United States v. Tony Hurlburt

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 14-3611 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY A. HURLBURT, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 14-cr-62-jdp — James D. Peterson, Judge. ____________________ No. 15-1686 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA GILLESPIE, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 14-cr-106-wmc — William C. Conley, Chief Judge. 2 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2016 ____________________ BeforeWOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, WILLIAMS, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. SYKES, Circuit Judge. Tony Hurlburt and Joshua Gillespie pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Their appeals raise the same legal issue, so we’ve consolidated them for decision. To calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range in each case, the district court began with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a), which assigns progressively higher offense levels if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” The term “crime of violence” is defined in the career-offender guideline and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, in- volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is known as the “residual clause.” The residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) mirrors the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which steeply increases the minimum and maximum penalties for § 922(g) violations. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). One year ago the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). The question here is whether Johnson’s holding applies to the parallel residual clause in the career- Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 3 offender guideline. An emerging consensus of the circuits holds that it does. See infra pp. 16–17. In this circuit, however, vagueness challenges to the Sen- tencing Guidelines are categorically foreclosed. Circuit precedent—namely, United States v. Tichenor 683 F.3d 358, 364–65 (7th Cir. 2012)—holds that the Guidelines are not susceptible to challenge on vagueness grounds. But Tichenor was decided before Johnson and Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), which have fatally undermined its reasoning. Accordingly, we now overrule Tichenor. Applying Johnson, we join the increasing majority of our sister circuits in holding that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is uncon- stitutionally vague. I. Background Tony Hurlburt was charged in a two-count indictment with possessing a firearm as a felon, see § 922(g)(1), and possessing a short-barreled shotgun, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d). He pleaded guilty to the felon-in- possession count; the second count was dismissed. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level for the crime of unlawful firearm possession depends in part on the defendant’s criminal history. For Hurlburt’s crime the base offense level ordinarily is 18. § 2K2.1(a)(5). But if the defend- ant has a prior conviction for a “crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” the base offense level is 22. § 2K2.1(a)(3). For a defendant with two or more prior convic- tions of either type, the base offense level jumps to 26. § 2K2.1(a)(1). 4 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 Application Note 1 to § 2K2.1 incorporates the “crime of violence” definition in the career-offender guideline, which reads: (a) The term “crime of violence” means any of- fense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that— (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or ex- tortion, involves use of explosives, or other- wise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is known as the “residual clause.” Hurlburt has a prior conviction for armed burglary, and at sentencing he conceded that this conviction qualifies as a predicate crime of violence. The government argued that another of Hurlburt’s prior convictions—for discharging a firearm into a building or vehicle, see WIS. STAT. § 941.20— should also count as a crime of violence. More particularly, the government argued that this second conviction qualified under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Over Hurlburt’s objec- tion the district judge accepted this argument. With two predicate convictions for crimes of violence, Hurlburt’s base offense level was 26, and the recommended sentencing range was 84–105 months. The judge imposed a below-range sentence of 72 months. Without the second Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 5 career-offender predicate, the Guidelines range drops to 57– 71 months. In an unrelated case in the same district, Joshua Gillespie was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, and he too pleaded guilty. Gillespie has a prior conviction for fleeing an officer. See id. § 346.04(3). The district judge counted this conviction as a predicate crime of violence under the residual clause, which increased Gillespie’s base offense level to 20. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The resulting Guidelines range was 92–115 months, and the judge imposed a below- range sentence of 84 months. Without the career-offender predicate in the mix, the Guidelines range drops to 51– 63 months. Hurlburt and Gillespie appealed and immediately asked us to suspend briefing to await the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, which raised the question whether the residual clause in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony”—a mirror image of the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2)—is unconstitutionally vague. We held the cases for Johnson and reinstated briefing after the Supreme Court issued its opin- ion. A panel heard argument in both appeals on the same day. 1 The panel prepared an opinion proposing to overrule Tichenor and circulated it to the full court in accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e). An en banc vote followed, and a majority of the court approved. This, then, is the opinion of the en 1 Another appeal we decide today, United States v. Rollins, No. 13-1731, also raises the same issue and was argued the same day. Because Rollins presents an additional issue unique to that case, we have not consolidat- ed it here. 6 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 banc court. 2 See Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (using the same procedure). II. Discussion In Johnson the Supreme Court held that the ACCA’s re- sidual clause is too vague to satisfy minimum requirements of due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Hurlburt and Gillespie argue that Johnson’s holding applies to the identically phrased residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2), which was used in their cases to increase the base offense level and thus the recommended sentencing range under the Guidelines. The Johnson argument is new on appeal, so our review is for plain error. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124 (2013); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Under Rule 52(b) we may correct a forfeited error if (1) the error is “plain”; (2) affects the defendant’s “substantial rights”; and (3) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1126–27 (quo- tation marks omitted). Johnson was not yet decided when the defendants were sentenced, but plain-error review asks whether the error is “plain” at the time of appellate review. Id. at 1130. The defendants maintain that the Johnson error is plain: The two residual clauses are identical, and because the ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, it necessarily follows that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is also uncon- stitutional. 2District Judge J. Phil Gilbert, of the Southern District of Illinois, served on the original panel, sitting by designation. We appreciate his willing- ness to assist the court. Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 7 The logic is compelling, but our decision in Tichenor stands in the way. Tichenor held that the Guidelines cannot be challenged on vagueness grounds. 683 F.3d at 364–65. The defendants maintain that Tichenor has been fatally under- mined by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson and Peugh. The government agrees, so the parties join forces in asking us to overrule Tichenor, apply Johnson, and invalidate the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) as unconstitutionally vague. Of course the parties’ agreement doesn’t relieve us of our obligation to resolve the question ourselves. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968). Before proceeding, however, we pause to note two important recent developments. First, the Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines to delete § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause in light of Johnson; the amendment became effective August 1, 2016. 81 Fed. Reg. 4741, 4742 (2016). Second, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case on collateral review to address the precise question presented here: whether Johnson’s holding applies to the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Beckles v. United States, 616 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-8544). Beckles will be heard in the Court’s upcoming term and raises additional issues unique to its facts and procedural posture. The Court’s decision is many months away, so we think it best not to hold these cases for Beckles. 8 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 A. Johnson and § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s Residual Clause The Due Process Clause 3 prohibits the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property “under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556. Johnson addressed persistent vagueness concerns about the residual clause in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” The Act increases the minimum and maximum penalties for various firearm-possession offenses if the defendant has three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act defines the term “violent felony” as follows: [A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … that— (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves con- duct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another … . § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is the residual clause; the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is a carbon copy. 3 The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 9 The Court began its analysis in Johnson by reaffirming the principle that the Constitution’s prohibition of vague laws applies “not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). Before continuing the doctrinal analysis, the Court first explained that the residual clause mandates a two-step categorical approach for classifying crimes as violent felonies. In the first step, the sentencing court must evaluate the predicate crime of conviction, hypothesizing “the kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’” rather than look- ing to the actual facts of the underlying case; in the second step, the court must assess whether this hypothesized “ordi- nary” case of the crime “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Id. These two features of the residual clause, the Court said, “conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague.” Id. First, the clause “leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because “[i]t ties the judicial assess- ment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements.” Id.; see also id. (“How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of the crime involves? ‘A statisti- cal analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’” (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc))). Second, the residual clause “leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 2558. “By combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much 10 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrar- iness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id. The Court noted as well that the residual clause had persistently resist- ed judicial efforts—by the Justices themselves and the lower courts—to settle on a stable construction. Id. at 2558–63. This interpretive struggle, the Court said, was a “failed enter- prise,” id. at 2560, and “the experience of the federal courts leaves no doubt about the unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause,” id. at 2562. The clause’s “hopeless indeterminacy,” the Court con- cluded, “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.” Id. at 2557–58. The Court called a halt to the long-running interpretive battle and held that “imposing an increased sentence under the [ACCA’s] residual clause … violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.” Id. at 2560, 2563. As we’ve explained, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s definition of “violent felony” contains the same residual clause, and we interpret the two provisions interchangeably, using the same categori- cal approach that Johnson found impermissibly indetermi- nate. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 802 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 749 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008). So unless the Guidelines are immune from chal- lenge on vagueness grounds, it follows inexorably from Johnson that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is also uncon- stitutionally vague. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Johnson to the similarly phrased residual clause in the “crime of violence” definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 11 B. Tichenor Tichenor held that the Guidelines are immune from vagueness challenges, but that conclusion is on shaky ground after Johnson and Peugh. Our decision in Tichenor rested on two premises. First, we reasoned that vagueness doctrine doesn’t apply to the Guidelines because they do not declare any conduct illegal; they’re just “directives to judges for their guidance in sentencing.” Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 364 (quoting United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1990)). The second premise overlaps the first: We reasoned that vagueness doctrine doesn’t apply because United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), demoted the Guidelines from “rules to advice.” Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 364 (quotation marks omitted). Because the Guidelines are merely advisory, a defendant has no due-process expectation that he will be sentenced within the recommended range, id. (citing Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008)), and he “cannot rely on them to communicate the sentence that the district court will impose,” id. at 365. Johnson conclusively refutes Tichenor’s first premise. Cit- ing Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123, the Court confirmed that vagueness doctrine applies to sentencing provisions as well as laws declaring conduct illegal. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. We touched on Batchelder in Tichenor but dismissed it as irrelevant, construing its reference to “vague sentencing provisions” as “mere dictum.” 683 F.3d at 365. We now know the Supreme Court sees things differently; the Consti- tution’s protection against vague laws is not limited to laws defining criminal liability. As far as vagueness doctrine is concerned, it makes no difference that the Guidelines deal exclusively with sentencing. 12 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 Tichenor’s second rationale has been fatally undermined by the Court’s decision in Peugh. There the Court held that the Guidelines, even though advisory, are subject to the limits imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2077–78. A district judge in Northern Illinois had calculat- ed Peugh’s sentencing range under the version of the Guide- lines in effect at the time of sentencing, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), and this newer version yielded a higher range than the version in effect at the time of the crime. Id. at 2078–79. Peugh objected, arguing that applying the harsher version of the Guidelines promulgated after he committed the crime violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Based on our circuit precedent, the district judge rejected the argument, and we affirmed. United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Supreme Court reversed, finding an ex post facto violation. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits, among other things, “[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.)). The “touchstone of [the Ex Post Facto Clause] inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the cov- ered crimes.” Id. at 2082 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court explained in Peugh, the Ex Post Facto Clause “ensures that individuals have fair warning of applicable laws and guards against vindictive legislative action.” Id. at 2085. And “[e]ven where these concerns are not directly implicated, … the Clause also safeguards ‘a fundamental Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 13 fairness interest … in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.’” Id. (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (explaining that the Ex Post Facto Clauses “assure that federal and state legisla- tures [are] restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation” and that “legislative enactments give fair warn- ing of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed”) (internal quotation omitted)). Crucially here, the government argued in Peugh that be- cause the post-Booker Guidelines are advisory, they “lack sufficient legal effect” to be considered “law” for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085; id. at 2086 (“The Government … argues … that the Guidelines are too much like guideposts and not enough like fences to give rise to an ex post facto violation.”). The Court emphatically reject- ed that argument, explaining that “[t]he post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process of appellate review.” Id. at 2083. This “anchoring” effect, the Court said, is enough to implicate the concerns underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause; the sentencing court’s discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines range “[does] not defeat an ex post facto claim.” Id. at 2081. The Court explicitly listed the procedural rules and ap- pellate-review standards that give the post-Booker Guidelines a degree of “binding legal effect” sufficient to raise ex post facto concerns. Id. at 2086. District judges must begin their 14 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 sentencing analysis with the Guidelines and correctly calcu- late the applicable sentencing range. Id. at 2083 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). Failure to correctly calculate the Guidelines range is procedural error. Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Variances above or below the range must be specifically justified, and more justification is need- ed as the variance increases. Id. In short, even though “a district court may ultimately sentence a given defendant outside the … range,” the Guidelines retain “force” as the “framework for sentencing.” Id. “Indeed, the rule that an incorrect Guidelines calculation is procedural error ensures that they remain the starting point for every sentencing calculation … .” Id. And perhaps most importantly, reviewing courts may presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Id. Our circuit has adopted such a presumption. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness [on appeal].”). With all these formal procedural requirements, the post- Booker Guidelines, though ultimately advisory, are not “merely a volume that the district court reads with academic interest in the course of sentencing.” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2087. To the contrary, the Guidelines have real-world conse- quences despite their demotion to advisory status. Peugh pointed to “considerable empirical evidence” establishing that the Guidelines continue to have “the intended effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges.” Id. at 2084. Data from the Sentencing Commission “indicate that when a Guidelines range moves up or down, offenders’ sentences Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 15 move with it.” Id. As the Court put it very recently, “[t]hese sources confirm that the Guidelines are not only the starting point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also the lodestar.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). This combination of formal legal requirements and real- world effects led the Court to conclude that the Guidelines, though advisory, are not immune from Ex Post Facto Clause scrutiny. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court went on to hold that “[a] retrospective increase in the Guidelines range … creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to constitute an ex post facto violation.” Id. It should be clear from this discussion that Tichenor’s sec- ond premise—that the Guidelines’ advisory status insulates them from vagueness challenges—did not survive Peugh. The Court held, after all, that the Guidelines are sufficiently law-like to trigger Ex Post Facto protection. If the Guidelines are constraining enough to require compliance with the Ex Post Facto Clause, it follows that they are constraining enough to require compliance with the Due Process Clause’s prohibition against vague laws. We see no principled way to distinguish Peugh on doctrinal grounds: The two constitu- tional protections share the same underlying concerns about fair notice and arbitrary governmental action. To the extent that Tichenor relied on Irizarry, Peugh explic- itly considered and rejected the analogy. Irizarry held that district judges are not required to give notice before impos- ing an above-Guidelines sentence based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 553 U.S. at 713. Peugh distin- guished Irizarry this way: 16 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 It is true that we held, in Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–714 … , that a defend- ant does not have an “expectation subject to due process protection” that he will be sen- tenced within the Guidelines range. But … the Ex Post Facto Clause does not merely protect re- liance interests. It also reflects principles of “fundamental justice.” Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531, 120 S. Ct. 1620. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court’s reference to “reliance interests” is shorthand for the fair-notice principle, and its reference to “fundamental justice” captures the Ex Post Facto Clause’s concern about arbitrary governmental action. Vagueness doctrine reflects the same concerns. Indeed, in Johnson the Court concluded that the ACCA’s residual clause both denies fair notice and invites arbitrary enforcement. But the fair-notice principle was mostly in the background; the Court’s chief concern was that the radical indeterminacy of the residual clause made judicial enforcement essentially ad hoc and arbitrary. Irizarry is also distinguishable for another reason. It ad- dressed a question about procedural notice: Must the sentenc- ing court give the defendant notice and an opportunity to respond before imposing an above-Guidelines sentence under § 3553(a)? 553 U.S. at 712–13. Vagueness doctrine and the Ex Post Facto Clause enforce a different notice principle: the substantive requirement that the law must give clear notice of the conduct that it prohibits and the consequences that attach to a violation. See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 909 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining the difference between Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 17 “adversarial notice” and “ex ante notice”). For this addition- al reason, Irizarry doesn’t inform the analysis here. Finally, our dissenting colleagues warn that if vagueness doctrine extends to the advisory Guidelines, then other broad and open-ended provisions are vulnerable—for example, the “sophisticated means” enhancement, § 2B1.1(b)(10); the “vulnerable victim” enhancement, § 3A1.1(b); the “abuse of trust” enhancement, § 3B1.3; and even the foundational concept of “relevant conduct,” § 1B1.3, which applies to all crimes. See Dissent at pp. 27–28. Johnson itself specially addressed this kind of objection and rejected it. The Court explained at length that the vagueness defect in the ACCA’s residual clause is not just its use of indeterminate language; it’s that the clause uses indetermi- nate language and must be applied categorically, without regard to real-world facts. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. The Court could not have been clearer on this point: It’s the combination of indeterminate language and categorical application that makes the clause fatally vague. The same is true of the residual clause in the Guidelines. But the categor- ical feature is unique to the residual clause; other Guidelines provisions are applied to actual facts on the ground. That distinction makes a difference under Johnson. Simply put, after Peugh we can no longer say, as we did in Tichenor, that because the Guidelines are “advice” rather than “rules,” they are immune from challenge on vagueness grounds. Because Tichenor has lost its analytical foundation, we now overrule it. Applying Johnson, we hold that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. With this holding, we join a growing consensus among the circuits. See id. at 907 (applying Johnson to the residual 18 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) and finding it unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that Johnson applies to the career-offender guideline but remanding for determination of the vagueness question). Several other circuits have accepted the govern- ment’s concession without further discussion or assumed without deciding that Johnson applies to the career-offender guideline. See United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2016) (accepting the government’s concession that the § 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague without deciding the issue); United States v. Maldonado, 636 F. App’x 807, 810 & n.1 (2d. Cir. 2016) (assuming without deciding that “the due process concerns that led Johnson to invalidate the ACCA’s residual clause as void for vagueness are equally applicable to the Sentencing Guidelines”); United States v. Townsend, 638 F. App’x 172, 178 & n.14 (3d. Cir. 2015) (invalidating the Guidelines’ residual clause after Johnson without extended discussion of whether the vague- ness doctrine applies). One circuit has declined to apply Johnson to the Guidelines. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2015). 4 C. Remedy For both Hurlburt and Gillespie, the Johnson error pro- duced a Guidelines range that was too high. That’s ordinari- ly enough to satisfy the prejudice requirement of plain-error 4 As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case from the Eleventh Circuit. Beckles v. United States, 616 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-8544). The Beckles panel followed Matchett, the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent on this question. Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 19 review. To establish that the error affected their substantial rights, the defendants must show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343, (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range[,] … the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasona- ble probability of a different outcome absent the error.” Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). This is because the Guidelines “inform and instruct the district court’s determination of an appropriate sentence. In the usual case, then, the systemic function of the selected Guidelines range will affect the sentence.” Id. at 1346. Hurlburt’s 72-month sentence fell below the original Guidelines range but is above the correctly calculated range once the Johnson error is removed. The same is true of Gillespie’s 84-month sentence. The defendants request full remand for resentencing. The government argues for a limited remand akin to the procedure we adopted in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005), for Booker errors. Paladino fashioned a “limited remand to permit the sentencing judge to determine whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his original sentence.” Id. at 484. But we’ve generally rejected the Paladino-style limited-remand procedure when the sentencing error involves a miscalculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range. See United States v. Williams, 742 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2014). “When a district court incorrectly calculates the [G]uideline[s] range, we normally presume the improp- erly calculated [G]uideline[s] range influenced the judge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.” United States v. 20 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014). Neither judge said otherwise here. Accordingly, we VACATE the defendants’ sentences and REMAND for resentencing. Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  21  HAMILTON,  Circuit  Judge,  joined  by  POSNER,  FLAUM,  and  EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, dissenting.  By now the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United  States,  135  S.  Ct.  2551  (2015),  is  familiar  to  all  in  the  federal  criminal justice system. Johnson held that the “residual clause”  in the Armed Career Criminal Act definition of a violent fel‐ ony, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is unconstitutionally vague.  The en banc majority now holds that the reasoning of Johnson  extends to a similar residual clause in an advisory Sentencing  Guideline  on  career  offenders,  holding  the  guideline  provi‐ sion  unconstitutionally  vague.  The  majority  also  overrules  United  States  v.  Tichenor,  683  F.3d  358  (7th Cir.  2012), which  held, correctly in my view, that the advisory Guidelines are  not susceptible to vagueness challenges.  The majority’s holding is both premature and erroneous.  There is no need for us to decide this now. There is already a  circuit split,  and the Supreme Court is  likely to  rule on this  question in the coming term. See United States v. Beckles, 616  Fed. Appx. 415 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2510  (2016),  which  should  be  argued  in  the  autumn  of  2016.  We  should not hurry to send many cases back to district courts  for re‐sentencings that may well prove unnecessary. I respect‐ fully dissent.  The best course at this point would be for this court simply  to wait for the Supreme Court to decide the issue in Beckles. If  we must reach the merits now, we should stick with Tichenor  and agree with the Eleventh Circuit, which decided in United  States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193–96 (11th Cir. 2015), that  the so‐called “residual clause” in the advisory Guideline def‐ inition of a crime of violence, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), is not  unconstitutionally  vague  because  it  is  only  advisory.  Judge  22  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  Pryor’s opinion in Matchett is careful and persuasive. Doctri‐ nal and practical considerations support that view. After all,  how can non‐binding advice be unconstitutionally vague?  To  begin  with  the  doctrine,  the  residual  clauses  in  the  Armed  Career  Criminal  Act  and  the  advisory  Sentencing  Guidelines have identical language, but their legal effects dif‐ fer in a fundamental way. That difference should lead to dif‐ ferent answers on the issue of constitutional vagueness. The  vague  definition  in  the  statute  led  directly  to  higher,  often  much higher, mandatory minimum and maximum sentences.  The most common effect of the Armed Career Criminal Act  provision was to require a fifteen‐year mandatory minimum  sentence for a felon in possession of a firearm when the statu‐ tory maximum was otherwise just ten years. See Johnson, 135  S. Ct. at 2560 (“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn  someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with  the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”).  In  contrast,  the  definition  in  the  advisory  Sentencing  Guidelines  leads  to  no  direct  consequences  of  any  kind.  It  simply gives the sentencing judge advice about an appropri‐ ate sentence. Unlike in statutory cases, the parties are free to  argue that the Guidelines’ advice about the defendant’s crim‐ inal history is either too harsh or too lenient. The judge may  accept the Guidelines’ advice or reject it. In fact, the law re‐ quires  the  judge  to  treat  the  advice  as  only  advice.  A  judge  who presumes the Guidelines’ advice produces a reasonable  sentence  commits  reversible  error.  Gall  v.  United  States,  552  U.S. 38, 50 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).  The doctrinal foundation of the majority opinion is incon‐ sistent with the overall sweep of Supreme Court decisions fol‐ lowing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which held  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  23  the Guidelines advisory as the remedy for the Sixth Amend‐ ment problems with mandatory sentencing rules that require  judicial  fact‐finding.  Since  Booker,  the  Supreme  Court  has  been  trying  to  maintain  a  delicate  balance,  recognizing  that  the difference between “binding law” and “advice” depends  on the different standards of appellate review. See Gall, 552  U.S. at 50–51.  Since Booker, the Court has treated the Guidelines essen‐ tially as advice for almost all purposes, but as closer to bind‐ ing  law  for  just  one.  For  purposes  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  rights to jury trial, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and to  grand jury indictment, the Guidelines are now advice. Booker,  543 U.S. at 245. For purposes of due process notice, they are  advice. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). For  purposes of sentencing policy, they are also advice. Kimbrough  v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110–11 (2007) (sentencing court  could reject guideline advice on ratio of crack and powder co‐ caine sentences).  In one sense, though, the Court has treated the Guidelines  as more law‐like. For purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause,  the Guidelines are closer to the binding law end of the spec‐ trum. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).  The analysis in Peugh was based on the persuasive effect the  Guidelines have, including “anchoring” effects on sentencing  judges. It is not easy to reconcile Peugh with the cases treating  the  Guidelines  as  advisory,  particularly  since  constitutional  doctrine allows completely unguided sentencing discretion, at  least apart from capital cases. Perhaps Peugh is the first sign  of a sea‐change in this area of the law, but given the extensive  24  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  case  law  treating  the  Guidelines  as  truly  advisory,  that  re‐ mains to be seen.1  If the Supreme Court extends the rationale of Peugh, as the  majority does here, and embraces wholeheartedly the concept  that the Guidelines are like laws, that result would be difficult  to reconcile with the Booker remedy, which spared the Guide‐ lines from Sixth Amendment challenges by making them ad‐ visory. The delicate doctrinal balance the Court has tried to  maintain  since  Booker  would  be  threatened  by  extending  vagueness jurisprudence to the advisory Guidelines.  In Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016),  the Supreme Court held that Johnson is retroactive, applicable  on  collateral  review  of  federal  sentences  under  28  U.S.C.  § 2255. If Johnson is extended to the advisory Guidelines, the  argument will be powerful for applying that new holding ret‐                                                   1 In extending Johnson to the Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit has tried to split  hairs even more finely, saying that for one due process notice purpose— “adversarial notice”—the Guidelines are advisory, as in Irizarry, while for  a  supposedly  different  due  process  notice  purpose—“ex  ante  notice”— they are closer to binding laws. United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 909– 10 (6th Cir. 2016). This distinction cannot withstand scrutiny. The hypoth‐ esis  of  “ex  ante  notice”  is  that  a  person  deciding  whether  to  commit  a  crime is entitled to know what punishment the law prescribes. The answer  is the statutory sentencing range, regardless of the Guidelines. The hypo‐ thetically rational candidate for prosecution should know already there is  no guarantee of a guideline sentence. Under Booker, Gall, Kimbrough, and  § 3553(a), the sentencing court will be free to impose a non‐guideline sen‐ tence for many reasons. That is exactly the same knowledge imputed to a  defendant  and  defense  counsel  on  the  eve  of  sentencing.  Given  that  knowledge, the Court held in Irizarry, due process does not require further  advance  notice  to  the  defense  about  reasons  why  the  sentencing  judge  may be considering not imposing a guideline sentence.  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  25  roactively. If that is the just result, so be it. But we should rec‐ ognize the likely consequences. Federal courts would need to  revisit thousands of previous guideline sentences that relied  on the residual clause in the career criminal guidelines.  And  what  would  be  the  point?  The  difference  between  statutory mandates and advisory Guidelines means that the  practical consequences of the vagueness holdings differ dra‐ matically. In the Armed Career Criminal Act cases affected by  Johnson, many cases must result in lower sentences, and in vir‐ tually all cases, lighter sentences are reasonably likely on re‐ sentencing.  But  if  guideline  sentences  are  remanded  on  the  theory that Johnson should apply to the advisory Guidelines,  in every case that is remanded the district court will be free to  impose  exactly  the  same  sentence  again.  In  fact,  the  district  courts probably should do so.  To understand why, consider the intellectual gymnastics  required by the “categorical” approach to recidivist enhance‐ ments.  Applying  that  approach,  courts  must  focus  on  ele‐ ments of a prior offense of conviction and must ignore what  the  defendant  actually  did.  The  results  are  often  arbitrary.  See, e.g., Mathis v. United States,  579 U.S. —, 136  S.  Ct. 2243  (2016) (breadth of state burglary statute, which included bur‐ glarizing  vehicles,  meant  that  defendant’s  prior  convictions  for  actually  burglarizing  occupied  houses  did  not  count  as  convictions  of  “violent  felonies”).  Yet  both  before  and  after  Booker, the Guidelines have allowed sentencing judges to ex‐ amine  what  the  defendant  actually  did.  See  18  U.S.C.  § 3553(a)(1) (requiring consideration of “history and charac‐ teristics  of  the  defendant”);  § 3661  (“No  limitation  shall  be  placed on the information concerning the background, char‐ acter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which  26  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  a court of the United States may receive and consider for the  purpose  of  imposing  an  appropriate  sentence.”);  U.S.S.G.  § 4A1.3 cmt. (encouraging departures where guideline crimi‐ nal history is over‐ or under‐representative); cf. United States  v. Sonnenberg, 628 F.3d 361, 367–68 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying  categorical approach  to vacate  career criminal enhancement  but encouraging district judge on remand to consider defend‐ ant’s actual conduct in case of child sex abuse).  As a result, we should expect little gain in terms of fairness  for  defendants  by  telling  sentencing  judges  (a)  they  cannot  use the residual clause in the career offender Guideline, but  (b) they remain free to consider available information about  the defendant’s actual conduct in the earlier crime and to sen‐ tence  accordingly.  In  fact,  they  should  be  doing  so  already.  The  judge’s  job  is  first  to  calculate  the  guideline  range  but  then to exercise judgment and discretion under § 3553(a) in  light of all the available information.  If  Johnson  is  extended  to  the  Guidelines,  and  if  a  judge  were to reduce the sentence because of such a reversal, that  decision might be evidence that the judge did not do his/her  job at the initial sentencing. No facts would be different, only  the advice that the judge was supposed to evaluate critically  the first time around. Absent new material facts, a different  sentence on remand would tend to show that the judge fol‐ lowed  the  Guidelines  too  mechanically,  perhaps  presuming  they were reasonable without assessing the defendant’s indi‐ vidual history and characteristics and the particular circum‐ stances of the case.2                                                    2 Federal prisoners who were sentenced as career offenders based on the  residual clause before Booker, while the Guidelines were still considered  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  27  In considering the consequences here, the scope of the ma‐ jority’s vagueness holding under the Guidelines will also be  difficult to limit. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Matchett, if  we  extend  due  process  vagueness  doctrine  to  the  advisory  Guidelines, many guideline sentences will be subject to chal‐ lenge. 802 F.3d at 1196. I do not see a principled way to avoid  extending  such  a  holding  beyond  the  residual  clause  in  the  crime of violence definition to other provisions in the Guide‐ lines that are at least as vague if not more so.  Consider,  for  example,  the  enhancements  for  “sophisti‐ cated means” in fraud crimes, § 2B1.1(b)(10); the “vulnerable  victim” in § 3A1.1(b) (defined as someone who is “unusually  vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who  is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct”— which sounds a lot like a residual clause); aggravating roles  in § 3B1.1 (based on “otherwise extensive” criminal activity);  or “abuse of trust” under § 3B1.3. Many departure provisions  in Part 5K of the Guidelines are quite vague, as is the provi‐ sion in § 4A1.3 for over‐ or under‐representative criminal his‐ tory. Even the fundamental concept of “relevant conduct” in  § 1B1.3 could easily be challenged as vague if we are worried  about  whether  defendants  have  fair  notice  of  the  conse‐ quences  of  their  crimes.  Yet  this  pervasive  vagueness  in  Guideline provisions is not a bug in the system. It is a feature.  It is intended to provide sentencing judges with needed flex‐ ibility.                                                    binding, might have a much stronger argument for extending Johnson to  their  sentences.  These  cases  do  not  present  that  issue,  and  I  express  no  views on it.  28  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  Perhaps one might draw a line between the residual clause  and  every  other  provision  of  the  advisory  Guidelines,  by  simply declaring that the result is limited to categorical deter‐ minations rather than application of vague standards to spe‐ cific facts. But it is difficult to see a principled basis for such a  limited  rule,  particularly  since  § 3553(a)  already  calls  upon  judges to take into account the real‐world facts of prior con‐ victions. The majority has opened the door to vagueness chal‐ lenges  to  any  advisory  Guidelines.  As  a  matter  of  broader  constitutional  doctrine,  including  the  difference  between  binding  and  advisory  Guidelines  that  is  essential  to  the  Court’s  Sixth  Amendment  jurisprudence,  it  would  be  more  sound to maintain instead the distinction between vague sen‐ tencing  advice  (permitted)  and  a  vague  sentencing  statute  with mandatory consequences (not permitted).  After  all,  judges  can  find  vague  sentencing  advice  from  many sources. Section 3553(a)(2) tells judges in a vague and  contradictory  way  to  follow  several  conflicting  theories  of  punishment at once, so that a sentence should reflect the seri‐ ousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide  just  punishment, afford adequate deterrence to crimes, pro‐ tect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and reha‐ bilitate the defendant. Judges can find further vague or inde‐ terminate advice about sentencing in law review articles, phil‐ osophical reflections on crime and punishment, advice from  probation  officers  and  law  clerks,  and  even  from  appellate  opinions.  The  fact  that  some  of  the  advice  may  be  vague  should not render the sentence unconstitutional.  I recognize that the Guidelines have a special, elevated sta‐ tus among those other available sources of advice, but they do  Nos. 14‐3611 & 15‐1686  29  remain advisory. And as we and later the Supreme Court con‐ sider the vagueness issue here, it is worth remembering that  one simple remedy to a regime of somewhat vague advisory  Guidelines would be to eliminate some or all of the advice and  to leave sentencing judges to their own devices. The permis‐ sibility of such discretion has been consistent in all of the Su‐ preme  Court’s  recent  sentencing  decisions  under  the  Sixth  Amendment,  from  Apprendi  v.  New  Jersey,  530  U.S.  466,  481  (2000); id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), through Booker,  543 U.S. at 233, and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. —, —, 133  S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013).  Such unguided discretion would be the vaguest regime of  all. Defendants would face even greater uncertainty about po‐ tential sentences and even greater risk of arbitrary variation  in sentences. Yet that is all perfectly constitutional. Why not  allow some vagueness in the Guidelines, whose advisory sta‐ tus is essential to avoid Sixth Amendment violations?  Another permissible remedy would be to impose manda‐ tory sentences by statute, denying judges any flexibility. But  stripping sentencing judges of discretion leads to other unfor‐ tunate  results,  including  delegating  sentencing  decisions  to  prosecutors’  charging  decisions.  Better  to  leave  the  Guide‐ lines as true guidelines, despite their vagueness and flexibil‐ ity.