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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DEVELE LAMAR REID, :
:
Appellant : No. 183 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 13, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009434-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2016
Devele Lamar Reid (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
of an aggregate term of life imprisonment imposed after being convicted of,
inter alia, second-degree murder. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts underlying this conviction as
follows.
On June 18, 2012, Michael Shearn, his brother, co-
defendant Brandon Lind, and co-defendant Jon Lee were driving
around in Lind’s car. Lind was driving, Lee was in the front
passenger seat, and Shearn was in the back. While they were
driving, Lee received a phone call.
Lee told the other occupants of the car that [Appellant]
wanted to “hit a lick” or commit a robbery. Shearn, Lee, and
Lind then picked up [D.M.] on the way to Edgewood. [D.M.] was
sitting behind the driver’s seat. According to Shearn, Lee told
[D.M.] what [Appellant] wanted to do and [D.M.] agreed to it.
[Appellant] called Lee again and told Lee where to pick him
up. The group then drove to the Swissvale Police Station and
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S57038-16
parked, waiting for [Appellant]. When [Appellant] arrived, he
asked if the others knew of anyone they could hit. Lind
suggested a number of people, including the victim, Jordan
Coyner. Lind and Coyner went to school together. Shearn
testified that he didn’t know Coyner, but he knew of him, that he
had “good marijuana” and made good money. He was chosen as
the target because he was a “drug kingpin.”
The group then drove to Homewood. [Appellant] got out
of the car, entered a house, and returned with a firearm. [D.M.]
identified the weapon as a semi-automatic. Shearn, Lee, and
[D.M.] were in the back seat. [Appellant] passed the gun to
Shearn, Lee, and [D.M.] in the back seat. Shearn refused to
accept the gun. Lee took the gun and pulled down the back of
the seat to put the gun in the trunk. Meanwhile, Shearn and
Lind texted [] Coyner from Shearn’s phone. The pair used his
phone because Lee’s phone was dead, [D.M.’s] was frozen, and
Lind’s and [Appellant’s] were traceable. Shearn admitted that
he sent the first text, although he had not previously
acknowledged texting Coyner at all. The first text to Coyner
claimed to be from Lee, asking for marijuana. Shearn admitted
that he didn’t want the call to be traced to him. As they drove,
[Appellant] told the group about “old licks” to make them more
comfortable.
They drove to a cul-de-sac in an area near Robinson
Township. Lind pointed out Coyner’s house. Lee, [Appellant],
and [D.M.] got out of the car while Shearn and Lind remained
inside. Lee removed the gun from the trunk and gave it to
[Appellant]. [D.M.] was given an Air Soft pellet gun from the
glove box in the middle console. Lee had no weapon at all.
[D.M.] testified that Lind dropped them off in front of Coyner’s
house and drove further down the street. Lee and [D.M.] stood
at the top of the driveway by the bushes, and [Appellant] went
behind the house. Neither Lee nor [D.M.] ever entered the
house. They were acting as lookouts.
[Lee] and [D.M.] heard a gunshot and saw [Appellant]
running toward them from the back of the house. All three
started running toward the car. [D.M.] and Lee climbed into the
backseat and [Appellant] got into the front. [Appellant] handed
the gun to Lee, who put it back in the trunk. When the others
asked what had happened, [Appellant] told them that Coyner’s
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father had stepped out and that he had shot him in the shoulder.
(In reality, [Appellant] shot and killed the robbery victim, []
Coyner). [Appellant] had taken three grams of marijuana and a
firearm from the house. Shearn deleted the messages on his
cell phone and Lind smashed the phone, throwing it from the
car. Shearn admitted that he was afraid of the police tracing it.
They drove back to Homewood where [Appellant] dropped off
the gun. They then dropped off [Appellant] in Swissvale and
returned to Shearn’s father’s house. [D.M.] walked home from
there.
[On June 19, 2012, Appellant was arrested charged with
criminal homicide, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and carrying a
firearm without a license.] After [Appellant] was arrested, he
provided a voluntary taped statement to homicide detectives on
June 19, 2012. The statement was played in [c]ourt during the
trial. [Appellant] basically reiterates the facts that are stated
previously but added that when he told the victim to give him
the money, the victim first said he had no money. After
[Appellant] hit him with the gun, the victim said I have money
but it is upstairs. As the victim went to go inside, he tried to
shut the door on [Appellant]. As [Appellant] pushed back on the
door, he stated the gun went off and he ran.
After concluding the statement to the detectives on June
19, 2012, [Appellant] was being walked from the Allegheny
County homicide office to a police car. At that time, a WTAE (an
ABC affiliate in Pittsburgh) television news camera and
microphone were thrust at him and he admitted to the shooting
and apologized. This videotape was played during trial.
The gun used to shoot [] Coyner was never found. Neither
[Appellant], Lee nor Lind testified at trial, and none called
character witnesses. In closing argument, trial counsel []
essentially argued for [third-degree murder] rather than a
[second-degree murder] conviction.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/2016, at 5-8 (citations to notes of testimony and
footnotes omitted).
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Appellant was tried in a joint trial with Lee and Lind. 1 A jury heard
Lee’s case, and the trial court heard the cases of both Lind and Appellant
without a jury. The trial court found Appellant guilty of second-degree
murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a
license. The trial court found Lind guilty of third-degree murder and related
crimes. The jury found Lee guilty of third-degree murder and related
crimes.
On March 6, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of
life imprisonment. No post-sentence motion or appeals were filed on
Appellant’s behalf, but on March 11, 2015, Appellant filed timely a pro se
PCRA petition. Appellant’s post-sentence motion and direct appeal rights
were reinstated nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion
challenging the weight of the evidence, with particular reference to the fact
that Appellant’s co-defendants were convicted of third-degree murder while
Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder. That post-sentence
motion was filed on September 28, 2015, and was denied by operation of
law on January 28, 2016. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both
Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant argues that his second-degree murder conviction
was against the weight of the evidence under these circumstances. He
1
D.M.’s case was transferred to juvenile court. He pled guilty to third-
degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy in exchange for his
testimony against Appellant, Lee, and Lind.
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suggests that all defendants should have been convicted of second-degree
murder or that all defendants should have been convicted of third-degree
murder, and it “shocks one’s sense of justice” otherwise. Appellant’s Brief at
18.
We consider this argument mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
When we review a weight-of-the-evidence challenge, we do not
actually examine the underlying question; instead, we examine
the trial court’s exercise of discretion in resolving the challenge.
This type of review is necessitated by the fact that the trial judge
heard and saw the evidence presented. Simply put, [o]ne of the
least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against
the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be
granted in the interest of justice. A new trial is warranted in this
context only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence that
it shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
prevail. Of equal importance is the precept that, [t]he finder of
fact … exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility
of witnesses, and may choose to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1022–23 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In considering Appellant’s issue, we observe that this Court has
rejected specifically the claim that similarly-situated defendants have to be
convicted of the same crimes or any crimes at all. See Commonwealth v.
Wallace, 817 A.2d 485 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that husband could
be convicted of eight counts of endangering the welfare of children and wife
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could be acquitted of those crimes even though the entire family resided
together and was responsible for maintaining the home because wife had put
forth efforts to clean home and husband made no efforts to do so).
Moreover, as with all arguments challenging the weight of the
evidence, Appellant acknowledges that his conviction for second-degree
murder was legally sufficient. While Appellant could have been convicted of
third-degree murder, and his co-defendants could have been convicted of
second-degree murder, this was not a requirement. “Consistent verdicts are
not required provided that there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict
reached.” Commonwealth v. Merbah, 411 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Super.
1979).
Further, the trial court offered the following conclusions.
[T]here is remarkably little dispute about the facts of the crime
itself, at least as those facts relate to [Appellant]. All of the
testimony in this case, including the taped statement by
[Appellant] himself, establishes that [Appellant] wanted to “hit a
lick.” All of the testimony shows that [Appellant] got out of the
car and went to the back of Coyner’s house, to an open garage
door. It is undisputed [Appellant] took the gun with him inside
the house. All of the testimony establishes that [Appellant] had
shot someone and that he fled the scene along with two
lookouts. [Appellant] doesn’t claim he didn’t do the things of
which he has been accused and convicted, but rather that others
did the same things. Given the uniformity of the testimony
about the crimes committed, it is unclear which facts [Appellant]
would accord greater weight.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/2016, at 13.
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Here, Appellant’s role in this conspiracy was materially different than
his co-conspirators. He was the one who came up with the idea for a
robbery, secured the weapon, and then actually confronted the victim which
resulted in the victim’s death. Because Appellant cannot demonstrate that
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the verdict did not
shock its conscience, he is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/29/2016
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