This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0191
LaQuinn Jamul Williams, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed August 29, 2016
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-12-9837
LaQuinn Jamul Williams, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JESSON, Judge
In this postconviction appeal, appellant LaQuinn Williams challenges the district
court’s summary denial of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s claims, we affirm.
FACTS
In December of 2012, Williams went to an apartment complex to pick up his son.
His ex-girlfriend, F.G., and her fiancé, E.S., brought the child out of the apartment for the
exchange. Upon learning that F.G. took the child for a haircut, Williams became enraged
and began threatening F.G. E.S. attempted to intervene. F.G. noticed that Williams was
carrying a gun, and she tried to pull E.S. toward the apartment building while Williams
was busy strapping the child into a car seat. Williams jumped out of the car and fired
multiple shots. At first Williams fired into the air, but, as F.G. and E.S. ran back to the
apartment building, F.G. looked back and saw Williams shooting at them.
A jury found Williams guilty of two counts of second-degree assault. The district
court sentenced him to two consecutive 36-month prison terms. On September 2, 2014,
this court issued an opinion affirming Williams’s convictions and sentences. State v.
Williams, No. A13-2037, 2014 WL 4288993 (Minn. App. Sept. 2, 2014), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 25, 2014).
On September 10, 2015, Williams filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief and
requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied his motion without a hearing.
This pro se appeal follows.
DECISION
This court reviews the summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). A postconviction court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.
State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 357 (Minn. 2012). An evidentiary hearing may be
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denied if the petitioner fails to allege facts that entitle him to the requested relief. Lussier
v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. 2014).
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims and his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-
counsel claims. The district court determined that Williams’s trial-counsel claims were
procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla because he failed to bring them in his direct
appeal. 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). The district court rejected
Williams’s appellate-counsel claims because Williams failed to show that his
representation on appeal was unreasonable or caused him prejudice. We address each
claim in turn, beginning with Williams’s trial-counsel claims.
Trial Counsel
A petition for postconviction relief filed after a direct appeal may not be based on
grounds that could have been raised in the direct appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1
(2014). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that, once a direct appeal has been
taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be
considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” Knaffla, 309 Minn. at
252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Nevertheless, an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim that
is known but not raised at the time of direct appeal may be brought in a postconviction
petition “if review of the claim requires consideration of facts outside those in the trial
court record.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Minn. 2016).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must show
“(1) that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
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and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). An attorney provides reasonable assistance when the
attorney exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would exercise under the circumstances. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn.
2014). Counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable. Id. at 266.
Williams argues that his trial attorney was ineffective because he (1) failed to obtain
records showing that Williams was never convicted of assaulting his estranged wife;
(2) failed to introduce E.S.’s robbery convictions for impeachment and to support
Williams’s self-defense claim; (3) failed to introduce F.G.’s criminal record to impeach
her testimony and to support his self-defense claim; (4) failed to call witnesses to show
Williams’s good character; and (5) failed to properly cross-examine, object to, or call
witnesses to rebut F.G.’s testimony about her relationship with Williams.
Williams first claims that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to
provide the district court with documents showing that Williams was not convicted of
assaulting his estranged wife. In his direct appeal, Williams claimed that the district court
erred by admitting evidence of this assault as relationship evidence under Minnesota
Statutes section 634.20 (2012). Williams, 2014 WL 4288993, at *2. Section 634.20 allows
the state to introduce evidence that the defendant has committed other acts of domestic
abuse against the victim of the current offense or against other family or household
members. Minn. Stat. § 634.20. We concluded that the evidence of the previous assault
“fits squarely within” that statute. Williams, 2014 WL 4288993, at *2. Now Williams
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argues that his counsel was at fault for not presenting documents to show that he was never
convicted of this assault. But the fact that Williams was never convicted of assaulting his
estranged wife—he also was never acquitted of doing so—does not make the evidence
inadmissible. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (providing that relationship evidence “is admissible
unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”
or other listed factors); see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004)
(concluding that evidence submitted under section 634.20 need not meet the clear-and-
convincing standard of proof). Moreover, Williams’s attorney did argue to the district
court that Williams was never convicted of committing this assault. The attorney’s failure
to bolster this argument with documentation does not establish that his performance was
objectively unreasonable.
Second, Williams claims that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to
present E.S.’s 2000 and 2001 robbery convictions both for impeachment purposes and to
support Williams’s self-defense claim. But the attorney did attempt to introduce the
convictions for impeachment. The district court declined to admit them because of their
age and because it admitted two of E.S.’s other convictions and believed admitting these
additional convictions would be unnecessarily cumulative. Although Williams’s attorney
did not introduce the convictions to support Williams’s self-defense claim, evidence of
prior acts of violence by the victim is admissible to support a defendant’s self-defense
claim only if the defendant was aware of the prior acts at the time of the offense. State v.
Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 202 (Minn. 2006). As this court held in Williams’s direct
appeal, there is no evidence in the record that Williams knew of E.S.’s robbery convictions
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when he shot at E.S. and F.G. Williams, 2014 WL 4288993, at *3. E.S.’s prior robbery
convictions therefore do not support Williams’s self-defense claim, and he has not shown
that by failing to present them his attorney performed below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Williams next argues that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to
impeach F.G. and bolster Williams’s self-defense claim with F.G.’s prior criminal
convictions. But Williams has not shown that F.G. has any convictions that would have
been admissible for impeachment under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609. There is also
no evidence that, at the time of his offense, Williams was aware of any violent acts
committed by F.G. that would have supported his self-defense claim. See Penkaty, 708
N.W.2d at 202. In fact, Williams’s testimony at trial indicated that his self-defense claim
was based on his fear of E.S., not F.G. The attorney’s failure to introduce F.G.’s criminal
convictions does not demonstrate that the attorney’s performance was objectively
unreasonable.
Williams’s final two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel involve his
attorney’s failure to call character witnesses and failure to properly cross-examine, object
to, or call witnesses to impeach F.G.’s testimony about her relationship with Williams. But
these are questions of trial strategy that are not subject to an ineffective-assistance claim.
“[W]hat evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are
part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and
will generally not be reviewed later for competence.” Carridine v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488,
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494 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Trial strategy also includes the extent of cross-
examination. Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 2010).
Even if Williams had established that his attorney’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, which he has not, Williams cannot show that the
result of his trial would have been different but for the alleged deficiencies. The evidence
of Williams’s guilt was very strong. F.G., E.S., and a bystander testified that Williams
fired several shots toward F.G. and E.S. without provocation as they ran into F.G.’s
apartment building. The witness testimony was supported by bullet fragments and bullet
holes found in and around the exterior of the building. Although he claimed he did so in
self-defense and only fired the gun into the air, Williams admitted at trial to firing his gun
during the confrontation in front of F.G.’s apartment. He testified that he believed E.S.
had a gun and was threatening to shoot him but admitted that he never saw E.S. with a gun.
We do not believe that exclusion or impeachment of relationship evidence, presentation of
E.S.’s and F.G.’s prior convictions, or character witnesses could have overcome this strong
evidence of guilt.
Williams’s claims that his trial attorney was ineffective are meritless. He has failed
to establish both that his attorney’s performance did not meet an objective standard of
reasonableness and that the result of his trial would have been different if not for the
attorney’s alleged errors.
Moreover, because his trial-counsel claims were known at the time of direct appeal,
can be decided on the basis of the trial record, and were not brought on direct appeal, they
are also procedurally barred. See Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 369. The district court did not
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abuse its discretion by summarily denying Williams’s motion for postconviction relief as
to these claims.
Appellate Counsel
Williams argues that his appellate attorney was ineffective because she failed to
raise the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims addressed above on direct appeal.
But appellate counsel is not required to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim if the claim has no merit. Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 745 (Minn. 2013).
Because Williams’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are without merit, his
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims also fail.
Affirmed.
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