MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Sep 02 2016, 8:56 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm Anna Kirkman
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the September 2, 2016
Commitment of H.F., Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Respondent, 49A02-1602-MH-335
Appeal from the Marion Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Steven Eichholtz,
Eskenazi Health/Midtown, Judge
Clinic, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner. 49D08-1601-MH-1348
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] In January 2016, police officers transported forty-seven-year-old H.F. to
Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health (“Eskenazi”) after she
displayed disruptive behavior at two downtown Indianapolis hotels. An
Eskenazi psychiatrist diagnosed H.F. with bipolar I disorder, citing H.F.’s odd
behavior, delusions, and illogical thinking. Eskenazi then petitioned for the
temporary involuntary civil commitment of H.F. in order to provide treatment.
Following a hearing, the trial court ordered H.F. be committed to Eskenazi for
a period not to exceed ninety days. H.F. now appeals, raising the sole issue of
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s temporary civil
commitment order. Concluding the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2009, H.F. was involuntarily committed to St. Vincent Hospital after
suffering from suicidal thoughts and depression. In August 2015, H.F. was
arrested after spitting on her husband’s face. Following her arrest, H.F. was
admitted to Community Hospital North due to her “manic” state. Transcript at
10. In September 2015, H.F. stopped taking her medications and attending her
doctor’s appointments.
[3] On the morning of January 10, 2016, H.F. visited a downtown Indianapolis
hotel. There, she became disruptive and refused security’s requests to leave the
premises. Police officers arrived and escorted H.F. from the hotel. Unable to
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open her vehicle door due to freezing temperatures, H.F. “started licking it to
try and open the door.” Id. at 7. H.F. then travelled to another hotel and again
became disruptive. After being escorted out of the hotel, H.F. was apprehended
by police officers. Police officers then escorted H.F. to Eskenazi where she
received treatment from psychiatrist Sarah Lark. Dr. Lark diagnosed H.F. with
Bipolar I disorder and attempted to treat her. However, H.F. refused to take
her prescribed medication and her disruptive behavior continued in the
hospital.
[4] On January 13, 2016, Eskenazi filed a petition seeking to involuntarily commit
H.F. to Eskenazi. On January 19, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the
matter. Dr. Lark testified H.F. exhibited symptoms of delusions and illogical
thoughts. For example, when Dr. Lark attempted to discuss Bipolar I disorder
with H.F., H.F. began talking about polar bears and igloos. Further, H.F. did
not sleep, attempted to have sex with her husband in front of hospital staff,
made sexual comments to hospital staff, and could not hold a logical
conversation. H.F. had taken only one dose of one of the prescribed
medications while hospitalized because she claimed “the medicines collide with
her brain and that [Dr. Lark] should give them to the people in Haiti.” Id. at
14. Dr. Lark opined H.F.’s judgment is severely impaired, and if left untreated,
H.F. could be arrested again or relapse into a depressed and suicidal state. Dr.
Lark concluded H.F. is gravely disabled, and without treatment, a danger to
herself. H.F. also testified at the hearing. On the same day, the trial court
noted H.F.’s testimony indicated her thoughts are “very disorganized” and
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ordered H.F. involuntarily committed for treatment for a period not exceeding
ninety days.1 Id. at 30. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Mootness
[5] H.F. acknowledges her ninety-day involuntary commitment to Eskenazi
hospital has expired and therefore this case is moot. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-
11. Generally, a case is deemed moot and usually dismissed when a court is
unable to render effective relief to a party. R.P. v. Optional Behaviors MHS, 26
N.E.3d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Because H.F. has been released from
her temporary commitment at Eskenazi, this court cannot render effective relief
to her. See id. However, “Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may
be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case
involves questions of great public interest. Typically, cases falling in the ‘great
public interest’ exception contain issues likely to recur.” Id. (citation omitted).
We have previously acknowledged the issue of whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a person is gravely disabled and in need of involuntary
commitment is a matter of great public importance that is likely to recur. See id.
Therefore, we will address the merits of H.F.’s claim.
1
H.F. has since been released from Eskenazi.
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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] H.F. argues Eskenazi failed to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to establish she was gravely disabled. When reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we look to the evidence most favorable to the trial
court’s decision and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If the trial
court’s commitment order represents a conclusion a reasonable person could
have drawn, the order must be affirmed, even if other reasonable conclusions
are possible. Id. at 1036.
[7] In Indiana, a person may be involuntarily committed if the petitioner proves by
clear and convincing evidence “(1) the individual is mentally ill and either
dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that
individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e).2 Indiana Code section 12-
7-2-96 defines “gravely disabled” as,
a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is
in danger of coming to harm because the individual:
(1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food,
clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or
(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious
deterioration of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or
2
H.F. does not challenge whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion she suffers
from a mental illness or whether commitment was appropriate.
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behavior that results in the individual’s inability to
function independently.[3]
In determining whether the totality of the circumstances supports an
involuntary commitment, we consider the gravity of the behavior leading to the
hospital admission, the behavior in the hospital, and the relationship between
problematic behaviors and the person’s mental illness. R.P., 26 N.E.3d at 1035.
[8] Here, H.F. has previously been involuntarily committed to hospitals for
treatment, most recently in August 2015. Shortly following her release from
involuntary commitment in 2015, H.F. stopped taking her medication, which
resulted in her current manic state. Given H.F.’s current conduct and
condition, Dr. Lark opined H.F.’s judgment is severely impaired. H.F. has
again refused to take her prescribed medications, and if this continues, Dr. Lark
fears H.F. could be arrested or relapse into a depressed and suicidal state. In
addition, as the trial court noted, H.F.’s testimony evidences her incoherent,
illogical, and disorganized state of mind. Based on this evidence, a reasonable
person could conclude H.F. is gravely disabled and a danger to herself.
Therefore, Eskenazi presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
order.
3
Because section 12-7-2-96 is written in the disjunctive, clear and convincing evidence establishing only one
of the two prongs is sufficient to establish H.F. is gravely disabled. We therefore only address the second
prong.
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Conclusion
[9] We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s involuntary
commitment order. Accordingly, we affirm.
[10] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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