J-S55005-16
2016 PA Super 199
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANTHONY BALDWIN
Appellant No. 3374 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Dated May 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0039618-2013
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 01, 2016
Anthony Baldwin appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County, which denied his petition for writ of certiorari of the
denial of his motion to suppress and the judgment of sentence entered by
the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. After careful review, we affirm.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On October 11, 2013, at
approximately 7:00 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officers Colin Goshert and
Jeffrey Thompson were on routine patrol near East Ashmead and Wakefield
Streets when Officer Goshert saw Baldwin, who was in a parking lot, pass
behind a van. The officer believed that Baldwin might have discarded
something behind the vehicle. This raised concerns because the police
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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consider 200 East Ashmead Street to be a problem area based on a high
number of reports of drug and gun crimes.
The officers pulled their marked patrol car into the lot without use of
lights or sirens, and did not block Baldwin’s path. After searching the area
behind the van, and not observing any contraband, Officer Goshert
approached Baldwin and requested his identification. Baldwin voluntarily
provided his identification, which Officer Goshert ran through the National
Criminal Information Center (“NCIC”) and the Pennsylvania Criminal
Intelligence Center (“PaCIC”). Baldwin had open traffic-related warrants out
for his arrest; the officers took him into custody. During the course of a
search incident to arrest, police found two clear jars of marijuana and
twenty-five and one-half Xanax pills on his person.
On December 18, 2013, Baldwin litigated a motion to suppress in
Municipal Court arguing that his stop was unsupported by reasonable
suspicion. The court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to a
stipulated trial, at the conclusion of which the court found Baldwin guilty of
possession of a controlled substance (Xanax)1 and possession of a small
amount of marijuana.2
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
2
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31).
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The court sentenced Baldwin to six months’ reporting probation for
possession of a controlled substance. No further penalty was imposed for
the marijuana conviction. On January 24, 2014, Baldwin filed a petition for
a writ of certiorari asserting that the Municipal Court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. The Court of Common Pleas held argument on May 8,
2014, at the conclusion of which it denied the writ.
This timely appeal followed in which Baldwin raises the following issue
for our review:
Did not the lower court err by denying Baldwin’s petition for writ
of certiorari, thereby, affirming the denial of the motion to
suppress physical evidence in this matter where the police did
not have reasonable suspicion to stop Baldwin after seeing him
do nothing more than walk behind a van parked on a public
street in Philadelphia?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
Our standard of review when assessing a challenge to the denial of a
motion to suppress is well-established. Review is limited to whether the
record supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Where the record supports the
factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those findings and
reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Id. When the
appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the legal conclusions of the suppression court are not binding on
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the appellate court, which must determine if the law was properly applied to
the facts. Id.
An interaction between police officers and a citizen can be classified
using three categories to measure the degree of intrusion on a case-by-case
basis.
Traditionally, this Court has recognized three categories of
encounters between citizens and the police. These categories
include (1) a mere encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and
(3) custodial detentions. The first of these, a “mere encounter”
(or request for information), which need not be supported by
any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop
or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be
supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a
stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest. Finally, an arrest or ‘custodial detention” must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations omitted).
When a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of
physical force or a show of authority, an investigative detention has
occurred. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 723 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. 1994). An
investigative detention constitutes a seizure of a person and activates the
protections of the Fourth Amendment and the requirements of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968). Lewis, supra at 622-23. To determine
whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an investigatory detention,
we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure
of the person involved.
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To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider
all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have
communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not
free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the
encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether,
considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have thought he
was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.
Collins, supra at 1046-47 (citation omitted.)
In Collins, a state trooper was traveling down a road when he saw a
car parked at an overlook. Concerned for the safety of the driver and
passenger, he pulled to the right of the vehicle with his headlights shining
into the passenger compartment. The trooper did not block the vehicle from
leaving. While the trooper was speaking to the driver and passenger, the
passenger, Collins, blurted out that they had been smoking marijuana. The
trooper then noticed a bong between the seats and the smell of marijuana.
The trooper seized the bong and obtained consent to search the vehicle.
Collins was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial
court granted his motion to suppress, after which the Commonwealth filed
an appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). On appeal, this court reversed,
holding that the interaction began as an act of official assistance rather than
an investigative detention. It was only after Collins blurted out that he was
smoking marijuana that the encounter rose to an investigative detention
supported by reasonable suspicion.
In Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1003 (Pa. 2012), an officer
approached a vehicle stopped in the parking lot of a closed business in the
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early morning hours. Finding six occupants in the vehicle he asked if
everyone was 18 years old, and when he found out they were not, he asked
for identification. When the front seat passenger took his identification out
of the glove box, two packets of marijuana fell out. The officer then opened
the driver’s door and asked for his identification. At that time, he saw drugs
on that side of the vehicle. Both the driver and front seat passenger were
arrested.
Our Supreme Court in Au determined that the request for
identification did not raise the level of the encounter to an investigative
detention. “Under Fourth Amendment law as reflected in the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, a request for identification is not to be
regarded as escalatory in terms of the coercive aspects of a police-citizen
encounter.” Au, supra at 1007. The officer’s cruiser did not block the
defendant’s vehicle from leaving the parking lot, and the officer did not use
lights or sirens. In the absence of escalating factors, the approach of the
vehicle was a mere encounter, which did not rise to the level of an
investigative detention prior to the discovery of illicit drugs. Id.
In Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. 2014), two
officers in a marked car approached two men sitting on the steps of a vacant
building. Police asked the men why they were loitering, and requested their
identification. While an officer copied Lyles’ information, Lyles put his hand
in his pocket on several occasions despite the officer’s warning to stop doing
so. Concerned that Lyles might be reaching for a concealed weapon, the
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officer frisked him. Lyles continued to place his hand in his pocket, and the
officer forcibly removed it, at which time packets filled with cocaine became
visible. Lyles was arrested and filed a motion to suppress, which the trial
court granted. Our Court reversed the trial court, and on further appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed our decision. Lyles, like Collins and Au, confirmed
that the mere request for identification does not in itself create an
investigatory detention. It is only where the request for identification is
coupled with a restraint of liberty, physical force or show of authority that a
detention occurs. Lyles, supra at 306.
In the instant matter, Baldwin was in a parking lot when Officers
Goshert and Thompson observed him. Baldwin passed behind a van and the
officers lost sight of him. Believing that Baldwin may have discarded
something, the officers pulled their marked patrol car into the parking lot,
but did not block Baldwin’s path. After searching the area behind the van,
Officer Goshert approached Baldwin and asked to see his identification.
Baldwin argues that by taking his identification, Officer Goshert detained
him. The relevant case law does not support this assertion.
When the officers entered the parking lot, as in Au and Collins, they
did so without activating sirens or lights. The officers did not block the path
out of the parking lot. Unlike Au and Collins, the officers went first to the
area behind the van; they did not immediately approach Baldwin. Only after
searching the area did police approach Baldwin and ask for his identification.
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The totality of the circumstances test requires that for an investigatory
detention to exist, there must be “physical force or a show of authority” to
activate Fourth Amendment protections. Lewis, at 619. In Au, Collins and
Lyles, the absence of a show of force or authority was critical. As in those
cases, the manner in which police approached Baldwin lacked the coercive
elements of an investigatory stop. Therefore, the request for identification
was a mere encounter.
The Court of Common Pleas properly concluded that the Municipal
Court did not err in denying Baldwin’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the
denial of the writ of certiorari is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/1/2016
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