NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 15-1948
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER STEIBING,
a/k/a Amanda Fox, a/k/a/ Cory,
Christopher Steibing,
Appellant
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-14-cr-00256-001)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on February 8, 2016
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 1, 2016)
________________
OPINION*
________________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Christopher Steibing pled guilty to one count of coercion and
enticement of a minor to engage in sexual conduct and received a 336-month prison
sentence. He argues that this sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
District Court failed to meaningfully consider the mitigating factor of his cooperation.
We disagree and will affirm.
I.
Steibing used various online aliases to coerce his ex-girlfriend’s 13-year-old
daughter into sending him multiple pornographic photographs of herself. When the
victim refused to submit more images, Steibing blackmailed her, e-mailed the
photographs to the victim’s family members, and posted the photos on image-sharing
websites.
After his arrest but prior to being charged, Steibing tried to assist the government
by soliciting images from an acquaintance whom Steibing believed was involved in
distributing child pornography. The acquaintance, however, did not provide any child
pornography in response.
Steibing pleaded guilty to one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to
engage in sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The guideline range for
his conduct was 360 months to life imprisonment. Steibing moved for a downward
variance based on mitigating factors such as his undiagnosed bipolar disorder, his history
of drug abuse, and his attempt to assist the government in identifying other individuals
2
engaged in similar conduct. The District Court sentenced Steibing to 336 months’
imprisonment—24 months below the advisory guidelines range. Steibing now appeals
the District Court’s sentence.
II.1
The parties do not dispute that Steibing failed to preserve his sentencing objections
at the time of his sentencing. We therefore review the sentencing decision for plain
error.2 Reversible plain error exists only if the error is “clear under current law,” affected
“substantial rights,” and “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”3
At sentencing, the “record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful
consideration” to the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).4 These factors include the
nature of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the
sentence imposed to provide just punishment, deter others, and protect the public from
the defendant.5 The “record must show a true, considered exercise of discretion on the
part of a district court, including a recognition of, and response to, the parties’ non-
frivolous arguments.”6
1
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
2
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2014).
3
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 , 736(1993); see also Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds
by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
5
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
6
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006).
3
Steibing claims that the District Court erred by failing to meaningfully address his
sincere efforts to cooperate with the FBI. While it is true that the District Court did not
specifically mention Steibing’s cooperation efforts when granting a downward variance,
“[a] sentencing court need not analyze explicitly every argument that a defendant puts
forward.”7 The judge mentioned the numerous years Steibing’s bipolar disorder went
undiagnosed, his past drug addiction, and his attempts to change his life, all
considerations within the penumbra of § 3553(a). The judge also expressed his belief
that Steibing had “undergone belatedly a change in [his] life.”8 As an example of such
change, Steibing’s counsel pointed to his cooperation efforts. The judge’s statements
were more than adequate to explain the reasons for the variance and demonstrate the
“meaningful consideration” our cases require.
Even if we were to agree that the District Court should have more explicitly
addressed Steibing’s cooperation efforts, Steibing has not made the “specific showing of
prejudice” that plain-error review requires.9 Under this standard, Steibing must prove
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, a different result would have
occurred.10 The most Steibing can do, however, is speculate that he “may very well”
have received a further variance from the guideline range if the judge had expressly
considered his failed cooperation efforts.11 Wishful thinking is not a substitute for
evidence of actual prejudice. Steibing already received a downward variance despite
7
United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 397 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
8
J.A. 104.
9
Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
10
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2004).
11
Def. Br. 17.
4
committing a string of heinous acts against a minor child, in part because the judge saw
evidence of improvement in Steibing’s behavior. We think it unlikely that the District
Court would have reduced Steibing’s sentence even further on the basis of his brief,
failed cooperation efforts. Steibing certainly has not provided evidence that could
convince us otherwise, and that failure is fatal to his argument.
Steibing also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence based on
the District Court’s alleged failure to consider his cooperation efforts. Because the
District Court meaningfully considered Steibing’s arguments, his substantive challenge
fails. Further, his sentence of 336 months is substantively reasonable given the § 3553(a)
factors.12
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
12
Cf. United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 196 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming a sentence of
30 years where the defendant, among other things, created pornographic pictures of her
young daughter and solicited someone to have sex with her daughter).
5