WTH-PRL
NOLAN NATHANIEL EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 29, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 2 of 9
Nolan Nathaniel Edwards appeals from the dismissal of his pro se complaint
raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2012, Edwards, a federal prisoner confined at FCI Coleman-
Medium, was sleeping on the lower bed of a triple-occupancy bunk, when he
awaked from a muscle spasm in his foot. Edwards sat up in an attempt to relieve
his foot pain; in doing so, he got his neck “wedged or trapped in between the
narrow space of the upper top ledge between the triple lower bunk bed.” R. at 8.
On April 16, 2012, Edwards filed an administrative grievance with the prison. He
complained the triple bunks did not allow enough space for him to sit up in bed
without injuring his neck and requested to be moved to a double bunk. The Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) denied Edwards’s grievance and subsequent appeal. In
denying his appeal, the BOP explained triple bunks had been incorporated at
Coleman to accommodate a significant increase in the inmate population.
Edwards complained to prison medical staff about his neck pain; several
MRIs ultimately were taken. An MRI taken on June 5, 2012, showed negative
findings except for mild degenerative-disc disease. Another MRI on October 6,
2012, showed Edwards had (1) a diffuse disc bulge and mild bilateral-neural-
2
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 3 of 9
foraminal stenosis 1 at C4-5; (2) a posterior-annular tear, diffuse disc bulge, and
mild right and moderate left foraminal stenosis at C5-6; and (3) a posterior annular
tear, diffuse-disc bulge, and mild right and moderate left foraminal stenosis at C6-
7.
Edwards was examined by both prison and outside medical staff regarding
his neck pain on several occasions. On November 9, 2012, Dr. Robert Carver saw
Edwards at the prison. Dr. Carver’s notes from that visit summarized the findings
from Edwards’s October 2012 MRI, diagnosed mild right and mild-to-moderate
left neural-foraminal stenosis, and recommended pain management. On February
6, 2013, Edwards saw Dr. Stephen Pyles at the Florida Pain Clinic. Dr. Pyles
noted Edwards’s history of neck pain, reviewed the October 2012 MRI results, and
diagnosed Edwards with cervical-degenerative-disc disease with disc herniation at
C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7. Dr. Pyles recommended a series of epidural-steroid
injections.
Dr. Carver saw Edwards on February 21, 2013, and noted Edwards’s x-rays
and CT scans showed mild cervical-degenerative-joint disease, mild arthritis, and
mild-to-moderate stenosis. Dr. Carver found Edwards did not meet the criteria for
the orthopedic-chronic-care clinic. On March 7, 2013, Dr. Carver again saw
Edwards. Dr. Carver’s notes show Edwards complained of neck pain and stiffness
1
Neural-foraminal stenosis refers to the narrowing of the neural foramen (nerve
passageways) in the spine, resulting in compression of the nerves that may cause neck pain.
3
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 4 of 9
because of cramped conditions in his bunk bed. Dr. Carver noted he was unable to
give Edwards sleeping accommodations in the absence of objective MRI findings
and referenced his previous treatment notes. In addition, Dr. Carver recommended
Edwards get out of bed to stretch as needed, take warm showers, and use over-the-
counter pain relievers from the commissary as needed. He also provided Edwards
a handout on joint injections and noted Edwards needed to decide whether he
wished to proceed with the approved pain-management consultation. Edwards
ultimately did elect to proceed with Dr. Pyle’s proposed treatment and received a
series of steroid injections in his neck in April and May 2013.
Subsequently, in July 2013, Edwards filed an administrative tort claim with
the prison and alleged Dr. Carver had failed to provide him ordinary care by
refusing to grant him a more suitable bunk assignment, which resulted in
aggravation of his neck injury. The BOP issued a final denial of Edwards’s
administrative claim in January 2014. Meanwhile, on December 14, 2013, a third
MRI on Edwards’s neck was taken; it showed similar findings to the October 2012
MRI and no significant interval changes in disc bulge, central canal, and neural-
foraminal stenosis.
In July 2014, Edwards filed an FTCA complaint in federal district court. He
alleged the government, through its employees, was negligent in failing to provide
him with a suitable sleeping accommodation in view of his neck injury, which
4
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 5 of 9
caused him additional harm. Specifically, he contended Dr. Carver had
misdiagnosed him based on an incorrect reading of his initial MRI, as
demonstrated by Dr. Pyles’s subsequent treatment. Edwards alleged that
misdiagnosis and subsequent failure of the prison to assign him to a more suitable
bunk aggravated his injuries. Edwards further alleged he suffered nerve damage
and permanent injury as a result of the government’s negligence and requested
damages in the amount of $500,000.
The government filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The
government first argued the district judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain Edwards’s claim, because it fell within the discretionary-function
exception to the FTCA. The government argued there was no directive requiring
the BOP to assign inmates to a specific bed type, and bed-assignment decisions are
grounded in considerations of public policy, such as inmate safety and medical
needs, security, and available resources of the facility. Alternatively, the
government argued it was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of
Edwards’s claim. In support of its motion, the government attached a copy of the
BOP-program statement regarding rated capacities for BOP facilities; it states the
inmate population will be managed and distributed based on capacity computation
formulas, security considerations, and institutional needs.
5
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 6 of 9
In response, Edwards asserted the government was not entitled to summary
judgment on the merits of his claim. He also argued the government’s assertion
his claim was barred by the discretionary-function exception lacked merit, because
his claim was a medical-negligence claim based on Dr. Carver’s misdiagnosis of
his neck injury; the duty of the prison to provide him suitable quarters was
inextricably intertwined with the medical standard of care.
The district judge granted the government’s motion and dismissed
Edwards’s complaint. The judge agreed Edwards’s claim was a negligent-bunk-
bed assignment, which was barred by the discretionary-function exception, because
bunk-bed assignments involve policy choices regarding the allocation of prison
resources. Consequently, the judge concluded he lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Edwards’s claim.
On appeal, Edwards contends the district judge erred in dismissing his
complaint, because the discretionary-function exception does not apply in his case.
He asserts the issue in this case is Dr. Carver’s misdiagnosis of his neck injury,
which prevented him from being moved to a different bunk and ultimately led to
the aggravation of his injury. Because a physician’s negligence does not fall
within the discretionary-function exception, Edwards argues the judge should not
have dismissed his complaint.
6
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 7 of 9
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, 717 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir.
2013). The FTCA waives government sovereign immunity in tort suits for
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government employees, acting within
the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Monzon v. United
States, 253 F.3d 567, 570 (11th Cir. 2001). This waiver is limited by various
statutory exceptions, including the discretionary-function exception. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a). Under that exception, the government does not waive immunity for
claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government.” Id. If the discretionary-function exception applies,
the district judge lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s FTCA claim.
U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 562 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir.
2009).
We apply a two-part test to determine whether the discretionary-function
exception applies. Id. First, we determine whether the challenged conduct is
discretionary in nature or involves an element of judgment or choice. Id. If a
federal statute, regulation, or policy dictates a particular course of action for an
employee to follow, the discretionary-function exception does not apply, because
7
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 8 of 9
the employee has no choice but to follow the directive. Id. Second, if the
challenged conduct does involve the exercise of judgment, then we determine
whether it is the kind of judgment the discretionary-function exception was
designed to shield, one grounded in policy concerns. See id. “If the decision is
inherently one allowing discretion, we presume that the act was grounded in policy
whenever that discretion is employed.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, our inquiry focuses on whether the challenged act is
“susceptible to policy analysis,” not whether the government employee actually
weighed policy considerations before taking a particular course of action. Cohen
v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although Edwards characterizes his claim as a negligent-misdiagnosis claim
based on Dr. Carver’s alleged misreading of his MRI results, the crux of his claim,
and the primary action of which he complains, is failure of the BOP to assign him
to a different bunk. Edwards provides no federal statute, regulation, or policy that
prohibits the use of triple bunks or requires prisoners with neck injuries be
assigned only to single or double bunks. The BOP retains discretion over how bed
space is assigned among inmates in its facilities. See U.S. Aviation Underwriters,
562 F.3d at 1299. Furthermore, the assignment of bed space is susceptible to
policy considerations, such as the facility’s available resources, the safety and
8
Case: 15-13548 Date Filed: 08/29/2016 Page: 9 of 9
medical needs of inmates, and the security of inmates and staff. Id.; Cohen, 151
F.3d at 1341.
It does not matter whether the discretionary decision of the BOP not to move
Edwards out of a triple bunk may have been based on Dr. Carver’s alleged
misreading of Edwards’s MRI results, because the subjective motive for the
decision not to move Edwards is irrelevant to the discretionary-function analysis.
Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1341. Consequently, the decision of the BOP not to reassign
Edwards to a single or double bunk falls within the FTCA discretionary-function
exception. The district judge correctly determined he lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Edwards’s claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); U.S. Aviation
Underwriters, 562 F.3d at 1299.
AFFIRMED.
9