[Cite as In re R.D.H., 2016-Ohio-5570.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
IN THE MATTER OF: : OPINION
R.D.H., DELINQUENT CHILD
: CASE NO. 2015-L-132
Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No.
2015-DL-01550.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor,
Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Charles R. Grieshammer, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. Clapp,
Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, R.D.H., appeals his conviction for complicity to robbery and
argues the state only established that he intended to commit theft. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} R.D.H., a fifteen-year-old boy, agreed via social media to purchase a pair
of tennis shoes and a mobile phone from Michael, a fourteen-year-old boy who knew
R.D.H. through football. The shoes belonged to Michael and the phone belonged to
Jason, who was thirteen at the time. R.D.H. agreed to exchange $100 cash and $400
worth of marijuana for the shoes and phone.
{¶3} On the day of the exchange, Michael had a football game and could not
meet R.D.H. So Jason agreed to meet R.D.H. at the park. Jason had never met R.D.H.
before, but had seen his Facebook photo. R.D.H. was with two others when Jason
approached him. Jason’s two younger siblings were with him. Jason handed R.D.H.
the shoes and phone, and R.D.H. questioned whether the shoes were real. Jason
suggested that they walk to a nearby McDonald’s to use its Wi-Fi to contact Michael and
confirm certain details about the shoes.
{¶4} At one point, one of the three boys told Jason to go behind a house where
Jason suspected something bad was going to happen. One of the boys named Niko
jumped on Jason knocking him to ground while R.D.H. and the other boy ran toward a
nearby fence. R.D.H. climbed the fence and continued running. Jason got up and gave
chase catching the third individual, who did not have the shoes or the phone. Jason
then called the police.
{¶5} Within five minutes of the police dispatch, the police saw R.D.H. and Niko
running. The two were stopped at gunpoint. Jason identified R.D.H. at the scene as
the individual who took his phone and shoes and Niko as the person who tackled him to
the ground. R.D.H. still had the shoes and phone at the time.
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{¶6} R.D.H. initially told the police that he ran off with the items because Jason
tried to punch him. Niko told the police that it was the third boy, who had not been
caught, who took Jason’s things.
{¶7} At trial R.D.H. testified that he only intended to run away with the items
and not harm Jason. R.D.H. stated that Niko only learned about his plan to steal that
day at the park.
{¶8} R.D.H. also denied telling Jason to go behind the house, but he could not
recall who told Jason to go there. R.D.H. explained that although he planned to steal
Jason’s things, he never intended or agreed to hurt him.
{¶9} The complaint alleging R.D.H. to be a delinquent child contains two
counts. First, R.D.H. “did knowingly aid or abet another in committing Robbery, a
violation of section 2911.02 of the Revised Code” if committed by an adult. The second
count alleged that R.D.H. received stolen property. The juvenile court found both
counts true.
{¶10} Appellant’s sole assigned error states:
{¶11} “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the delinquent child-appellant
when it denied his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for judgment of acquittal, in violation of his
rights to fair trial and due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the
Ohio Constitution.”
{¶12} A juvenile court may adjudicate a juvenile as a delinquent child when the
evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed an act that
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would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. R.C. 2151.35(A); Juv.R. 29(E)(4); In
re Williams, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-64, 2011-Ohio-4338, ¶18.
{¶13} Appellate courts do not consider a witness’ credibility when reviewing a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98528,
2013-Ohio-1181, ¶27; State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767
N.E.2d 216, ¶79. Instead, we determine whether the testimony and other evidence
presented satisfy every element of the offense. In re C.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
102675, 2015-Ohio-4768, ¶51.
{¶14} Appellant argues acquittal was necessary because the state failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided or abetted his co-delinquent in inflicting,
attempting to inflict, or threatening to inflict physical harm on another. Consequently, he
claims the state violated his state and federal due process rights.
{¶15} A Juv.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the evidence
and requires a trial court to issue a judgment of acquittal when the state fails to
establish sufficient evidence to support a conviction. State v. Haggerty, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 24405, 2011-Ohio-6705, ¶20, citing State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d
261, 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978); In re R.A.M., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-011, 2010-Ohio-
4198, ¶10. Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for acquittal under the same
standard for arguments asserting insufficient evidence. Id.
{¶16} “‘An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
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viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” State v. Chessman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24451, 2012-Ohio-1427, ¶3
quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).
{¶17} Following trial, the court found both counts of the complaint, i.e., complicity
to robbery, a felony of the second degree if committed by an adult under R.C.
2923.03(A)(2) and receiving stolen property, a first-degree misdemeanor if committed
by an adult under R.C. 2913.51(A), true.
{¶18} Appellant only challenges the mens rea aspect of his complicity to robbery
offense and argues although he intended to commit theft, he did not intend to commit
robbery, and the state did not prove he was complicit to his friend’s robbery. Thus,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we must determine
whether the state satisfied its burden.
{¶19} R.C. 2923.03(A) complicity states in part:
{¶20} “No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission
of an offense, shall do any of the following:
{¶21} “* * *
{¶22} “(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense * * *.”
{¶23} R.C. 2911.02 states in part:
{¶24} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing
immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
{¶25} “* * *
{¶26} “(2) Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another;
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{¶27} “(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of robbery. A violation of
division (A)(1) or (2) of this section is a felony of the second degree.”
{¶28} In State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 2001-Ohio-1336, 754 N.E.2d 796,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Appellate District and
reinstated Johnson’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated
murder. Johnson was a member of the Crips, who along with other gang members,
took a caravan of stolen cars to locate and kill a rival gang member. Johnson was in
the backseat with the shooter when the shooter shot and killed a three-year old girl and
injured three others.
{¶29} Johnson argued the state failed to establish he had the requisite mental
state that he intended to kill. The Supreme Court rejected this argument explaining in
part,
{¶30} “Defendant would have this court conclude that because no witness
pinpointed a specific statement by defendant of his intent to join the plan to kill * * *,
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for complicity based on aiding and
abetting. This position defies not only the law but common sense.
{¶31} “* * *
{¶32} “Defendant was not an innocent bystander who was merely along for the
ride. In fact, he intended to assist with the murder * * *. We agree with the proposition
that ‘participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and
conduct before and after the offense is committed.’
{¶33} “* * *
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{¶34} “The fact that defendant did not articulate his intent will not allow him to
escape responsibility for his clear actions of complicity by aiding and abetting in the
commission of these crimes. Accordingly, we hold that to support a conviction for
complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must
show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or
incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the
criminal intent of the principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the crime.” (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Id. at 245-246.
{¶35} In State v. White, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA99-09-025, 2000 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5655, (Dec. 4, 2000), White challenged his convictions for aggravated robbery
and petty theft arguing that the offenses occurred after he left the scene. However, the
court of appeals disagreed and found the state provided sufficient evidence from which
it could be inferred that White intended to rob the victim based on his participation in the
assault on him minutes before. Id. at *5-6.
{¶36} In this case, the state’s evidence confirms that R.D.H. devised a plan to
steal the shoes and phone and his friend participated in his plan. One of the three boys
directed Jason behind the house where he was tackled to the ground. At approximately
the same time Jason was tackled, R.D.H. and the other boy began running away.
R.D.H. still had possession of the items when he scaled a fence to get away from the
victim. Niko then ran away and caught up to R.D.H., and the two continued to run
together until they were detained by the police. The victim caught up to the third
individual, who did not have possession of his stolen items, so he let him go. This third
person was not with Niko and R.D.H. when they were spotted running by the police.
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{¶37} After viewing the evidence in R.D.H.’s case in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we agree that the state produced sufficient evidence that could be
construed as R.D.H. sharing the intent to inflict injury on their common victim. As in
Johnson and White, supra, R.D.H.’s participation in the requisite criminal intent may be
inferred from his presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.
Specifically, the boys acted together by walking with Jason out of the park and directing
him behind a home. R.D.H. had possession of the stolen items and ran while Niko
knocked the victim to the ground. The assault provided R.D.H. the opportunity to get
away. Thereafter, the two were found running from the scene together.
{¶38} Based on the foregoing, R.D.H.’s sole assignment of error lacks merit, and
the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs in judgment only.
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